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ADJUDICATIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
* Christopher J. Peters 
While political speech-speech intended to influence political decisions-is 
afforded the highest protection under the First Amendment, adjudicative 
speech-speech intended to influence court decisions-is regularly and 
systematically constrained by rules of evidence, canons of professional ethics, 
judicial gag orders, and similar devices. Yet court decisions can be as important, 
both to the litigants and to society at large, as political decisions. How then can 
our practice of severely constraining adjudicative speech be justified as consistent 
with First Amendment principles? 
This Article attempts to answer that question in a way that is informative 
about both the adjudicative process and the nature of free speech under the First 
Amendment. The author first explores, and rejects, a number of possible 
theoretical justifications for the relative lack of protection afforded adjudi~ 
cative speech. He then offers a more satisfactory explanation that relies in part 
on the connection between participation and political legitimacy . Restrictions on 
adjudicative speech, he argues, are necessary to preserve the opportunity for all 
litigants to fully and fairly participate in the decisionmaking process, and to 
maintain judicial subservience to general policies generated by processes 
(legislation, constitutional lawmaking, the common law) that are more politically 
legitimate than ad hoc judicial policymaking. 
The author then applies this justification of adjudicative speech restrictions 
to several recent controversies involving adjudicative speech. He contends that 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a 
congressional ban on the use of Legal Services Corporation funds to challenge 
state welfare laws, was correctly decided; that court rules prohibiting the citation 
of unpublished opinions are unconstitutional; and that the Court was wrong to 
strike down Minnesota's regulation of judicial campaign speech in Republican 
Party v. White. 
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underlying issues, I thank Matt Adler, Tony Dillof, Chris Eisgruber, Peter Henning, Tim Iglesias, 
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law schools of the University of Michigan and Wayne State University, and the discussants at the 
First Annual Constitutional Theory Conference at Vanderbilt University Law School. I 
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workshops and to Matt Adler, Rebecca Brown, and Barry Friedman for organizing the 
conference and inviting me to present a precursor of this paper. For generous research 
support, I thank Dean Joan Mahoney and The David Adamany Endowment at Wayne State 
University Law School. For support that is less quantifiable but no less valuable, I thank my wife, 
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Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that the constraints regularly 
imposed on adjudicative speech, designed to preserve the political legitimacy of 
adjudication, imply the propriety of similar constraints on political speech where 
necessary to preserve the legitimacy of democratic politics. Thus the author sug-
gests that the regulation of campaign funding, mass media, and hate speech might 
be justifiable as means of promoting full and fair participation in political life . 
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Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment 
[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our 
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them. 
707 
-Justice Hugo Black, Bridges v. California! 
INTRODUCfrON: FOUR CASES 
At its core, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendmene connects free-
dom of speech with legitimate government decisionmaking. The clause, 
according to the U.S. Supreme Coun, "was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people,") and so the Coun protects "political" speech by applying 
"strict scrutiny" to measures infringing it.4 It probably is no exaggeration to say 
that speech directed to processes of government decisionmaking is the most 
highly protected category of speech in the Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Consider, then, the following four cases, asking yourself which of them 
involves the kind of "political" speech that should be protected by strict scrutiny: 
Case 1. An editorial writer accuses the President of the United States of 
attempting to assume "dictatorial powers." The writer is prosecuted and 
convicted under a federal statute that prohibits the publication of "false, 
scandalous and malicious ... writings against the government of the 
United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the 
President of the United States, with intent to defame ... or to bring 
them ... into contempt or disrepute.,,5 
Case 2. A candidate for election to a state's supreme court distributes 
campaign literature critical of some of the court's prior decisions. The 
candidate is brought before the state's attorney disciplinary board and 
charged with violating provisions of the state's codes of judicial and attor-
ney conduct that forbid a "candidate for a judicial office" to "announce his 
or her views on disputed legal or political issues.,,6 
Case 3. Members of the press seek to report details of a grisly multiple 
murder, including an alleged confession and other evidence that impli-
cates the defendant in custody. The judge presiding over the pending 
murder trial enters a "restrictive order" that prohibits the press, under 
1. 314 U.S. 252, 260(1941). 
2. "Omgressshall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " u.s. CoNST. amend. 1. 
3. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
4. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002). 
5. Alien and Sedition Act of1798, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
6. White, 536 U.s. at 768; see MINN. CoDE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUer Canon 5(A)(3)(d)G) 
(1993); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUerR. 8.2(b) (1993). 
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penalty of contempt, from publicly disclosing those facts before or during 
the tria1.7 
Case 4. An attorney believes certain evidence may convince a federal jury 
to rule in her client's favor and attempts to present that evidence during 
trial. The judge, after ruling that the evidence is not "relevant" pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 401,8 prohibits the attorney from pre-
senting the evidence or referring to it in her arguments on the strength of 
FRE 402, which provides that "[elvidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible.,,9 
In all four cases, someone is being prohibited from or punished for engaging 
in speech; and in all four cases, the basis for the prohibition or punishment is that 
the attempted speech may have an undesirable influence upon a government 
decisionmaking procedure. The editorial writer in Case 1 is being punished 
because his speech might "bring [the President] ... into contempt or disrepute," 
thus impairing the President's chances for reelection or the effectiveness of his 
administration. The judicial candidate in Case 2 is being punished because his 
campaign speech threatens "the impartiality of the state judiciary"IO by poten-
tially "precommitting" him to particular decisions in cases he will hear if elected. 
The members of the press in Case 3 are being prohibited from speaking, under 
threat of contempt, because their speech might engender predisposition or bias 
among jurors or prospective jurors in a pending criminal case. The attorney in 
Case 4 is being prohibited from speaking, also under threat of contempt, because 
her speech might mislead the jury into deciding her client's case based on 
"irrelevant" facts. 
Given the similarities in structure of each of the four cases, the proverbial 
visitor from Mars, assuming he or she {or it?} is generally familiar with the impor-
tance of political speech in our First Amendment jurisprudence, probably would 
assume that all four cases involve specially protected "political" speech-that is, 
speech that has the potential to influence a government decisionmaking process. 
But the visitor from Mars would be wrong. While the Supreme Court has 
indicated that Cases 1, 2, and 3 involve protected political speech, it has never 
even suggested that Case 4 might do so {and has often assumed, mostly implicitly, 
that it does not}. 
Case 1 presents such an obvious infringement of political speech that one 
must go back to 1798 to find it, in the form of the notorious Alien and Sedition 
7. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,542 (1976). 
8. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence."). 
9. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
10. White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
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Acts. While the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of those 
Acts before they were repealed, it has since rather resoundingly condemned 
them. ll Much more recently, the Court has invalidated an "announce clause" 
provision like the one at issue in Case 2 on the ground that it did not survive the 
strict scrutiny applicable to content,based restrictions on political speech.12 And 
the Court has unanimously overturned a "gag order" like the one at issue in Case 
3 as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.13 
But the Court has never even entertained, much less upheld, a challenge to 
FRE 401 or 402, or indeed to any evidentiary rule, on the ground that such rules 
impermissibly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment. 14 
This First Amendment blind spot regarding evidentiary rules is, on 
reflection, quite baffling. Evidentiary rules seem to fit the classic paradigm of 
restrictions-indeed, prior restraints--on political speech. A litigant arguing 
before a court is, in so doing, seeking to influence the decision of a branch of 
government that will directly affect him or her, no less than classic 
beneficiaries of political speech protections-the street comer pamphleteer/5 
the editorial writer,16 the stumping political candidatel7-are seeking by their 
speech to influence government decisions that will affect them. IS Indeed, the 
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the Sedition Act 
was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." 
(footnote omitted)). 
12. See White, 536 U.S. at 774-88; see also infra Part IY.B. 
13. See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570. 
14. Nor have commentators paid much heed to the issue. A notable exception is Frederick 
Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L REv. 687 (1997). Schauer takes restrictions 
on speech in adjudication as a First Amendment given (although he briefly mentions some reasons why 
those restrictions make sense, see id. at 695) and proceeds from that premise to some more general points, 
including: (a) that out-okourt speech by trial participants might present the same dangers as in-court 
speech, see id. at 692-94; and (b) that free speech is in fact restricted in many contexts in our society 
without our thinking that it presents a major First Amendment ptoblem, see id. at 696-97. Myapptoach 
here will be a bit different: I will try to explain in some theoretical detail why we can take restrictions on 
adjudicative speech as a First Amendment given. In doing so, I will focus, as Schauer does not, on the fact 
that adjudication-unlike many other contexts in which speech is heavily restricted-is a government 
decisionmaking process, like legislation or administration. Having done that, I will, among other things, 
expand a bit on Schauer's observation that in-court and out-of-court speech often present similar 
dangers, see infra Part IY.B.l., and on his suggestion that restrictions on speech in adjudication imply the 
legitimacy of restrictions on speech in other contexts as well, see infra Part IV, and the Conclusion. 
15. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating the convictions of 
protest organizers under an ordinance prohibiting distribution ofleaflets on the street). 
16. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (invalidating the contempt conviction 
of a newspaper for publication of editorials commenting on a pending criminal case). 
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal statutory limitations on 
campaign expenditures by political candidates); White, 536 U.S. 765 (invalidating state restrictions on the 
content of candidates' speech during judicial campaigns). 
18. Of course, unless the litigant is appearing pro se, he or she "speaks" in court mostly through his 
or her attorney. This fact is related, I think, to the most convincing justification for restricting adjudicative 
speech, as I explain infra Part IlI.D. 
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litigants in a court case, criminal or civil, are quite likely to be affected by the 
resulting decision more profoundly than most citizens ever will be affected by 
an act of one of the political branches of government. The losing litigant may 
be sent to jail, or forced to pay a large amount of damages, or denied custody of 
a child, or compelled to grant a right-of-way on her property, or made to swallow 
some other rather nasty medicine. 
Of course, each litigant has a chance to directly influence the court's 
decision-through the presentation of "proofs and reasoned arguments,,19 -that 
is, correspondingly, considerably greater than a typical citizen's opportunity to 
directly influence the policies of government. And that is what makes the 
existence of evidentiary rules especially mysterious from a First Amendment 
perspective. To censor the content of the litigants' proofs and arguments--and 
censorship is precisely what evidentiary rules accomplish-is to dictate the terms 
on which litigants (through their lawyers) can participate in adjudicative 
decisionmaking that will bind them. Government attempts to dictate the 
terms of participation in other government decisionmaking contexts are uni-
formly subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny and almost as uniformly 
stricken down.20 Why should rules of evidence in adjudication be any different? 
Why doesn't the First Amendment dog bark in the courtroom?21 
This Article attempts, from the point of view of political theory, to answer 
that question in a way that is informative about both the value of political speech 
and the nature of the adjudicative process. More precisely, it attempts to answer 
the normative question of why adjudicative and political speech are treated so 
differently from each other, not the corresponding question of positive First 
Amendment law. 22 The outcome of an actual First Amendment challenge to 
evidentiary rules seems a foregone conclusion: Such rules would be summarily 
upheld, probably on the ground that a long tradition of restrictions on courtroom 
speech, together with the incompatibility between unrestricted speech and a 
19. Lon L. Fuller, The Farms and Umits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 369 (1978). 
20. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("Government action that 
stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the 
Government, contravenes this essential [First Amendment) right."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
95 (1972) ("(A)bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content."); see generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSfllUfIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.1, at 902-03 (2d ed. 2002). 
21. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexud Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment 
Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 1,2 (citing Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver 
Blaze, STRAND MAG. (Dec. 1892)) (discussing the absence of First Amendment analysis in hostile work 
environment claims). 
22. In this respect my small project proceeds in the same spirit as the much more comprehensive 
one undertaken by Frederick Schauer in his book Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry: It "adopts a 
philosophical rather than a legal approach." FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY ix-x (1982). 
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courtroom's function, makes a courtroom a "nonpublic forum" in which govern-
ment may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral constraints on speech.2J 
But my query here is theoretical, not doctrinal: I want to know whether 
there is any convincing normative justification for the seemingly obvious out-
come of a hypothetical First Amendment challenge to evidentiary rules. That is, 
I want to interrogate our legal assumptions about speech to courts--which I will 
refer to generally as adjudicative speech-and justify those assumptions norma-
tively, if I can. Why is the imposition of severe restrictions on adjudicative 
speech a matter of long-standing tradition? How is unfettered speech by litigants 
incompatible with the function of a court? My hope is that asking and attempt-
ing to answer these questions in a systematic way will help us to understand both 
freedom of speech and adjudication a bit better. 
I begin in Part I by suggesting that Anglo-American adjudication is more 
like Anglo-American politics than is often acknowledged: Each requires for its 
legitimacy the meaningful participation of the affected parties. And, as I 
explain, freedom of speech is a necessary condition of meaningful political 
participation. Given the centrality of participation to both political and 
adjudicative legitimacy, and the centrality of free speech to meaningful partici-
pation, it seems especially anomalous that the First Amendment applies vigor-
ously in politics but hardly at all in adjudication.24 And despite our reflexive 
familiarity with this incongruity, it cannot easily be explained away, as I 
demonstrate in Part II by assessing (and rejecting) five ways of attempting to do 
precisely that. 
In Part III, I offer a more satisfactory explanation for the otherwise curious 
distinction between (mostly unfettered) political speech and (tightly 
constrained) adjudicative speech. The very need to preserve the meaningfulness 
23. Cf. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 6n, 680 (1992) (holding that 
public airports are nonpublic fora); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. no, 730 (1990) (holding that post 
office property is a nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military 
bases are nonpublic fora); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (holding that the areas outside 
prisons and jails are nonpublic fora). 
24. Much of the argument in Part I derives from several prior articles. I first compared 
adjudication and democratic (Xllitics, from the perspective of political legitimacy, in Adjw:l.ication as 
Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997) [hereinafter Peters, AdjuLlication], in which I argued that 
Anglo-American adjudication contains the democratic elements of participation and representation. In 
Assessing the New}uJidal Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, Minimalism], I 
contended that the desirability of preserving the representative legitimacy of adjudication provides a reason 
in favor of narrow, "minimalist" court decisions. In Persuasion: A Model of Majaritarianism as 
AdjuLlication, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Peters, Persuasion], I argued that majoritarian 
politics can be understcxxl as a type of adjudication the legitimacy of which depends, like actual 
adjudication, on the degree to which decisionmakers are responsive to the arguments of those affected by 
decisions. And in Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8 LEGAL THEORY 185 (2002) 
[hereinafter Peters, Participation], I contended that a judge's res(Xlnsibility to the litigants generally 
precludes her from deciding cases based u(Xln prospective policy rather than retrospective principle. 
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of participation in adjudication, I contend, partly explains the existence of 
evidentiary rules and other restrictions on adjudicative speech. The rest of the 
explanation derives from the limits of the legitimacy that participation lends 
to adjudication, and from the need to maintain judicial subservience to more 
legitimate modes of policymaking. 
In Part IV, I tum to some contemporary issues involving the interaction 
between free speech norms and adjudication, asking whether those issues might 
be illuminated by the explanation of adjudicative speech restrictions that I offer. 
Specifically, I assess the validity of recent congressional attempts to prevent 
federally funded attorneys from challenging state welfare systems; of court rules 
prohibiting the citation of unpublished judicial opinions; and of attempts to 
regulate the speech of candidates in state judicial campaigns. 
Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the justification for evidentiary rules 
and other restrictions on adjudicative speech tells us something valuable not only 
about speech in adjudication, but also about speech in politics: It tells us that 
political speech itself, the paradigm of specially protected speech, might permis-
sibly be restricted when necessary to preserve the participatory legitimacy of 
democratic politics. 
I. PARTICIPATION AND SPEECH, POLITICS AND ADJUDICATION 
Adjudication and politics are alike in at least two obvious ways: Both pro-
duce decisions that bind people, and both, at least paradigmatically, are processes 
of government.2S Courts are institutions of government no less than legislatures 
and administrations; judges, like legislators and chief executives, are 
26 So . d 27 d 28 d' d' . I government actors. court JU gments, court proce ures, an JU lCta 
25. This is not to say that all adjudication is run by government, or that everything that might 
be called "politics" is aimed at producing government decisions. Types of alternative dispute resolution, 
such as arbitration and mediation, often proceed without government intervention. And interactions 
in nongovernmental contexts-families, workplaces, law faculties-frequently are considered 
"political." 
26. This obvious premise underlies Supreme Court decisions that have held a court's enforcement 
of common law principles to be state action in the constitutionally relevant sense. See, e.g., N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (holding that judicial enforcement of common law libel was 
state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 19 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a racially 
restrictive covenant in private contracts was state action). 
27. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1. 
28. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabarna, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (invalidating a civil litigant's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on gender as a violation of equal protection); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (invalidating a civil litigant's use of peremptory 
challenges to strike jurors based on race as a Violation of equal protection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79,89 (1986) (invalidating the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial to strike jurors 
based on race as a violation of equal protection). Of course court procedures are subject to constitutional 
norms that are directed specifically to courts, such as most provisions of the Fifth Amendment, the Due 
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orders29 are subject to constitutional limitations just as the actions of the politi-
cal branches are. 
Because adjudication is a process of coercive government decisionmaking, it 
is subject not only to the limitations of positive constitutional law, but also to 
even more fundamental standards of political legitimacy. We may ask not only 
the familiar question of whether, and under what conditions, politics is politically 
legitimate, but also the question, perhaps somewhat less familiar, of whether and 
under what conditions adjudication is politically legitimate. 
When directed to adjudication, this question in practice tends to be asked 
primarily in the particular public-law contexts of judicial review and statutory 
interpretation---contexts in which courts interpret and evaluate the work of the 
political branches and thus provoke worries about comparative legitimacy. So 
commentators fret about the "countermajoritarian difficulty" of judicial review30 
and about the degree of deference courts owe to legislatures in constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.31 But the question of the political legitimacy of adjudica-
tion as a general matter is rarely put. 
A careful consideration of that question reveals a deeper similarity between 
adjudication and political decisionmaking. This fact shouldn't be surprising; 
both adjudication and political decisionmaking in our democracy rely on the 
same democratic value-participation-to provide legitimacy. It would in fact 
be a bit surprising if this were not the case; if participation is central to 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provisions of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments 
and Article III. 
29. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding the First 
Amendment validity of protective orders limiting public access to information produced during discovery); 
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Sruart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a judicial restrictive order against press 
coverage of a criminal trial as violative of the First Amendment); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 
(1941) (invalidating a contempt citation for a newspaper editorial referring to a pending court case as 
violative of the First Amendment). 
30. Examples here are too numerous to cite without being arbitrary; nonetheless, see, for example, 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (coining the phrase 
"counter-majoritarian difficulty"); Symposium, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 843 
(2001) (discussing the difficulty). For an historical account of the development of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty in constirutional theory, see Barry Friedman's ambitious and informative series of articles: Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajaritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajaritarianDifficulty, Part Three: The 
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic 
Obsession: The History of the Countermajaritarian DifficuI.r:y, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter 
Friedman, Part Five). Part Two of Friedman's series is, apparently, as yet unpublished. See Friedman, Part 
Five, supra, at 157 n.l2. 
31. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BaRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW (1990) (defending an "originalist" approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation); 
WILLIAM N. EsKRlDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (defending a "dynamic," 
nonoriginalist approach to statutory interpretation); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 
(I 994) (defending a "textualist" approach to starutory and constitutional interpretation). 
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democratic legitimacy (as I will argue in a moment), why shouldn't all 
significant government institutions, the courts included, meaningfully incorpo-
rate that value? 
A. Participation and Democratic Legitimacy 
"0 ". f f d .)2 0 ' emocracy 1S, 0 course, a term 0 conteste mean mg. ne can t get 
very far in an argument about "democratic" legitimacy without at least describ-
ing, and preferably defending, the particular conception of democracy that forms 
the basis for one's argument. In my view, the most attractive understanding of 
democratic legitimacy, from both a descriptive and a normative perspective, 
has participation as its central value. By participation I mean the participation 
in government of those bound by government decisions. 
Consider participation's main competitor as a foundational democratic 
value: consent.)) As a bedrock principle of democracy, consent is both descrip-
tively and normatively problematic. As a descriptive matter, it is difficult to 
assert honestly that most of us have meaningfully "consented" either to our 
general system of government-what reasonable choices do we have?---or, 
perhaps more to the point, to those specific actions of that government with 
which we disagree.14 As a normative matter, consent is rather severely underde-
32. This point has recently been made quite effectively by several commentators. See RONALD 
DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONsrmmON 15-35 (1996); 
Offi.ISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITlITIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-20, 46-108 (2001); LoUIS 
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSEITLEDCONSTITlITION 69 (2001). 
33. Some commentators treat government by "consent" and government by "participation" as 
functionally the same thing, without making any conceptual distinction between them. See, e.g., 
ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Se/f-GOIIe7nment, in POLITICAL FREEDOM 1,9-16 
(1960). If one's definition of political consent in fact tums on the value of political parricipatian, as I believe 
Meiklejohn's does, then any competition between consent and panicipation for the status of core 
democratic value is merely a matter of semantics: By consent one really means panicipation. 
34. Locke and Rousseau both attempted to justify majority tule as the product of an original act of 
consent, a unanimous "compact" or agreement by which all members of society agreed to be tuled 
thereafter by a majority. See JOHN LocKE, TWo ThEA TISES OF GoVERNMENT 348-58 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SCx::IAL CONTRACT 116-21 
(Wilmoore Kendall trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1954) (1762). But of course such an original social contract 
would, and could, bind only those who actually agreed to it, not their descendants. Locke tried to solve this 
ptoblem with a rather tenuous argument that subsequent members of society "tacitly" consent to the 
compact through "Possession, or Enjoyment, of any pan of the Dominions of ... Government." LocKE, 
supra, at 366. Rousseau's attempted solution at first seems even more tenuous, but in fact amounts to the 
same thing: He held that "[tlo reside within the state after its actual establishment ... is to consent to it," 
including to the principle of majority rule on matters of ordinary legislation. ROUSSEAU, supra, at 168. Of 
course it is difficult to "reside within" a state without also "possessing or enjoying any pan of the dominions 
of government" of that state. 
The vulnerability of both Locke's and Rousseau's solutions is suggested by Rousseau's qualification that 
consent by residence applies only "to a state that is free. Where this condition is not fulfilled, a resident 
may be prevented from leaving, despite a wish to do so, by family ties, property, lack of a place of refuge, 
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terminative as a justification of democratic government, for a society might 
consent to rule by oligarchy or by dictatorship.J5 
The value of participation, on the other hand, fares reasonably well both 
descriptively and normatively as a justification of American democracy. Descrip-
tively, govemment-by-participation is a roughly accurate characterization of our 
system, at least if participation is understood to include not only actual participa-
tion but also the opportunity to participate.36 Every adult citizen in the United 
States has the opportunity to influence policy by participating in the election 
of those who directly make it (or who appoint and supervise those who directly 
make it). In many states, citizens also have the occasional chance-steadily 
becoming less occasional-to make policy directly by voting on ballot referenda 
or initiatives.J7 In some places citizens directly make local policy by participating 
in town meetings. The notice-and-comment process allows for direct participa-
tion in administrative rulemaking.J8 Then, of course, there is the ubiquitous 
power of political speech in its many forms-not least by way of public opinion 
polls---which constitutes a sort of direct citizen participation in government 
between elections. 
poverty, or coercion." Id. (emphasis altered). In the real world, of course, such deterrents to exit are nearly 
ubiquitous. And Rousseau neglects to mention that, even if exit is possible and relatively cost-free, there 
may not be a suitable alternative state to exit to. 
35. Indeed, Thomas Hobbes grounded his case for absolute monarchy in consent theory. See 
ThOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262-88 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., 1958) (1651). 
36. Many or most of us do not regularly actually participate in politics, even in the fonn of voting. 
For example: 
In the midtenn congressional elections of 1998, only 41.9% of the [voting age population, or 
YAP) bothered to vote, giving the country its worst turnout in modem history. The 1998 
elections, however, were only the culmination of a trend forty years in the making. In the 
congressional elections held throughout the 1960s, the average turnout was 54.6%; by the 1990s, 
it had dropped nine points to 45.7% . 
... Throughout the 1990s, on average, Congress has been elected by less than a majority 
of the YAP .... [N)ot since 1970 has the turnout been over fifty percent in a midtenn election. 
Even in presidential election years, fifty percent of the YAP has not voted regularly for 
Congress. In fact, 1992 was the first and last time in twenty years that the congressional vote 
in a presidential election year did sunnount the fifty-percent mark. 
Daniel]. Schwartz, Note, The Potential Effects of Nandeferential Review em Interest Group Incentives and Voter 
Turnout, 77 N.Y.U. L REV. 1845, 1852-53 (2002) (citations omirted). 
37. "Over the last few decades, there has been a sea change in the lawmaking process in this 
country. By initiative and by referendum, American voters in a significant number of states are participat-
ing directly in state and local governments." Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent 
State and Lxal Fiscal Policy at tile Intersecticm of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a 
Case in Point, 35 U. MICH.].L REFORM 511, 512 (2002) (citations omirred). 
38. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.s.c. § 553 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to 
provide "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making" and to allow "interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments"). 
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"Of course," Learned Hand remarked, "I know how illusory would be the 
belief that my vote determined anything.,,39 ("Hardly altogether," Alexander 
Bickel replied.40) But if Hand's problem is a problem, it is a problem oflarge-scale 
democracy, not of democracy itself.41 Even on a massive scale, democracy is more 
participatory than dictatorship or oligarchy on any scale. 
Normatively, the value of participation unites a broad spectrum of theo-
retical justifications of democracy. In thinking about normative arguments for 
democracy, we might divide the universe between proceduralist and functionalist 
justifications. Proceduralist justifications value the procedures of democracy 
themselves, while functionalist justifications value the outcomes of those pro-
cedures. Proceduralist justifications might be further divided into deontological 
and consequentialist forms, with deontological arguments locating inherent value 
in democratic procedures and consequentialist arguments placing value in certain 
ancillary effects of democratic procedures. 
The value of participation is central to all of these ways of justifying democ-
racy. One who justifies democracy on deontological proceduralist grounds---who 
believes that democratic procedures are valuable for their own sake-is likely 
to focus, like Immanuel Kant, on the ideals of individual autonomy and 
antipaternalism,42 each of which is given substance when citizens participate in 
the government that binds them. Participation in government 
decisionmaking, the theory goes, transforms government decisions from 
instances of coercion to expressions of self-government.43 Likewise, one who 
justifies democracy on consequentialist proceduralist grounds---believing that 
democratic procedures produce valuable ancillary benefits, good decisions 
aside-is likely to value participation in government as a means of individual 
character development, 
39. LEARNEOHANO, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 {1958}. 
40. BICKEL, supra note 30, at 20. 
41. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY ANO ITS CRmes 225-31 {1989} {discussing problems of 
participation in large-scale democracy}; EISGRUBER, supra note 32, at ~2 {same}. And it has not been 
considered a problem by every democratic theorist. James Madison, for example, saw the attenuation of 
individual influence in a large-scale democracy as a good thing because it impeded the formation of 
majority factions. See THE FEOERALISTNo. 10 (James Madison). 
42. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does 
Not Apply in Practice," reprinted in KANT: POLmCAL WRITINGS 61, 74-87 {Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet 
trans., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1991} {1793}. For Kant, it was an "a priori principle" that "[nlo-one 
can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek 
his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to 
pursue a similar end." Id. at 74. 
43. This idea also animates Locke's justification of civil society and Rousseau's concept of the 
general will. See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 34; ROUSSEAU, supra note 34. 
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like John Start Mill (following Aristotle),+! or, like Alexis de Tocqueville, as an 
impetus to general social dynamism.45 
And one who justifies democracy on functionalist grounds-believing that 
it tends to produce better decisions than other forms of government-almost 
inevitably relies on the value of participation. The functionalist, for example, 
may believe that broad participation, by bringing those directly affected by 
decisions into the process of governance, increases the likelihood that the 
resulting decisions will serve the interests of a majority of society.46 Or the 
functionalist might focus on the diversity of experiences and opinions that 
broad participation injects into government decisionmaking,47 or on the related 
idea that broad participation triggers the need for reasoned deliberation in poli-
tics.48 The value of participation, unlike the value of consent, is capable of 
44. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(Currin V. Shields ed., Library Arts Press 1958) (1861) [hereinafter MILL, REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69 
(Geraint Williams ed., J.M. Dent 1993); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 3-80 (Roger 
Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (describing a theory of moral virtue). 
45. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 231-45 (George Lawrence trans., 
J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1835); see also Stephen Holmes, TocqueviUe and 
Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 23 (David Copp et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) 
(discussing Tocqueville's theory of democracy). 
46. J.S. Mill's utilitarian philosophy, not surprisingly, produced such a view, see, e.g., MILL, 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, supra note 44, at 17-23,43-46, as did Herbert Spencer's market-based 
social Darwinism, see HERBERT SPENCER, RetJresentacive Government-What Is It Good For? (1857), 
reprinted in THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE WITH SIX EssAYS ON GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, AND FREEDOM 
331,375 (Liberty Classics 1981), and John Dewey's pragmatism, see, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, INTELLIGENCE 
AND MORALS (1910), reprinted in JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 66,69 (Debra Morris & Ian 
Shapiro eds., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993) [hereinafter DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS); JOHN DEWEY, THE 
ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY (1888), reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, sutJra, at 59-61; JOHN 
DEWEY, THE PuBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 206-fJ7 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927). Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 44, at 5 ("Each person judges well what he knows, and is a good judge."). 
47. This was part of Madison's point in Federalist No. 10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James 
Madison) (contending that "a greater variety of parties and interests" makes the formation of a majority 
faction less likely). J.S. Mill made the point somewhat more affirmatively. See MILL, REPRESENTATIVE 
GoVERNMENT, sutJra note 44, at 82-83 (defending representative assemblies as "place[s) where every 
interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded"). 
48. Contemporary work in "deliberative democracy" exemplifies this view. Cass Sunstein, for 
example, contends that "a large point of the system [of representative democracy) is to ensure discussion 
and debate among people who are genuinely different in their perspectives and position, in the interest 
of creating a process through which reflection will encourage the emergence of general truths." CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, FREE 
SPEECH); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITIJTIONS Do 8-9 
(2001) (arguing that a diversity of perspectives and interests is vital to effective deliberation and that 
democratic constitutions are centrally concerned with preserving and promoting such diversity). Sunstein 
invokes similar views held by the American Framers and John Dewey. See SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, 
supra, at 242 (discussing the Framers' views); ill. at 248 & n.l7 (citing Dewey); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20-24 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITIJTION) (discussing 
the Framers' views); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 
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grounding functionalist arguments for democracy because it has an obvious rela, 
tionship to the quality of political outcomes. 
If we are looking for Lincoln's "sheet anchor of American republican, 
ism,,,49 therefore, we need to move beyond mere consent and focus on the value 
of participation. The essence of our democracy is best understood as govern, 
ment by the meaningful participation of the governed. 
B. Democratic Participation and Political Speech 
On an understanding of democracy to which participation is essential, the 
importance of political speech is rather obvious. Political speech by citizens is 
both a form of participation in government and a facilitator of other forms of par-
ticipation. 
As a working conception of political speech, we can adopt Cass Sunstein's 
definition: Speech is political "when it is both intended and received as a contri, 
bution to public deliberation about some issue.,,5o The act of contributing to 
public deliberation is a direct form of political participation because, in an ideally 
functioning democracy, the outcome of deliberation-a political decision, such 
as the election of a candidate or the enactment of a statute-will reflect the 
reasonable arguments made by all the participants in the discussion.51 When 
those who make political decisions (voters, legislators, etc.) take into account not 
only the arguments of those who favor that particular decision, but also the 
arguments of those who oppose it, then the decision has a claim to legitimacy as 
a truly collective decision; members of the losing minority have participated in 
the decisionmaking process just as members of the winning majority have.5z 
Political speech in fact constitutes political decisions to the extent those 
(James Madison); JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us (1939), reprinted in DEWEY, 
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 240, 243; JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Human Nature (1939), 
reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 219, 228; JOHN DEWEY, John Dewey 
Responds (1950), reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 246, 248; JOHN DEWEY, 
Uberalism and Social Action (1939), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS 1925-1953, at 1, 
50-51 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1987) (1935). 
49. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, The Repeal af me Missouri Compromise and me Propriety af Irs Restoration: 
Speech at Peoria, IUinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas October 16, 1854, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 283,304 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). Lincoln's "sheet anchor" was the principle 
"that no man is good enough to govern another man, without tluu orner's consent." Id. But Lincoln had a 
panicipatory notion of "consent," as he demonstrated a few lines later: "Allow AIL the governed an equal 
voice in the government, and that, and that only, is self-government." Id. Lincoln's target, of course, was 
slavery, and more specifically the argument that prohibiting the spread of slavery into the territories denied 
the (white) people of those territories the power of self-government. 
50. SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
51. Here I follow the considerably more extensive argument in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, 
which is itself inspired by the arguments of John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM ( 1993). 
52. See Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 3-<5, 22-31, and sources cited therein. 
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decisions are responsive to the content of the speech.5) Of course, democracy 
in the real world seldom works quite this way; almost invariably some political 
speech is unheard or ignored by other participants in the debate. But political 
speech at least affords the potential to influence political decisions. 
Political speech also facilitates other forms of participation, most saliently 
the act of voting. Mere voting without the benefit of deliberation is likely to be 
ill-informed and therefore to produce poor decisions, offending functionalist 
justifications of democracy. Perhaps worse, nondeliberative voting is likely to 
produce decisions that simply aggregate the individual voters' self-interests,54 
and that result should offend those proceduralist justifications that are con-
cerned with promoting individual autonomy and resisting paternalism. Purely 
aggregative democracy allows no role in decisionmaking for the opinions and 
interests of the members of the losing minority, who thus cannot be said to 
have truly participated in the decisionmaking process at all.55 But freedom of 
political speech allows for the participation in political deliberation of all the 
affected parties, which in turn produces political decisions that are~r at least 
are likely to be-both better-informed and more legitimate than decisions pro-
duced on a purely aggregative model. 
It shouldn't be controversial, then, to say that political speech is central to 
democratic participation. The Supreme Court has recognized as much by gen-
erally affording political speech the highest level of protection under the First 
Amendment.56 And some of the most influential scholarly commentaries on 
free speech have justified it in whole or in part by virtue of its connection to 
political participation.57 
53. "Moting is merely the external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by means 
of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities of making judgments, which ... freedom to govern 
lays upon them." Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 245, 
255. 
54. For critiques of the idea that aggregation of the preferences, or self-interest, of individual voters 
is sufficient for democratic legitimacy, see DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 15-19; Joshua OJhen, Procedure and 
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DENfCX.:RACY: EssAYS ON REASON AND PoLITICS 
407 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 
38 SrAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and 
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]. 
55. See Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 22-3l. 
56. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating restrictions on speech 
in judicial campaigns pursuant to strict scrutiny); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447~8 (1969) 
(invalidating restrictions on subversive speech where speech is not both directed to inciting imminent 
lawlessness and likely to do so); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating restrictions on campaign 
spending pursuant to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times OJ. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254,279-80 (1964) (imposing an "actual malice" requirement for defamation actions brought by public 
officials) . 
57. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-16 (1980); MEIKLEJOHN, 
supra note 33, at 9-16; SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,23 (1971). 
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C. Participation and Adjudicative Legitimacy 
Political speech is central to citizen participation in government, and citi-
zen participation is, on most views, central to democratic legitimacy; these 
propositions are relatively familiar, if not entirely undisputed. What is perhaps 
less familiar is the centrality of participation to the legitimacy of adjudication. 
American adjudication is, paradigmatically, a participatory process, but that fairly 
obvious fact tends to be taken for granted, even by lawyers. Instead it should be 
celebrated, for participatory adjudication is, in its own way, a type of democratic 
governance. 
Lon Fuller described adjudication as "a form of decision that defines the 
affected party's participation as that of offering proofs and reasoned arguments.,,58 
Fuller's characterization was descriptive, not interpretive; he meant to define 
the effective boundaries of adjudication, not to explore its normative founda-
tions. But his positive account of adjudication hints at a more normative 
understanding, one that connects litigant participation to political legitimacy. 
Earlier, Edward Levi articulated the same hint when he noted that litigants who 
are subjected to "new" common law rules "have participated in the law making. 
They are bound by something they helped to make."59 But Levi, like Fuller, let 
the suggestion drop there. 
These hints provide a glimpse of a larger truth: American adjudication is 
structured as a participatory enterprise, perhaps to an even greater extent than 
American politics. A litigant's capacity to influence the outcome of a case to 
which she is a party is likely to be much more extensive and direct than an 
ordinary citizen's capacity-as a voter or a political speaker-to influence the 
outcome of legislative or administrative policymaking. A litigant's influence on 
a court decision, in fact, is likely to be greater even than the influence of an 
individual legislator.60 This is mostly a matter of simple numbers: A typical 
court decision reflects the contributions of two or, at most, a small handful of 
actual participants, while most legislative decisions reflect the input of dozens 
or hundreds of legislators, each of whom represents thousands or millions of con-
58. Fuller, supra note 19, at 369. 
59. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949). 
60. Of course, in adjudication as in politics, a panicipant's ability to influence the outcome of 
the process is likely to depend in pan upon that participant's economic resources. See Peters, 
Minimalism, supra note 24, at 1489-90 n.17l. Restrictions on adjudicative speech sometimes can be 
understood in pan as mechanisms for mitigating the effects of economic inequality in adjudication, see 
infra note 222, and I suggest below that restrictions on speech outside adjudication, such as campaign 
financing and spending limits and "fairness" requirements for mass media, might be justifiable as 
mechanisms for mitigating the effects of economic inequality on political debate, see infra notes 330-338 
and accompanying text. 
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stituents. Adjudicative participation is therefore less attenuated than (most 
instances of) political participation. 
Of course it is true that the effectiveness of adjudicative participation-the 
participation, by proofs and reasoned arguments, of the litigants {usually through 
their attorneys t in the decisionmaking process--depends to a large extent on 
the good faith of the judge and, sometimes, the jury. In making legal rulings, the 
judge must actually respond to the litigants' participation sincerely-must 
actually rest her decision on the arguments offered by the parties, without 
precommitment for or against one of those parties or one of those parties' argu-
ments62-in order for that participation to have complete legitimating force. 
The jury, likewise, must actually rest its decision on the proofs offered by the 
litigants. To the extent that judges and jurors in the real world do not {indeed 
cannot} live up to this ideal, the participatory element of adjudication may seem 
like a sham, too much so to allow the process to be fairly characterized as 
"democratic." Thus Martin Kotler objects: 
Even if all the recognized trappings of the American judicial system 
existed--even if the parties initiated the action, framed the legal and 
factual issues, and participated in the resolution of the dispute by submit-
ting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law-this would not 
alter the fact that a fully participating litigant's essential position is still 
that of supplicant. While such a form of decision making might 
be legitimate in a society committed to a monarchy, it is not in a 
d 63 emocracy. 
The suppliant nature of adjudication, for Kotler, "compels the conclusion of ille-
gitimacy" in adjudicative decisionmaking.64 
But this surely is an overstatement, and not just because it is hard to swal-
low such a casual condemnation of a centuries-old, constitutionally enshrined65 
decisionmaking procedure. The question is not so much how adjudication 
works, or doesn't work, in practice, but how adjudication is structured to work 
in practice. And the structure of American adjudication, however much it may 
be honored in the breach, clearly is designed to promote meaningful {indeed, 
61. In Part IIl.D., infra, I discuss the fact that litigants typically participate in adjudication 
through the agency oflawyers and the connection between that fact and my underlying themes in this 
Article. 
62. On the impermissibility of judicial precommitment, see the discussion infra Part IY.B. 
63. Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms arul]udicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process arul the 
Basis of Tort Law, 49U. KAN. L REv. 65, 82 (2000). 
64. Id. 
65. Article III, after all, creates "the judicial power." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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decisive) litigant participation. Consider the following facts about our judicial 
66 
system: 
• A court case in the United States is not supposed to come into exis-
tence at all unless and until one of the litigants brings it into existence 
by means of a complaint.67 
• Except in cases involving absent parties who will be directly bound by 
the result, such as class actions, the judge typically must defer to a deci-
sion by the litigants to end a case prior to a final judgment on the 
merits.68 (Many contemporary procedural statutes and court rules in 
fact encourage litigants to resolve disputes without any substantive 
intervention by the court at all. 69) 
• The litigants, not the judge or jury, locate relevant facts/o identify 
relevant legal authorities/1 and determine how to combine them into 
coherent legal arguments. Judges, for their part, are expressly limited in 
their ability to rely on facts not proven by the litigants,n are tradition-
66. I focus here on procedures in civil cases. Criminal prosecutions differ because they detennine 
whether the government may use its coercive power to punish someone. So, many procedures in criminal 
cases are skewed in the direction of protecting the defendant from abuse of the government's power (such 
as the requirement of a grand jury indictment for most federal prosecutions, see U.S. CONST. amend. V; 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7). Procedures like the grand jury requirement seem to depart from the litigant-driven 
mooel of American civil adjudication, but in fact they only depart from that mooel with respect to one of 
the litigants-the government-and they do so for the purpose of protecting the other litigant (the 
defendant) under the specially freighted circumstances of a criminal case. That said, I think my point here 
aoout the participatory quality of American adjudication applies with as much force to criminal as to civil 
cases, and I can't think of any reason why this Article's ultimate conclusions about the function and 
justification of evidentiary rules would differ according to the nature of particular cases. 
67. See FED. R. CrV. P.3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."). 
68. See, e.g., id. 41{a)(l) (allowing dismissal of an action without leave of the court by "stipulation 
of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action"); c[. id. 23{e) (requiring court approval 
for dismissal of a class action). 
69. See, e.g., 28 U.s.c. § 651{b) ("Each United States district court shall authorize, by local 
rule ... , the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions .... "); id. § 654{a) (With 
certain exceptions, "a district court may allow the referral to arbitration of any civil action ... pending 
before it when the parties consent."). 
70. See, e.g., FED. R. CrV. P. 11{b){3) (requiring that papers presented to the court be based upon 
factual contentions that "have evidentiary support or ... are likely to have evidentiary support"); id. 26-37 
(providing for litigant-driven discovery). 
71. See, e.g., id. 8{a) (requiring pleadings that set forth claims to state the grounds of the claim 
and of the court's jurisdiction); id. 11{b)(2) (requiring that litigants certify to the court that their 
"claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for" a change in the law); id. 56{c) (requiring that a party seeking summary judgment 
demonstrate an "entitle[ment) to a judgment as a matter of law"). 
n. Federal judges may take "judicial notice" of certain facts not in the record, see, e.g., FED. R. 
EVID. 201, but only of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute," id. 201 (b). However, even the process 
of taking judicial notice is largely litigant-driven. Under FRE 201, while a court "may take judicial 
notice, whether requested or not," id. 201{c), the court "shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and 
supplied with the necessary information," id. 201{d) (emphasis added), and "[a) party is entitled upon 
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ally discouraged from relying on legal arguments not made by the 
parties,73 and often are required to write opinions in which they demon-
strate their responsiveness to the litigants' proofs and arguments.74 
If judges or jurors in practice sometimes deviate from these structural norms, 
the result is not to render adjudication illegitimate on a wholesale basis, but 
simply to demonstrate that adjudication done in bad faith can be corrupted into 
illegitimacy.75 
Which brings us to a second response to the cynicism expressed by Kotler, 
which is that it is at least as applicable to democratic politics as to adjudication. 
Participants in democratic politics, too, are supplicants to the whims of a "judge 
and jury" in the form of the political majority.76 Those seeking political change 
in a democracy must convince a majority of their fellow citizens (in an election 
or referendum) or fellow legislators (in a legislative assembly) to vote in favor of 
that change. Interestingly-and here is a point seemingly missed by Fuller-that 
process of persuasion, like adjudication, also typically proceeds by means of proofs 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed," id. 201(e). 
73. Such discouragement tends to be implicit, as in a recent Supreme Court decision in which the 
Court reversed a court of appeals decision after noting-;;omewhat snidely, one might think-that "the 
Court of Appeals based its decision entirely on a ground that was not relied upon below and that was 
'virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs.'" Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 
564,572 (2002) (citation omitted). 
74. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), for instance, require the court to "find the faCts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon" after a bench trial, a requirement typically 
fulfilled by a written opinion. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). Most state systems have similar requirements. See 
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.2, at 539-43 (2d ed. 1993); FLEMINGjAMES,jR. 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 399 (5th ed. 2001). Trial judges often invite counsel for the litigants 
to submit proposed findings offact and conclusions oflaw. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra, § 12.2, at 541-42; 
JAMES ET AL., supra, § 7.6, at 399. 
75. Admittedly I am glossing over some important complexities here. What if the litigants (or one 
of them) or their attorneys are incompetent in presenting proofs and reasoned arguments? May the judge 
then depart from the proofs and arguments, or at least the arguments, actually presented and supplement 
them with the judge's own ideas about how the case should be argued? (Fuller asked this question and gave 
a rather ambivalent answer. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 388-91.) May the judge, for example, base her 
decision on a controlling case that the parties failed to argue? Surely that happens often, explicitly or 
otherwise. And it seems right and fair that it should, despite the apparent cost to the value of participation. 
We might draw an analogy here to john Hart Ely's "representation reinforcement" theoty of constitutional 
judicial review. In that context, the "nondemocratic" intervention of judicial review might be thought 
necessaty ro promote the proper "democratic" functioning of the political system. See ELY, supra note 57, at 
73-104. In the incompetent counsel context, too, the nondemocratic intervention of the court might be 
thought necessary to promote the proper democratic functioning of the adjudicative process, especially 
where the skill or resources of one participant in that process are being greatly outmatched by those of the 
other. Of course it sometimes will be di...'ficult for a judge to know where to draw the line on these matters. 
76. Here I follow my more extensive arguments in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24. 
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d d 77 R l' " k d [' ,,78 . 11 an reasone arguments. e lance on na e prelerences IS not usua y 
enough to win the day in American political debate. 
Of course there is nothing to stop citizens or legislators from relying on 
naked preferences when they actually vote; indeed there is less institutional pro-
tection, and perhaps less ethical stigma, against voters or legislators doing so than 
against judges and juries doing so when they make their decisions. (Judges must 
write opinions explaining their decisions in non-self-interested terms; voters and 
legislators need not. And jury verdicts that a judge determines to be against the 
manifest weight of the evidence can be overturned in favor of a new trial.79 ) Yet 
somehow the suppliant position in which we as citizens find ourselves with 
respect to a majority of our fellow citizens does not generally trigger charges that 
our supposedly democratic political system is in fact democratically illegitimate. 
The fact that the same dynamic of supplication exists in adjudication shouldn't 
prompt such charges there, either. 
D. Democratic Participation and Adjudicative Speech 
All of this simply underscores the strangeness of a regime in which restric-
tions on the speech necessary for meaningful participation in politics are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, while restrictions on the speech necessary for 
meaningful participation in adjudication don't draw a constitutional second 
glance. Both politics and adjudication in America are structured to be partici-
patory in a democratic sense; neither of them is perfectly so in practice, for 
essentially the same reasons. The potential whims of the majority don't 
convince us that generally unfettered speech in the political realm is a useless 
exercise, so why should the potential whims of the judge or jury convince us of 
this in the adjudicative context? 
77. Fuller contrasted adjudication with two other "fonns of social ordering": contract and elections. 
See Fuller, supra note 19, at 36~. Interestingly, in describing the "modes of participation" in each form, 
Fuller focused rather holistically on adjudication and contract but quite narrowly on elections; he described 
the "mode of participation" in contract as "negotiation," in adjudication as "presentation of proofs and 
reasoned arguments," but in elections simply as "voting." Id. at 363. Surely there is much more to elections 
than the final act of voting, just as there is much more to contracts than the final act of executing them 
and much more to adjudication than the judge's ultimate decision. But aside from a passing reference to 
the "optimum conditions" of elections--including "an intelligent and fully informed electorate, an active 
interest by the electorate in the issues, land) candor in discussing those issues by those participating in 
public debate," id. at 364--Fuller ignored the complex set of participatory dynamics that contributes to 
political decisions. Indeed it is somewhat strange that he fixated only on "elections" rather than on the 
entire political process of which elections are only a part. Had Fuller paid more attention to those dynam-
ics, he might not have drawn such a sharp contrast between adjudicative participation on the one hand and 
"electoral" participation on the other. 
78. Cass Sunstein's perfectly evocative term. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54. 
79. See FED. R. aVo P. 59; JAMES IT AL., supra note 74, § 7.24, at 462-63. 
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Yet adjudicative speech in our system is routinely and severely limited by 
rules of evidence and procedure, by judicial rulings pursuant to those rules, and 
by canons of professional ethics and judicial "gag orders" that stifle the speech 
of litigants and attorneys outside the courtroom. In the Introduction, I rather 
casually described adjudicative speech as "speech to COUrts,,;80 let me now be a bit 
more precise and define it, adapting Cass Sunstein's definition of political speech, 
as speech that "is both intended and received as a contribution to [a court's] 
deliberation about some issue.,,81 So defined, adjudicative speech is regularly, 
indeed almost casually, restricted inside and outside American courts of law. 
Frederick Schauer describes our prevailing treatment of adjudicative speech this 
way: 
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there appears to be 
quite little free speech. There are elaborate rules about who goes when, 
about who speaks, and about who does not speak. There are rules about 
how to speak, and there are rules about what not to say. All of that part 
of the law of evidence that deals with relevance and materiality can be 
thought of as a prohibition on speech, a prohibition on saying what (a 
judge believes) is irrelevant to the particular matter at hand. Those who 
persist in saying irrelevant things after a ruling by the judge risk punish-
ment for contempt, and thus it is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a 
place in which people run the risk of imprisonment for saying things that 
a government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to the matter at 
hand . 
. . . If we were to move our thinking about what happens at a trial 
away from the category "trials" and into the category "free speech," it 
would appear that the very institution we call a trial exists by virtue of an 
elaborate system of restrictions on the freedom of speech, restrictions 
whose willful violation carry the ultimate threat of imprisonment for 
contempt of court. The rules that constitute the trial process thus tell 
people what to say and tell them when to say it, and the trial that is both 
created and regulated by prohibitions on speech is thereby among the most 
constrained of all communicative environments.82 
But courts have never found restrictions on adjudicative speech to be con-
stitutionally controversial except when judges reach outside their courtrooms 
to stifle litigant or attorney speech. And even in those cases the courts have 
allowed much more constraint on speech than would be tolerated in the 
80. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
81. SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 130 (emphasis omitted). "A court's deliberation" 
might include the deliberations of both jUly and judge, or of either of them. I will bend the edges of this 
definition a bit in the discussion that follows, especially in Part IY.B., when I discuss in more detail the 
distinction between political and adjudicative speech; but this description should suffice as I layout the 
basic arguments of this Article. 
82. Schauer, supra note 14, at 689-90. 
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seemingly analogous political context. Put simply, adjudicative speech in our 
system is substantially less free than "pure" political speech. A quick look at 
evidentiary rules, and at a few of the rare judicial decisions that have applied 
the First Amendment to adjudicative speech, will illustrate the point. 
1. Rules 
In illustrating the ubiquity and severity of formal restrictions on adjudica-
tive speech in our courts, I will focus on rules of evidence as opposed to rules of 
procedure.s3 By rules of evidence, I mean rules like the FRE that govern the 
content and form of proofs and arguments presented to the trier of fact and the 
manner of presenting them. I focus here on rules of evidence rather than rules of 
procedure because, while most procedural rules impose only content-neutral 
restrictions on speech,s4 most rules of evidence are classic examples of content-
based speech restrictions. 
Consider some illustrations from the FRE: 
Relevancy. Under FRE 402, "[elvidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Evidence is "relevant" under FRE 401 if it has "any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." FRE 403, moreover, allows the exclusion even of 
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence." When combined with FRE 104, which requires 
the court to determine whether evidence is admissible pursuant to the 
Rules, the relevancy provisions of the FRE allow a judge to prohibit 
adjudicative speech that she concludes is not relevant to the action or, 
even if relevant, is simply not worth the cost of allowing it to be heard. 
83. For examples of restrictions on adjudicative speech that apply outside the courtroom, see infra 
Panl.D.2. 
84. Many, perhaps most, rules of procedure do not really regulate speech at all, at least not in a way 
that limits it. The discovery provisions of the FRCP, for instance, do not limit speech so much as they 
compel it. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37. The rules regarding service of process do not regulate speech at all in 
any meaningful sense, see ill. 4,4.1; the rules governing joinder of panies and claims regulate speech only 
incidentally to what are probably better understood as regulations of conduct, see ill. 17-25. And most of 
those procedural rules that do regulate speech in a meaningful sense do so in a content-neutral, not a 
content-based, way, serving simply as "time, place, and manner" restrictions. For example, FRCP 7 
specifies the form in which claims and defenses may be presented to the coutt, but not the content of those 
claims or defenses. See ill. 7. Not all rules of procedure are content-neutral, however. Pleading rules often 
require a particular rype (or at least a panicular quality) of speech, see, e.g., ill. 8,9, and "ethical" rules like 
FRCP Rule 11 require litigants and attorneys to certify that their speech meets certain content 
requirements, see ill. 11. 
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Character evidence, other crimes, and post sexual behavior. The FRE pre-
sumptively prohibit the use of character evidence, evidence of other 
crimes, or evidence of the past sexual behavior of alleged victims in order 
to prove the likelihood of conforming or similar conduct.8s This prohibi-
tion applies regardless of the possibility that such evidence will in fact be 
relevant to an issue in the case. 
Witness competency and hearsay. FRE 602 prohibits a witness from testi-
fying "unless ... the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." FRE 
701 limits the ability of lay witnesses to give opinion or inferential testi-
mony; FRE 702 imposes conditions that must be met in order for expert 
witnesses to testify; and FRE 704 prohibits experts from testifying "as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." FRE 
802 prohibits the use of hearsay evidence, which is defined in FRE 801, 
subject to exceptions catalogued in FRE 803 through 807. The upshot 
of these rules is that some would-be witnesses cannot speak at all during 
trial, while those who can testify may speak only on certain subjects. 
Authenticity of evidence. The FRE prohibit the use of evidence that does 
not pass certain tests of authenticity. FRE 901 generally requires that 
evidence be supported by proof "that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims"-for example, testimony as to the genuineness of a 
person's alleged handwriting by someone familiar with it. FRE 1002 
requires the use of originals to prove the content of writings, recordings, 
and photographs.86 
Miscellaneous categories of inadmissible evidence. In the service of policy 
goals ancillary to the main issues in a lawsuit, the FRE exclude certain 
types of potentially relevant evidence, including evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures in a tort or product defect case (FRE 407), evidence 
of settlement offers in civil cases (FRE 408), evidence that a defendant 
has paid medical expenses of a plaintiff (FRE 409), evidence of plea nego-
tiations in criminal cases (FRE 410), and evidence of a defendant's liability 
insurance (FRE 411). FRE 501 incorporates evidentiary privileges recog-
nized either by principles of federal common law (with respect to substan-
tive federal questions) or by state law (with respect to substantive state law 
questions). Many evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privi-
lege, the physician-patient privilege, and the spousal privilege, prohibit the 
727 
85. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (evidence of character and other crimes); id. 412 (evidence of a victim's 
past sexual behavior). There are exceptions laid out in these and other rules. See, e.g., id. 413,414,415 
(providing exceptions to prohibitions on evidence of other crimes); id. 6(J) (allowing evidence of certain 
other crimes to impeach a witness). 
86. Exceptions appear in FRE 1003 and 1004. 
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introouction of evidence in order to encourage, or not to discourage, 
certain types of out-of-court communications deemed important.87 
These evidentiary rules impose content-based restrictions on adjudicative 
speech; they limit the substance of what litigants and their lawyers may say in 
court in an attempt to persuade the judge or jury to make a particular decision. 
And the theory behind these limitations is that the prohibited evidence may 
influence that decision (which is, after all, a government decision) in a way that 
society deems undesirable. The rules therefore seem precisely analogous to 
content-based restrictions on political speech. If restrictions like these were 
in fact imposed on participants in politics proper---on street-comer pamphle-
teers, op-ed writers, political candidates, or politicians-they would, with 
scarcely a moment's thought, be stricken down under strict scrutiny. "Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid,,;88 "[t]o allow a government the 
choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the govern-
ment control over the search for political truth.,,89 PoUtical truth, apparently, but 
not adjudicative truth. 
Moreover, evidentiary rulings are prior restraints-supposedly "the most 
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.,,90 
Judicial rulings enforcing evidentiary rules are essentially "judicial orders forbid-
ding certain communications [that are] issued in advance of the time that such 
communications are to occur," which is the classic example of a prior restraint.91 
Violations of evidentiary rulings---that is, attempts to introduce evidence that a 
court has prohibited-can result in contempt citations,92 and convictions for 
contempt are constitutional even if the conduct triggering the contempt citation 
was constitutionally protected.93 
87. See generally EDWARD J. iMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.2.1, at 447-53 (Richard D. Frieelman gen. eel., 2002) (assessing 
"instrumental" and "humanistic" rationales for the spousal privilege); id. § 6.2.4, at 471-77 (same regarding 
the attomey-client privilege); § 6.2.6, at 490--502 (same regarding the physician-patient privilege). 
88. RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also Republican Party v. White, 536 
U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny); T umer Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (same). 
89. Conso\. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980). 
90. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
91. Alexander v. Uniteel States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)). 
92. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927-29 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation 
for violation of evidentiary rulings as consistent with the First Amendment). 
93. See Walker v. City of Binningham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). This principle is known as the 
"collateral bar rule." See CHEMERlNSKY, supra note 20, § 11.2.3.2, at 922-23. 
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2. Decisions 
Given that evidentiary rules are content-based prior restraints on what 
looks a lot like political speech, one would expect many of them not to exist-to 
have been invalidated by a court pursuant to strict scrutiny, or at least to have 
been challenged in a court under the First Amendment. But, so far as my 
research reveals, none of these things have occurred with respect to any provision 
of the FRE or of state rules of evidence. In the cases that have come closest to 
such a challenge, courts invariably, and usually summarily, have declared that 
adjudicative speech simply is not entitled to the same quantum of First 
Amendment protection as political speech. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Zal v. Steppe94 denied the habeas petition 
of Zal, an attorney who had been cited for contempt for violating a state trial 
court's orders not to present certain defenses or use certain inflammatory words 
during trial. Zal had represented abortion protestors charged with criminal 
trespass. He was ordered not to use words like "baby killers," "holocaust," and 
"Hitler" before the jury. Asserting an obligation to obey only "higher law," Zal 
apparently used many of the words on the court's off-limits list. "In sum, Zal was 
held in contempt twenty times.,,95 Zal contended that the trial judge's orders in 
limine were prior restraints that violated his First Amendment rights.96 
Over the partial dissent of one judge, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected Zal's 
free speech claim on the ground that "the trial judge is charged with preserving 
the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of issues. Zealous counsel cannot 
flout that authority behind the shield of the First Amendment.,,97 The court 
addressed only the issue of whether Zal could be held in contempt for violating 
the trial court's evidentiary orders---not the underlying question of whether the 
orders themselves contravened the First Amendment.98 In a separate concur-
rence, however, Judge Trott did address that question: 
I believe neither a defendant nor his attorney has a right to present to 
a jury evidence that is irrelevant to a legal defense to, or an element of, the 
crime charged .... If society deems important certain "explanations," those 
explanations explicitly can become part of the law .... 
94. 968 F.2d at 924. 
95. Id. at 926. 
96. Id. at 927. 
97. Id. at 929. 
98. The court should have addressed this question. As the court acknowledged, California, the 
state of Zal's conviction, does not have a collateral bar rule. See id. at 927 (citing In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273, 
281 (Cal. 1968) (en bane)). Thus the question of whether Zal had a constitutional right to present the 
excluded evidence was relevant to the question of whether his contempt citation was constitutionally 
permissible. 
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Traditional First Amendment analysis also supports the idea that 
lawyers {and others} have no First Amendment right to speak freely in a 
courtroom: a courtroom is not a public forum in the technical sense that 
this terminology is used in free-speech analysis .... Although courtrooms 
have always been devoted to debate, they have never been devoted to free 
debate, but only to debate within the confines set by the trial judge and 
the rule of law. The First Amendment does not allow an attorney to speak 
beyond those confines. 
Nor am I convinced by [the] argument that the trial court's order 
violated Zal's clients' First Amendment rights .... If a plaintiff or defendant 
has no trial right to present evidence or testimony, then the evidence or 
testimony may not be presented. In a courtroom, during a judicial 
proceeding, the First Amendment simply does not protect speech which 
exceeds the speaker's trial rights. Until today, I would have thought this 
proposition too obvious for comment.99 
What is striking about these excerpts from Judge Trott's opinion is how 
much they take for granted. Zal's (and his clients') freedom of adjudicative 
speech extends only as far as their "trial rights"-that is, their right to present 
evidence that "society deems important." O:)Urtrooms simply are not public 
forums. But why not? What are the grounds of distinction between the tightly 
constrained "debate" that "traditionally" takes place in a courtroom and the 
largely unconstrained-indeed, constitutionally protected---debate that takes 
place in other government decisionmaking contexts? Why should a judge be 
able to prohibit Zal from saying to a jury what he has a clear First Amendment 
right to say to those same twelve people, in their capacity as voting citizens, from 
a soapbox on a street comer? 
Similar question begging can be found in several Supreme Court opinions 
dealing with the contempt power and attorney disciplinary proceedings. The 
Court has held that a lawyer may be cited for contempt if, following an adverse 
ruling, he "resist[s] it or ... insult[s] the judge" rather than merely "respect-
fully ... preserve[s] his point for appeal."lOO At the same time, the Court has 
held that vehement language alone is not enough to justify a contempt citation; 
the language "must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the 
administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it 
must immediately imperil."lol The former holding suggests a broad judicial 
license to censor adjudicative speech; the latter suggests something akin to the 
99. 968 F.2d at 930-32 (Trott, ]., concurring). 
100. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,9 (1952). 
101. In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 
376 (1947». 
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"clear and present danger" test fonnerly applied to subversive political speech. lo2 
But none of these contempt cases was a First Amendment case, at least not 
expressly so; the cases involved either the interpretation of the federal criminal 
rule providing for criminal contempt citations lOJ or some rather vague notions of 
due process.104 Nor did any of these decisions actually assess the validity of the 
underlying evidentiary rules or rulings whose violation produced the contempt 
citation. 
The Supreme Court, however, has used the First Amendment to overturn 
the punishment of an attorney for out-of-court speech about a pending case 
that violated a state's rules of professional conduct. Gentile v. State BarlOs 
involved restrictions on speech that were somewhat analogous to evidentiary 
rules or rulings but that-rather crucially, in light of the Court's contempt 
precedent-applied to speech that took place outside the courtroom. Gentile, an 
attorney, held a press conference following the indictment of his client at 
which he proclaimed his client an innocent "scapegoat" and blamed the crime 
on "crooked COpS.,,106 The State Bar of Nevada later reprimanded Gentile for 
violating a state supreme court rule prohibiting an attorney from making "an 
extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated 
by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudi-
cative proceeding."lo7 Five Justices on a fractured Court held the state rule void 
for vagueness;lOB but a different alignment of five Justices held that the rule 
survived what appeared to be strict (or at least heightened) scrutiny, although the 
Court never expressly labeled it as such. lo9 
Despite applying heightened scrutiny, the Gentile Court drew an expansive 
general distinction between (less-protected) adjudicative speech and (more pro-
tected) political speech. Gentile argued that his speech was shielded by the 
"clear and present danger" standard applied by the Court in cases involving 
judicial attempts to prohibit or punish newspapers and others for reporting or 
102. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The "clear and present danger" 
fonnulation has been supplanted by the test laid out in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.s. 444,447-48 (1969). 
103. SeeSacher,343 U.S. at 6-14. 
104. The per curiam opinion in In re Uttle, which reversed a conviction in a state court, is 
astoundingly unclear about its supposed basis in federal law. But the First Amendment is never 
mentioned, and the general tenor of the brief opinion suggests a grounding in due process. See In re 
Uttle, 404 U.S. at 553-56. 
105. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
106. Id. at 1034. 
107. Id. at 1033; see NEVADA S. Cr. R. 177. 
108. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-50 (Kennedy, ]., for the Court). 
109. Id. at 1065-76 (Rehnquist, C.]., for the Court). The Court held that the rule served Nevada's 
"legitimate interest" in "protect[ing] the integrity and fairness of[its] judicial system," id. at 1075, and that it 
was "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest, id. at 1076. 
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commenting on pending court cases.110 In rejecting that argument, the amrt 
began with the "unquestionable" premise that "in the courtroom itself, during a 
judicial proceeding, whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.,,111 After all, '''[t]he very word 'trial' connotes decisions on the 
evidence and arguments properly advanced in open court. Legal trials are not 
like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the 
newspaper.",ll2 The very "theory upon which 'our criminal justice system is 
founded" holds that "[t]he outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by 
impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on material 
admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding."II3 
From these premises the Court reasoned that, in the interest of protecting 
"the integrity and fairness of a State's judicial system," attorney speech outside 
the courtroom may be circumscribed as well.1I4 The Nevada rule in question 
was "narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives" because it "applie[d] only 
to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it 
[was] neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating 
in a pending case; and it merely postpone[d] the attorneys' comments until after 
the trial.,,115 
Gentile involved rules of professional conduct aimed at extrajudicial attor-
ney speech, not rules of evidence applied in the courtroom. But it is not difficult 
to extrapolate from the Gentile Court's reasoning to a result in a hypothetical 
First Amendment challenge to evidentiary rules. The rule at issue in Gentile was 
in fact a sort of evidentiary rule: It prohibited attorneys from making statements 
likely to "prejudice" the jury in a pending case, much as rules against, say, the 
admission of irrelevant evidence are designed to do. If the state's interest in 
protecting the "integrity and fairness" of its judicial system is adequate to sustain 
the rule challenged in Gentile (or at least a sufficiently clear version of that rule), 
it must be adequate to sustain evidentiary rules that apply to attorney (or litigant) 
speech within the courtroom. Like the "gag rule" upheld in Gentile, evidentiary 
rules are intended to preserve the "integrity and fairness" of adjudication by 
confining the jury's decision to grounds that, in the words of Judge Trott in Za1 
S ". d' ,,116 E'd' I "I v. teppe, soclety eerns lmportant. Vl entlary ru es too are neutra as to 
points of view, applying equally to all attorneys [and litigants] participating in a 
110. See id. at 1069 (citing Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.s. 539 (1976)); Bridges v. California, 
314 U.S. 252 (1941)). I discuss the Stuart and Bridges cases infra notes 309-324 and accompanying text. 
11 LId. at 1071. 
112. Id. at 1070 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 271). 
113. Id. 
114. ld. at 1075. 
115. Id. at 1076. 
116. 968 F,2d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 1992) (Trott, J., concurring). 
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pending case," and they too "merely postpone[] the attorneys' [or litigants'] 
comments until after the trial.,,117 
But this analysis simply begs the important questions. Why is the preserva-
tion of the "integrity and fairness" of the process a sufficiently strong state interest 
in the context of adjudication but not in the broader context of politics?"8 
(What, in fact, does "the integrity and fairness of [the] judicial system" really 
mean?) Why does society have the authority to decide-indeed, to overrule the 
participants' decisions about-which facts and arguments are "important" 
enough to influence ("prejudice"?) decisions of courts but not of legislatures or 
of voters? Why can attorneys' and litigants' adjudicative speech legitimately 
be "postpone[d] ... until after the trial"-at which point, of course, it has become 
irrelevant to its purpose of influencing the court's decision-while citizens' and 
legislators' political speech cannot be "merely postponed" until after the election 
is held or the statute is enacted? 
Why, in short, is adjudication so different from politics that stringent 
restrictions on participants' speech are justified, even required, in the former 
but not in the latter? 
3. Velazquez 
Comparing Gentile and Zal to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez1l9 complicates things even further. In Velazquez, the 
Court (in a 5-4 decision) struck down, as violative of the First Amendment, a 
federal statutory provision "prohibit[ing] legal representation funded by recipients 
of [Legal Services Corporation] moneys if the representation involves an effort to 
amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law."120 The Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) is a federal agency created by Congress "for the purpose of 
providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or 
matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.,,121 The restriction 
at issue was among the many conditions imposed by Congress over the years on 
the use of LSC funds;122 none of the others was at issue in the case, and arguably 
117. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076. 
118. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the 
"governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome 
of elections serves to justifY" limits on campaign expenditures). 
119. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
120. Id. at 536-37. 
121. Id. at 536 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 2996b(a) (2000)). 
122. See id. at 537-38. The Court described the situation as follows: 
From the inception of the LSC, Congress has placed restrictions on its use of funds. For 
instance, the LSC Act prohibits recipients from making available LSC funds, program personnel, 
or equipment to any political parry, to any political campaign, or for use in "advocating or 
opposing any ballot measures." 42 U.s.c. § 2996e(d)(4). See § 2996e(d)(3). The Act further 
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none of them applied as broadly as the challenged restriction, which had been 
interpreted by the LSC to require its funded attorneys to withdraw "[e]ven in 
cases where constitutional or statutory challenges [to existing welfare laws] 
became apparent after representation was well under way."m Thus the 
challenged restriction acted as a sort of evidentiary rule, prohibiting LSC~ 
supported attorneys from making certain arguments on behalf of their clients in 
court cases. 
In contrast to Gentile, in which the Court approved of restrictions on attor~ 
ney speech as necessary to preserve the judicial function, the Velazquez Court 
invalidated these speech restrictions on the ground that they actually impaired 
the judicial function: 
Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission of 
the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a 
case or controversy. Marbury v. Madison ("It is emphatically the province 
and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"). An 
informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent 
bar. Under [the challenged statutory provision], however, cases would 
be presented by LSC attorneys who could not advise the courts of serious 
questions of statutory validity. The disability is inconsistent with the 
proposition that attorneys should present all the reasonable and well-
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case. By seeking 
to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation 
to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression 
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial 
124 power. 
The Velazquez Court thus expressly recognized the connection between attorney 
(and, implicitly, litigant) speech and the legitimacy of adjudication: The 
"analysis of certain legal issues" and their "presentation to the courts" is "speech 
and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the 
judicial power.,,125 By seeking to "prohibit" that analysis and to "truncate" that 
presentation in cases litigated by LSC-funded attorneys, Congress had violated 
Id. 
proscribes use of funds in most criminal proceedings and in litigation involving nontherapeutic 
abonions, secondary school desegregation, military desenion, or violations of the Selective 
Service statute. §§ 2996f(b)(8)-(1O} (1994 ed. and Supp. IV). Fund recipients are barred from 
bringing class-action suits unless express approval is obtained from LSC. § 2996e(d)(5}. 
123. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 539. 
124. Id. at 545 (citations omitted). 
125. See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts? Some 
Implications for Jw1ges \\'ihen Ftmding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 
R::lRDHAM URB. LJ. 873, 899 (2002) ("In Velazquez, the Coun's holding ultimately rested on a recognition 
that the opponunity to advance all relevant legal arguments is essential to the proper functioning of the 
judiciary."). 
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"the proposltlOn that attorneys should present all the reasonable and well~ 
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case." 
But why is it that Congress may not, consistent with the First 
Amendment, "prohibit" or "truncate" attorneys' ability to present proofs and 
arguments to the court in Velazquez, while the Nevada Supreme Court may do 
so in Gentile (and while Congress, through delegation t<;> the U.S. Supreme 
Court,126 apparently may do so by means of the FRE)? The key distinction must 
lurk behind the Velazquez Court's understated qualification that arguments 
must be "reasonable," "well~grounded," and "necessary for proper resolution of 
the case" in order to be the type of "speech ... upon which courts ... depend 
for the proper exercise of the judicial power." Perhaps arguments about the 
constitutionality of welfare laws are "reasonable," "well-grounded," and "neces~ 
sary for proper resolution of the case" in litigation involving welfare benefits, 
while arguments about the morality of abortion in a prosecution of trespassing 
pro-lifers, or extrajudicial speech about police and prosecutorial misconduct in 
a criminal case, simply are not "reasonable," "well~grounded," or "necessary for 
proper resolution" of those cases. 
Such assumptions are necessary to reconcile Velazquez with Gentile, with 
Zal, and with the complete absence of any First Amendment challenges to 
evidentiary rules. But they are assumptions, not justifications. The Court has 
not explained why certain legal arguments are "reasonable" and others are not; 
more to the point, it has not explained why the government may, consistent with 
the First Amendment, determine which legal arguments are reasonable and 
which are not,127 given the near~truism that the government may not make such 
determinations in the political context. 12S 
126. See infra note 201 (outlining the procedure for adoption of the Federal Rules). 
127. Cf. Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and rlIe Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71,73 (1996). Alexander writes: 
Id. 
The general view reflected in both the theories of freedom of speech and the Supreme Court's 
first amendment jurisprudence is that it is better to let false or pernicious ideas compete in the 
marketplace of ideas, where they are unlikely to prevail in the long run, than to trust government 
to distinguish the false from the true and the pernicious from the beneficial. 
128. This justification gap is made all the more salient by the Velazquez Court's conceptualization of 
constitutional litigation as a type of political speech. 531 U.S. at 548 ("It is fundamental that the First 
Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.' There can be little doubt that the LSC Act funds constitutionally 
protected expression .... ") (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). See also Robert L Tsai, ConceptuaiizingConsticutional Utigation 
as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L REv. 835 (2002) 
(arguing that constitutional litigation is a type of dissident or antigovernment speech). 
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II. SOME UNSATISFACfORY JUSTIFICATIONS 
The unanswered theoretical question, then, is why extensive content-
based restriction of adjudicative speech is permissible, even desirable, while 
extensive content-based restriction of political speech is not. I have been 
able to think of six reasonable-sounding answers to this question. Five 
of them-the five discussed in this part---do not end up working very well, 
although some of them provide hints of a more satisfactory sixth answer, 
which I offer in Part III. 
A. The Argument From Relative Importance 
Perhaps the most obvious justification of the differential First 
Amendment treatment of adjudicative and political speech is simply that adju-
dication is less important than politics. If adjudication is less important than 
politics, then adjudicative speech might be less important than political 
speech; this fact in tum might justify restricting adjudicative speech to a 
greater degree than political speech, on roughly the same theory that other 
kinds of relatively "low-value" speech-fighting words,129 obscenity ,130 
d £ . 131 . 1 h132 b . d elamatlOn, commercia speec --can e restncte . 
The trouble is that adjudication is not obviously less important than 
politics in any way that seems to matter; or if it is, it is not less important 
enough to justify the vastly discrepant treatment of speech in the two 
contexts. This is true on two levels. 
First, to the parties most immediately affected-the litigants 
themselves-adjudication is likely to be tremendously important, perhaps 
more important than politics ever will be. Courts can order people to jail, to 
pay large amounts of damages, to perform onerous injunctions-things that 
will affect their lives more acutely and directly than most political decisions 
can. Equally to the point, adjudicative speech is likely to be proportionally 
more effective than political speech, for the reason I suggested earlier: The 
ability of a single litigant to influence a court's decision that will bind her is 
likely to be much greater than the ability of a single citizen, acting as a voter 
or a political speaker, to influence executive or legislative decisions that bind 
her. 
129. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
130. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 476. 
131. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
132. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Va. 
State Bd. ofPhannacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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Tocqueville's famous dictum-almost a truism, really-is apropos 
here: "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does 
not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."ll3 Political issues often become 
judicial issues; political decisions frequently rely for their ultimate content 
and validity on judicial decisions. The effect of my vote for a ballot initiative 
may ultimately be determined by a court decision interpreting that initiative 
or assessing it for constitutionality.I34 The same goes, of course, for the effect 
of my representative's vote for a statute or my state governor's endorse~ 
ment, or enforcement, of a statute. It may even be true of my vote for 
President.135 So political participation, including political speech, often ends 
up depending upon adjudicative participation and adjudicative speech for its 
efficacy. 
This leads to the second level at which the attempt to prioritize politics 
over adjudication falters: the level of impact on society generally. Much 
public policy is in effect determined by adjudication, which can implement, 
supplement, and even overrule the results of politics. Courts can overrule 
political decisions by declaring them unconstitutional. They can imple~ 
ment political decisions---constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative 
rules-by interpreting them in particular ways, thus requiring their 
enforcement in a manner consistent with those interpretations. They can 
supplement political decisions by developing common law doctrines that 
profoundly affect private behavior.I36 And, mostly in the former two 
133. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 248. 
134. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding invalid, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a state ballot referendum prohibiting the state or its subdivisions from 
extending "protected status" based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation); Washington 
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding invalid, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, a state ballot initiative prohibiting mandatory busing for the purpose of racial 
integration). 
135. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding invalid, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Florida Supreme Court's order of a partial recount of Floridians' votes for President 
during the 2000 election, with the result that George W. Bush carried Florida and won enough 
electoral votes to defeat Al Gore). 
136. Consider the impact of damages awards in mass tort contexts like asbestos litigation: 
At least fifty-six [asbestos-related] companies have filed for bankruptcy. There are 
currently hundreds of thousands of claims pending against thousands of solvent 
defendants. Eventually, between one and three million claims will be filed in total, 
according to historically low projections. An estimated $54 billion in asbestos-related 
liabilities have been incurred to date, and an additional $200 to $265 billion are likely to 
be incurred in the future. 
Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2002) 
(citations omitted). 
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contexts, courts can order sweeping injunctive relief (school desegregation,IJ7 
prison reform/ 38 education reform,Il9 etc.) that directly dictates public policy. 
On both the microcosmic and the macrocosmic levels, then, it simply is not 
accurate to say that adjudication is generally less important than politics. Which 
means that the argument from relative importance cannot provide a satisfying 
justification for our comparative lack of concern for adjudicative speech, at least 
not by itself. 
As I explain in Part III, there is a meaningful sense in which adjudication 
can in fact be considered "less important" than politics, a sense that ties in with a 
more satisfactory explanation of our treatment of adjudicative speech. The point 
here is simply that adjudication is not generally any less important than politics 
with respect to its actual effects on those who are bound by it. 
B. The Argument From the "Search for Truth" 
Perhaps adjudicative speech can be restricted to a greater extent than 
political speech because adjudication involves a "search for truth," or for "right 
answers," in a sense (or to a degree) that politics does not. If, for example, a prin-
cipal goal of a judicial trial is to find the "truth" about what happened-about 
the facts underlying the dispute at hand-then evidentiary rules designed to 
elicit that truth and to weed out erroneous information would seem justifi-
able. 140 And if Ronald Dworkin is correct that every court case has a "right 
answer,,,141 then restrictions not only on proofs but on the content of legal 
137. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (reversing a district court's refusal to 
order system-wide relief for de facto school segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming a district court order requiring the gerrymandering of school districts and the 
busing of students). 
138. See The Prison Utigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Dearh Penalty Act: Implica-
tions for Federal District Judges, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1846, 1847-52 (2002) (briefly surveying the history of 
prison reform litigation in the United States). 
139. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (affirming a district court order requiring 
expenditure of state funds for remedial education, counseling, and career guidance in order to remedy segre-
gation); Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 710 A2d 450 (N.]. 1998) (ordering a comprehensive state school 
reform plan to redress funding inequities). 
140. The FRE purport to be based on the premise that truth seeking is a primary function 
of adjudication. FRE 102 reads: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of 
evidence w the end dUll the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102 
(emphasis added). But note that "just determination" of the proceedings is enumerated alongside ttuth 
seeking as a principal goal of the Rules, and that "fairness in administration" and the "elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay" are listed as subservient goals. 
141. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 82-90 (1978) 
(explaining his "rights thesis"). 
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arguments, like those contained in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) , 142 can be explained as tools for discovering that answer. 
The "search for truth" possibility also founders, however, because 
neither side of the comparison it supposes matches our actual practice. It is 
pretty clear that American adjudication involves much more than the search 
for truth or for right answers, and indeed it is clear that truth often plays a 
subordinate role in adjudication. It also is clear that the pursuit of truth or right 
answers--or at least better as opposed to worse answers--plays a significant and 
often motivating role in American politics. 
On the adjudication side, even a cursory survey of procedural and eviden-
tiary rules, and structural features of adjudication more generally, reveals many 
that are designed to promote goals other than, and often at the expense of, 
the search for truth. Some rules of evidence, for example, can only be explained 
as mechanisms for promoting independent social policies that have nothing to 
do with truth seeking at trial. l43 FRE 407's prohibition on admitting evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures, for example, actually impedes the search for 
truth; fixing a dangerous condition or a product defect implies both the existence 
of that condition or defect and the defendant's knowledge of it, both facts that 
seem relevant in a tort lawsuit. In fact the rule promotes the entirely distinct 
goal of encouraging the remediation of dangerous conditions and products.144 
FRE 408 (excluding evidence of civil settlement offers), 409 (excluding evidence 
that a defendant has paid a plaintiffs medical expenses), 410 (excluding evidence 
of criminal plea bargaining), and arguably 411 (excluding evidence of a defen-
dant's liability insurance) all serve similarly independent policies that have 
nothing to do with, and indeed often stand opposed to, the pursuit of truth in a 
particular dispute.145 And most of the law of evidentiary privilege excludes 
potentially truth-promoting evidence in the service of the extrinsic goals of 
encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of out-of-court behavior.146 
142. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring attorneys and unrepresented parries to cerrify to the 
court that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" in papers presented "are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonmvolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the estab-
lishment of new law"). 
143. I discuss this phenomenon in more detail infra Parr IlI.C.2.c. 
144. "The exclusionary principle [of FRE 407) rests in large parr upon an extrinsic policy-one of 
encouraging persons to take subsequent precautionary measures." Q-\RlSTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 127, at 26 (2d ed. 1994). 
145. See id. § 134, at 79--86 (regarding FRE 408); id. § 129, at 113-14 (regarding FRE 409); id. 
§ 142, at 120-31 (regarding FRE41O); id. § 152, at 175-76 (regarding FRE 411). 
146. The classic statement of the "instrumental" rationale for evidentiary privileges is Wigmore's. 
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285 Oohn T. McNaughton 
ed., 1961); see also IMWINKELRlED, supra note 87, § 5.11, at 257-59 (describing Wigmore's view). Professor 
Imwinkelried offers a "humanistic" rationale that he believes better explains many rules of privilege. See 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 87, §§ 5.1-.5, at 256-438 (distinguishing between instrumental and humanistic 
rationales, critiquing the former, and defending the latter). For my purposes, however, Imwinkelried's 
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Procedural rules, too, often-perhaps most often-promote values other 
than truth seeking. The stated purposes of the FRCP are not only "the 
just . .. determination of every action,,147 (which might incorporate the pursuit of 
truth), but also the "speedy" and "inexpensive determination of every action"148 
(which might, and surely often does, stand against the pursuit of truth). The 
concerns for speed and avoiding expense flow prominently through almost all of 
the FRCP. Rule 8 requires "short and plain" statements of claims and defenses, 
not exhaustive and comprehensive ones.149 Rule 9{b) imposes special pleading 
requirements for allegations of fraud or mistake,lso with the result that many 
truthful claims will be dismissed or not brought at all, thus promoting speed and 
reducing expense. lSI Rule 11 forbids even truthful papers from being presented to 
the court "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."lsz Rule 12 mandates the 
waiver of potentially truthful defenses of certain types when not made at an early 
stage in a lawsuit.!53 The discovery rules limit discovery of even relevant material 
that "is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," or when "the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit";ls4 they 
allow for protective orders "to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,,;ISS and they restrict the 
discoverability of attorney work produd56 and of facts and opinions held by 
retained experts. IS7 One could go on and on. 
"humanistic" rationale---"that it is desirable to create certain privileges out of respect for personal rights 
such as autonomy or privacy," IMWlNKELRIED, supra note 87, § 5.1.2, at 259---serves just as well, for it too 
demonstrates that values extrinsic to truth seeking playa large role in evidentiary privileges. 
147. FED. R. CIv. P.1 (emphasis added). 
148. Id. (emphasis added). 
149. Id.8(a),(b). 
150. Id.9(b). 
151. See, e.g., Olsen v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 136 FJd 273 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing fraud 
claims for failure to meet Rule 9(b)'s "particularity" requirement). The special pleading requirement for 
garden-variety fraud may be simply a remnant of the fact that "[f]raud was a so-called 'disfavored action' 
at common law because it raised questions of defendant's morality." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 257 (2d ed. 1993). Courts, however, have given it teeth in securities fraud 
class actions, and Congress recently bolstered special pleading requirements for such cases. See Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; JAMES IT AL., supra note 
74, § 3.19, at 223-24. 
152. FED.R.CIv. P. l1(b)(1). 
153. See id. 12(h)(l) (mandating waiver of defenses based upon lack of jurisdiction or insufficient 
service when omitted from a pre-answer motion or responsive pleading). 
154. Id. 26(b)(2). 
155. ld. 26(c). 
156. See id. 26(b)(3). 
157. See id. 26(b)(4). 
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Consider also some of the general structural features of American adjudi-
cation. Court cases are initiated by disputing parties, not by the court itself, and 
usually can be terminated by the parties without the court's permission.158 While 
a case is going on, the court relies on the litigants' truth-seeking efforts-however 
self-interested or even incompetent they may be-rather than conducting its 
own investigation into the facts. 159 A system devoted primady to the function of 
truth seeking might be structured to, well, seek the truth, regardless of whether the 
directly affected parties care (or are able) to do so; it might allow for the initiation 
and investigation of cases by the court itself and for their continuation at the 
court's, not the litigants', discretion. 
And consider the fact that standards of proof shift depending upon the 
f h "b d bl db'" .. I 160 " d nature 0 t e case: eyon a reasona e ou t m cnmma cases, prepon er-
ance of the evidence" or, sometimes, "clear and convincing evidence" in civil 
cases.
161 Surely it is not the nature of truth itself, or even the difficulty in dis-
covering it, that differs so comprehensively and dramatically across different 
types of cases; it is rather the strength of society's interest in discovering the truth 
that differs when balanced against competing values in different kinds of cases. 
Society wants courts to get it right in the vast majority of cases in which 
someone is sent to jail or worse; but in resolving private disputes, society is 
content if courts get it right somewhat more often than not. 
If one were to encapsulate the idea that other values besides truth seeking 
playa prominent, sometimes even a dominant, role in adjudication, one might 
use the phrase "dispute resolution." American adjudication, and particularly civil 
adjudication, is concerned at least as much with resolving disputes peacefully, 
reasonably, speedily, and inexpensively as with finding the truth. Obviously 
there is a relationship between the two categories of values: Litigants, and thus 
society as a whole, are not likely to be satisfied if they perceive that court judg-
ments typically have little or no relationship to something that looks like the 
"truth." Ripping a coin is not enough; dispute resolution must be reasonable. But 
as long as truth seeking plays some role in the mix---even if that role is primarily 
a hortatory one-the speedy and inexpensive judicial resolution of disputes is 
likely to satisfy the litigants and society. 
From the perspective of the "search for truth," then, adjudication actually 
looks a lot like politics. Politics is often conceptualized as a form of dispute 
158. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
160. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
in a criminal trial is a requirement of due process). 
161. "mhe normal burden of proof in a civil case is measured by a 'preponderance of the evidence.'" 
21 CHARLES AlAN WRIGHT IT AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 557-58, § 5122 (1977) 
(citations omitted). "Some civil cases also involve heavier burdens; for example, in most states fraud must 
be proved by 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Id. at 557 (citations omitted). 
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resolution-a method of allocating resources among competing groups 
in society.162 But while there is certainly much of value in this "pluralist,,16J 
story, it is nonetheless fairly obvious that it does not accurately describe all 
there is to American politics. 
As Cass Sunstein has persuasively shown, the American constitutional 
system is designed in large measure to be "deliberative" rather than pluralist: A 
central point of the system is to promote reasoned deliberation about "the public 
good" or "public values" rather than simply to divvy up resources among compet-
ing groupS.164 Many of the Constitution's most important provisions-the Equal 
Protection Clause, the "dormant" Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clauses, 
and of course the Free Speech Clause-have been interpreted by the courts 
(albeit not entirely consistently) to serve this function. 165 As a matter of 
constitutional design, American politics is about the pursuit of (political) 
"truth"-the common good, or at least the "best" policy according to some 
standard-and not simply, or even primarily, the "resolution of disputes" among 
competing interest groups. 
This is true at ground level as well. Political science research suggests that 
legislators often act according to their notions of good policy, despite being 
influenced by special interests, constituent pressures, and other factors. 166 That is, 
legislators often pursue political "truth" rather than simply acting on behalf of 
competing groups or mediating disputes among them. And certainly legislators 
often declare, at least, that they are pursuing political truth. I trust I don't need to 
provide citable examples of this phenomenon; one can open any issue of the New 
Yark Times and find instances of legislators or other public officials advocating or 
opposing some measure because it either is or isn't "in the public interest" and the 
162. See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); ARTi-iUR F. BENnEY, THE 
PROCESS OF GoVERNMENT (Peter H. Odegard ed.,John Harvard Library 1967) (1908); ROBERT A. DAHL, 
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GoVERNMENTAL PROCESS: 
POLmCAL INTERESTS AND PuBLIC OPINION (1951). 
163. I use the term "pluralism" in the same sense as Cass Sunstein does. See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION; RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 137 
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-43 (1988) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Republican Revivaa; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 54, at 32-33. 
164. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 17-39; see also SUNSTEIN, FREE 
SPEECH, supra note 48, at 241-50; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 163, at 1558--64; Sunstein, 
Interest Groups, supra note 54; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54. 
165. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 32-37; SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, 
supra note 48, at 249; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54. 
166. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The ]urispnulen.ce of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 
873, 883-901 (1987) (summarizing such research and concluding: "Our best picture of the political 
process ... is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all influence 
legislative conduct"). 
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like. '6l (One would be hard pressed to open the same newspaper and find 
examples of public officials explaining their actions on the grounds that "a 
special interest group made me to do it" or "I did it because I want to get re-
elected.") And of course even "special interest legislation is ... often drafted 
with a public-regarding gloss.,,'68 The public-regarding rheroric of American 
politics suggests that, whatever its failings may be in practice, everyone under-
stands that its purpose, or at least a large part of its purpose, is to pursue good 
policy-political "truth." 
I should address here a potential confusion between two different conno-
tations of the word "truth." Arguably, when a politician speaks in terms of "the 
public interest" and so on, she is referring to what we might think of as normative 
truth: the correct, or at least the best, policy choice from among a number of 
alternatives. In contrast, evidentiary rules in adjudication seem mostly to be 
about empirical truth: the factually correct version of "what happened.,,'69 Thus 
politics and adjudication might seem to be about different kinds of "truth," one 
normative and one empirical; perhaps this justifies the differential treatment of 
speech in the two contexts. 
But of course both kinds of "truth" play important roles in both contexts. 
In adjudication, getting the facts right is important so that the judge or jury 
can make the best normative decision about the legal consequences of those 
facts-Dworkin's "right answer.,,110 (And indeed it is not just speech about 
facts that is restricted in adjudication, but also speech about norms: Litigants are 
prohibited from bringing "unwarranted" or "frivolous" claims,I7I from making 
certain arguments to the jury,I72 and so on.) Likewise, in politics, choosing the 
normatively best policy obviously depends on getting the facts right, as the 
167. All right, here are two pretty good examples from a single story on a recent New York Times 
front page, which happened to be the first article I looked at in search of evidence: 
"'Our approach is to maximize the quality of life for America,' said James L. Connaughton, chairman 
of (president] Bush's Council on Environmental Quality .... " IX>uglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush 
Sees a Balance, Critics a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 1, at I. 
'''We are managing our lands for the needs of the American public ... " Gale A. Norton, the 
interior secretary, said in a recent interview .... 'We ... need to look for those things that serve the 
American public.'" Id. 
168. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An 
Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223, 251 (1986). 
169. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 18-19 (distinguishing between the truth of "factual" and of 
"normative statements"). 
170. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 141. Dworkin's theory holds not that there is always a single 
"best" or "right" answer to the empirical questions presented in a case, but rather that, assuming a given set 
of facts, there will be a single best answer to the normative question of what legal consequences should 
obtain. See id. 
171. See, e.g., FED. R. CN. P. 11 (b)(2) (requiring "claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" to 
be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument" for a change in the law). 
1 n. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation for, inter 
alia, making impermissible arguments to the jury). 
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Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized in protecting not just the commu-
nication of opinions but also the communication of facts under the First 
Amendment. l73 
So the idea that adjudication involves the "search for truth" in a way that 
politics does not fails to convincingly justify our comparative disregard for adju-
dicative speech. As it turns out, I think there is a germ of promise in the "truth-
seeking" argument, and particularly in the distinction between normative and 
empirical truth that I discuss above, but only when those points are considered in 
the context of a more satisfying differentiation between adjudication and politics. 
I explain that differentiation in Part III. 
C. The Argument From Subservience 
Maybe our comparative disregard for adjudicative speech can be justified by 
understanding adjudication as subservient to politics, in the sense that the proce-
dural conditions of adjudication can be determined and altered by the political 
173. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (protecting a person from civil liability for 
disclosure of the contents of illegally intercepted cellular phone conversations); Butterworth v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 624 (1990) (protecting a grand jury witness from punishment for the disclosure of testimony); Fla. Star 
v. B.].F., 491 U.s. 524 (1989) (protecting a reporter from a damages action based upon publication of a 
rape victim's name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (invalidating the punishment of a 
newspaper based upon the publication of the name and photograph of a juvenile offender); Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting any person 
from divulging information regarding confidential matters pending before the state's judicial review 
commission); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (invalidating a court order restraining a 
reporter from disclosing the name of a juvenile offender); Neb. Press Alis'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) 
(invalidating a state ttial court order restraining the press from publishing accounts of supposed confessions 
made by a criminal defendant); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 524 (1975) (protecting a broadcaster 
from a damages action based upon the publication of a rape victim's name). 
Of course, the communication of incorrect facts is not subject to full First Amendment protection in 
the political or social contexts. Such communication may incur damages for defamation, see, e.g., Dun 
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (upholding a damages award for defa-
mation by a nonmedia defendant against a nonpublic figure in the absence of a public issue); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (upholding a damages award for defamation by a media 
defendant against a nonpublic figure despite the existence of a public issue), and it may be regulated if it 
constitutes "commercial speech," see, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the advertisement of drug prices but 
noting in dictum that "false or misleading" commercial speech may be forbidden). As the Court has said, 
"[ulnttuthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Va. Srnte &m-d 
of Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 771. But untruthful political speech has been protected for the sake of preserving 
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open," N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), on the theory "[tlhat 
erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive,"' id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963». In contrast, false adjudicative speech is virtually unprotected-it may be 
punished, for example, via FRCP 11 (or a state-coun analogue) and, if it is sworn testimony, via perjury 
laws----and even ttue adjudicative speech is restricted by means of evidentiary rules. 
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process. On this view, so long as we allow unfettered participation in the 
political arena, we can justifiably restrict it in subservient contexts like adjudi-
cation, or the legislative chamber (which has its own procedural rules), or the 
workplace, etc. Everything (including adjudication) is subject to politics; and if 
we end up thinking that restrictions on speech in these subservient contexts 
are unjust, or unfair, or ineffective, or bad in some other way, we can simply use 
the political process-with its unrestricted speech-to change them. Adjudi-
cative speech really is "free," in the sense that we are free to relax or eliminate 
restrictions on it through politiCS. 
One problem with this argument is that its premise of judicial subservience 
is potentially vulnerable. Article III or the Due Process Clauses might limit the 
ability of the political process to modify traditional court procedures174 {and of 
course courts ultimately would decide what such limits are).175 If, say, admission 
only of relevant evidence is deemed a due process requirement, then the same 
Constitution that restricts speech in the adjudicative context also {through the 
First Amendment} generally prohibits restrictions on speech in the political 
context. We are left with the normative question of why our Constitution 
should make this distinction-and not only make it, but insulate both sides of it 
from political alteration. 
A more serious problem is that the argument might prove too much. If an 
activity's subservience to politics means that speech within it can be restricted 
by politics, then politics can restrict a whole lot of speech-not just in 
174. The OJurt has stated that, in criminal cases, "[dlue process requires that the accused receive a 
trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
Read broadly, this dictum suggests that at least some evidentiary tules are required by the Due Process 
Clause in criminal prosecutions (although that was not the holding of Sheppard, which involved out-of-
court publicity). Of course, the OJnstitution prescribes certain specific procedural protections in criminal 
cases. See U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that federal crimes be tried by jury in the state of 
commission); id. art. 1II, § 3 cl. 1 (prohibiting convictions for treason without the testimony of two 
witnesses or a confession in open court); id. amend. V (requiring a grand jury indictment for "capital" or 
"infamous" crimes and prohibiting compelled self-incrimination); id. amend. Vl (conferring rights to a 
"speedy and public trial" by an impartial jury in the state and district of the crime, to information of the 
"nature and cause of the accusation," to confrontation of witnesses, to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel). The Seventh Amendment also preserves the right to a jury 
trial in many civil cases in federal court, see U.S. CONST. amend. VlI; Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers 
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), "and nearly every state constitution contains a similar 
guaranty," JAMES IT AL., supra note 74, § 8.1, at 49l. 
More generally, the OJurt has assessed claimed deprivations of "procedural" due process according to 
the three-part balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), which weighs the 
private interest affected, the risk of error combined with the probable benefits of additional procedural 
protections, and the governmental interest. See generolly CHEMERlNSKY, supra note 20, §§ 7.4.1-7.4.3, at 
556-79. 
175. See, e.g., Cleveland &I. of Educ. v. Loudennill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that procedural 
requirements of the Due Process Clause must be detennined by the judiciary rather than the political 
branches); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the federal courts must decide 
whether the jurisdiction given them by OJngress exceeds the bounds of Article III). 
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adjudication, but in commerce, employment, art and literature, private rela-
tionships, and on and on. All of these areas of activity are subservient to politics 
in some sense; as with adjudication, the political process is capable of regulating 
what happens in them. 
Of course it is true that the courts have allowed restrictions on speech in 
some of these contexts that would not be allowed in politics: with respect to 
commercial speech,176 for example, and in the employment context.177 But the 
restrictions that have been allowed are different both in degree and in kind from 
the restrictions imposed by evidentiary rules. 
They are different in degree because they tend not to be as severe as restric-
tions on adjudicative speech; regulations of commercial speech, for instance, 
cannot be "more extensive than is necessary" to serve a "substantial" government 
interest,178 in contrast to evidentiary rules, which completely exclude certain 
categories of speech from the courtroom. 
And they are different in kind because they do not restrict speech to the 
government. Unlike other activities that are subservient to politics, adjudication 
is, again, a form of participatory government decisionmaking with the authority 
to legally coerce people. Comparison to political restrictions on, say, commercial 
speech thus seems somewhat beside the point; while both commerce and 
adjudication are subservient to politics in some way, adjudication is much more 
like politics than is commerce. Restricting speech in the latter does not justify 
restricting speech in the former. 
All of which is to say that using the idea of subservience to politics, by itself, 
as an explanation of restrictions on adjudicative speech seems insufficient. 
And then there is the Velazquez problem. The Velazquez decisionl79 
illustrates an important sense in which adjudication is not subservient to 
politics: Adjudication can determine, or change, the results of politics. Courts 
can interpret statutes and other political decisions and can even declare them 
unconstitutional. Political control of adjudicative speech, then, has the sinister 
potential to insulate politics from assessment according to legal standards. 
(This potential was an important factor behind the Court's invalidation of the 
176. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980) (holding that "[r)he Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression" and articulating a four -part test for assessing regulations of 
commercial speech). 
177. See RAY. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (distinguishing Title VII's prohibition 
on workplace sexual harassment from a law prohibiting racially motivated cross burning on the ground that 
the fonner is "directed not against speech but against conduct"); see also Fallon, supra note 21; Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Freedom of ExtJression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminawry Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REv. 
687 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First 
Amendment, 52 OHIO Sr. L.J. 481 (1991). 
178. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
179. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); see supra Part 1.0.3. 
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speech restriction in Velazquez. ISO) It is hard to justify politically imposed 
restrictions on speech that are designed to prevent political change; "clearing 
the channels of political change," in John Hart Ely's phrase, is precisely the 
function of unrestricted political speech. lSI Indeed, viewed this way, adjudicative 
speech is a farm of "pure" political speech-making its casual treatment, through 
evidentiary rules and the like, all that much harder to justify. 
Adjudication, then, is not entirely subservient to politics; and the sense 
in which it is subservient is not enough to justify the differential treatment of 
adjudicative and "pure" political speech. That said, the relationship of 
subservience, if we can call it that, that does exist between adjudication and 
politics will play an important role in the justification I offer in Part III. 
D. The Argument From the Need for Closure 
We might attempt to justify restrictions on adjudicative speech by reference 
to the fact that adjudication is a decisionmaking procedure; not just an opportu-
nity for discussion. Courts must render decisions, and perhaps restrictions on 
adjudicative speech are justifiable as mechanisms for bringing debate to a close 
and allowing those decisions to be made. Evidentiary and procedural rules are, 
on this view, akin to the rules (and related precedents and informal traditions) 
that govern procedure in legislatures: Both are legitimate means of bringing 
closure to the decisionmaking process and producing an actual decision. 
One difficulty with this view is that, as a general matter, evidentiary rules 
in a courtroom look quite different from procedural rules in a legislature. As 
we have seen, evidentiary rules are mostly content based; but rules of legislative 
procedure are mostly content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. The 
rulesls2 of the two houses of the u.s. Congress, for example, primarily dictate who 
ld. 
180. See Velazquez, at 545 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178}. The Court stated: 
Congtess cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source. "Those, then, who 
controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, 
are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, 
and see only the law." 
181. ELY, supra note 57, at 105-34. Ely explains the connection between unfettered political speech 
and political change. ld. at 105-16. The Supreme Court has often justified protection of political speech 
in these tenns. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)) ("The constitutional safeguard [of freedom of speech) ... 'was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people."'}; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (Freedom of speech serves "the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means."). 
182. The conglomeration of formal rules, precedents, and informal traditions and practices that 
governs procedure in each house of Congtess is extremely complicated and bewildering to the non-expert. 
Most of what I know about the subject I have learned from two informative and well-written overviews 
published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS): CRS Report No. 95-563, The Legislative Process on 
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may speak, when, and for how long; only occasionally do they dictate what may 
be said. 18) The mostly content-neutral rules of legislative procedure really are 
designed primarily to facilitate closurel84 (or, by their absence, to facilitate 
deliberation, as in the SenateI85 ). But the mostly content-based evidentiary 
rules of adjudication are designed to influence the substance of the resulting 
decision, not simply to facilitate a decision being made. 
A related difficulty is that rules of legislative procedure, quite unlike rules 
of evidence, typically can be altered or suspended on an ad hoc basis by the 
participants in the process themselves. The House of Representatives, for 
. "d h l" b tho cIs 186 Th S " instance, may suspen t e ru es y a two- lr vote. e enate may agree 
by unanimous consent to operate outside of its standing rules" and frequently 
does 80;187 "[g]enerally also, Senators insist that the rules be enforced strictly only 
when the questions before [the body] are divisive and controversial.,,188 And of 
course each legislative body is free to amend or replace its standing rules by 
resolution, although in actual practice amendments to the rules typically are 
t11e House Floor: An IntrOOuction, by Elizabeth Rybicki & Stanley Bach, updated on November 8, 2002, 
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/95-563.pdf [hereinafter Rybicki & Bach, The 
House Legislative Process), and CRS Report No. 96-548, The Legislative Process on t11e Senate Floor: An 
Introduction, by Thomas P. Cart and Stanley Bach, updated on November 8, 2002, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/96-548.pdf [hereinafter Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative 
Process). I will cite to these reports here rather than to particular rules or precedents. 
183. Perhaps the most important exceptions are the germaneness requirements in the House, which 
generally mandate that both debate and offered amendments be germane to the bill or resolution being 
debated. See Rybicki & Bach, The House Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 3,6. More quaintly (and less 
functionally), "all debate on the [House) floor must be consistent with certain rules of courtesy and 
decorum. For example, a Member should not question or criticize the motives of a colleague." Id. at 3. 
184. Rybicki and Bach note: 
[U)nderlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke and the procedures the House 
may follow is a fundamentally important premise-that a majority of Members ultimately should 
be able to work their will on the floor. While House rules generally do recognize the importance 
of pennitting any minority, partisan or bipartisan, to present its views and sometimes to propose 
its alternatives, the rules do not enable that minority to filibuster or use other devices to prevent 
the majority from prevailing without undue delay. 
Id. at 1 (citation omitted). 
185. According to Carr and Bach: 
The essential characteristic of the Senate's rules, and the characteristic that most clearly 
distinguishes its procedures from those of the House of Representatives, is their emphasis on the 
rights and prerogatives of individual Senators. Like any legislative institution, the Senate is both 
a deliberative and a decision-making body; its procedures must embody some balance between 
the opportunity to deliberate or debate and the need to decide. Characteristically, the Senate's 
rules give greater weight to the value of full and free deliberation than they give to the value of 
expeditious decisions. 
Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 1. 
186. See Rybicki & Bach, The House Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 3-4. 
187. Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 2. 
188. Id. 
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minor. 189 Rules of legislative procedure, then, really are voluntary--created, 
maintained, altered, and enforced by the consent of those who are bound by 
them-in a way that rules of evidence clearly are not. 190 
And there is a third, even more salient distinction between evidentiary 
rules and rules of legislative procedure that undermines the comparison alto-
gether. Rules of legislative procedure apply only inside the legislative chamber; 
they do not, and are not designed to, restrict legislators' extralegislative public 
speech on issues the legislature will consider, even when that extralegislative 
speech clearly is intended, or likely, to influence the outcome of the legislative 
process. Representative Smith may be constrained in the subject matter of his 
speech on the House floor, but no one would suggest that the same 
Representative Smith cannot appear on the Sunday morning news-talk shows 
and say whatever he likes about whatever he pleases, even (especially!) if his 
efforts are intended to influence his fellow representatives to vote a certain 
way, or his fellow citizens to pressure their representatives to vote a certain way. 
As we've seen, though, the same is not necessarily true for Litigant Jones or 
Attorney Gentile. The rules of evidence themselves don't apply outside the 
courtroom, but the power of the court, or of the bar as defender of "the integrity 
and fairness of the judicial system," do so apply. Litigant Jones or Attorney 
Gentile might be punished (held in contempt or disbarred, for example) for 
speaking publicly about their pending cases outside the courtroom, even (espe-
cially!) if their efforts are intended to influence the jury or the judge to decide a 
certain way. 
What this means is that, while rules of legislative procedure really do look 
simply like mechanisms for facilitating the legislature's function as a decision-
making body, evidentiary rules-and the larger web of potential restrictions on 
189. The O:mstitution provides that "[elach House may detennine the Rules of its Proceedings." 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, d. 2. Each house adopts its standing rules by resolution at the beginning of the 
legislative session. Changes from previous versions of the rules typically are minor. See, e.g., 
CONSTITLmON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REpRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS, H.R. r:x:x::. No. 107-284, at v (2003) (referencing 
the adoption by resolution of the House Rules and describing the changes from the Rules of the previous 
session), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hnnlbrowse_108.html. 
190. There are some complexities here. Litigants have, in a sense, a role in creating and 
changing rules of evidence, in that they can make legal and factual arguments about how those rules 
should be applied in the circumstances of a particular case; a judge's rulings on such issues then may 
serve as precedents influencing the application of the rules in future similar cases. A litigant also 
might consent, in a way, to a change in an evidentiary rule by simply failing to object to her opponent's 
violation of that rule, or by behaving in some other way that is deemed a waiver of the rule (as when a 
criminal defendant offers character evidence in her defense, thus opening the door for the prosecution 
to offer rebuttal character evidence under FRE 404(a)(1)). Both of these phenomena also exist, of 
course, with respect to rules of legislative procedure. But particular litigants cannot enact wholesale 
repeals or amendments of evidentiary rules in the way that particular legislatures can with respect to 
legislative rules. 
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adjudicative speech of which they are a part-look like something quite differ-
ent. Evidentiary rules look like mechanisms for promoting court decisions that 
have a certain content, or perhaps a certain type of content: content, if you will, 
that has "integrity" and is "fair." They are much more than, and on the whole 
very different from, mere means of bringing closure to a decisionmaking proc-
ess.!9! So if they (and the general speech-restrictive ethos in adjudication) are to 
be justified, it is not by understanding them in those terms. 
E. The Argument From Illusoriness 
But it might tum out that the comparatively hostile treatment of adjudi-
cative speech need not be justified at all, because that hostility is illusory or 
mostly so. In fact adjudicative speech might be protected as much as, if not more 
than, political speech. It is true that evidentiary rules and other restrictions on 
adjudicative speech are mostly content based and often rather draconian in form; 
but in practice they might not be so bad, for two reasons. 
First, the typical consequences of restrictions on adjudicative speech 
might not be so severe compared to the consequences of restrictions on political 
speech. If you are prohibited from presenting certain evidence, testimony, or 
argument in the courtroom, you can always step outside the courtroom and 
engage in the same speech in another forum.!92 (Perhaps your spouse or cowork-
ers will be interested in hearing about the excluded evidence.) But if you are 
prohibited from engaging in certain political speech because of its content, no 
alternative forum exists; if you are barred from advocating, say, the violent over-
throw of the government, you cannot step "outside" of politics to do it, because 
there is no "outside" of politics. And, as if the lack of any alternative forum for 
political speech weren't enough, engaging in unlawful political speech is likely 
191. On the other hand, procedural rules in adjudication can in fact be understood largely (if not 
entirely) as content-neutral means of making the decisionmaking process more efficient. See, e.g., supra 
notes 147-157 and accompanying text. 
192. On occasion judges, even highly regarded ones, have actually made this or similar 
arguments. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991) (Rehnquist, c.J.) ("The 
regulation of attorneys' speech [in question] is limited ... it merely postpones the attorneys' comments 
until after the tria!."); Patterson v. O:llorado ex reI. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (Holmes, J.) 
("When a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and 
necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimi-
dation hardly can be denied.") (emphasis added); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666-68 (1959) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfutter implicitly adopted this position: 
Id. 
Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too has a constitutional freedom of utterance and may 
exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice. But a lawyer actively participat-
ing in a trial ... is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer. ... He is an intimate and 
trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an "officer of the court" in the most 
compelling sense. 
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to land you in jaiL193 So (the argument might go), while content-based restric-
tions on political speech might be relatively few and far between these days, their 
consequences are considerably more severe than those of content-based restric-
tions on adjudicative speech. 
Second, in adjudication, the question of what speech is permissible is typi-
cally decided by the participation of the affected parties. The litigants (usually 
through their lawyers) can argue to the judge about whether, for example, a 
particular item of evidence is relevant or is more prejudicial than probative.194 In 
this sense restrictions on adjudicative speech are quasi-voluntary in nature; they 
prohibit speech, yes, but they do so only after the affected party has had the 
opportunity to demonstrate (without being subject to the rules of evidence in 
doing S0195) that his or her speech should not be prohibited.196 Thus restrictions 
on adjudicative speech, on this argument, are not as severe as they may at first 
appear. 
These points seem so weak to me that I hesitate even to raise them. 197 For 
one thing, the consequences of restrictions on adjudicative speech really are 
every bit as bad as the consequences of restrictions on political speech, for reasons 
that should be apparent by now. There is no alternative forum for adjudicative 
speech any more than there is for political speech: Once speech is confined to a 
time and place where it cannot influence the judge's or the jury's decision, the 
entire purpose of that speech is defeated. Revealing excluded evidence or 
presenting barred arguments to one's spouse or coworkers-Dr even on national 
television, once the trial and the appeal are over-is not adjudicative speech at 
all, because it cannot affect the government decisionmaking process to which 
193. For example, the fIrst three defendants whose convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 
were upheld by the Supreme Court pursuant to the nascent "clear and present danger" standard "all 
ended up going to prison for quite tame and ineffectual expression. In fact they went to prison far ten 
years." ELY, supra note 57, at 107 (footnote omitted). See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); 
see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
194. The FRE require that evidentiary questions "be determined by the court." FED. R. EVlD. 
104(a}. A court's general obligation to consider the arguments of the litigants on such questions is 
implied rather than stated expressly by the rules. See, e.g., id. 103(a} (requiring parties who wish to appeal 
evidentiary rulings either to object to the admission of evidence or to make an offer of proof that the 
evidence should be admitted); id. 104(a} (proViding that a court "is not bound by the rules of evidence" 
in making evidentiary rulings); id. 104(c} (requiring that "lh]earings on preliminary matters [be] 
conducted" outside the hearing of the jury "when the interests of justice require"). 
195. See id. 104(a} (a court is not bound by rules of evidence in making evidentiary rulings); id. 
1101 (d) (rules of evidence are not applicable to a court's determination of questions of fact necessary for 
evidentiary rulings). 
196. But see supra note 190. 
197. But, again, reputedly smart judges occasionally have done so. See supra note 192. To be fair, 
the judges in two of the instances I cited were opining in the context of attorneys' in-court criticism of 
judges or the judicial process; such criticism might in fact be effective even outside the courtroom (that 
is, it might have a true alternative forum), as I explain infra notes 309-324 and accompanying text. 
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the speech is ostensibly relevant. Barring adjudicative speech from the hearing of 
judge or jury, then, is the functional equivalent of barring political speech 
altogether: It eliminates the content of that speech as a potential factor in the 
process of decisionmaking. (And if that isn't enough, violating restrictions on 
adjudicative speech can land you in jail,198 or affiict you with other nasty 
consequences,199 just as violating restrictions on political speech can.) 
Nor can adjudicative speech be distinguished from political speech by the 
fact that litigants and their attorneys typically can participate in deciding exactly 
which of their intended speech will be restricted. The same is true, in essentially 
the same ways, of restrictions on political speech. Prior restraints against political 
speech, the Supreme Court has held, cannot be imposed without the opportunity 
for prompt judicial review by means of a full and fair adversary hearing. zoo Ex post 
criminal punishments for violations of political speech restrictions must, of 
course, follow only from the fully safeguarded process of a criminal prosecution. 
And the rules themselves pursuant to which political speech might be restrained 
and punished come from a political process that is at least as participatory as the 
h ad 'd' 1 ~ one t at pr uces eVl entlary ru es. 
In other words, the comparatively harsh treatment afforded adjudicative 
speech in our system is far from illusory. Restrictions on adjudicative speech can 
impact the affected parties' ability to influence government decisionmaking as 
profoundly as restrictions on political speech can, and violation of those restric-
tions can result in punishments or disabilities no less severe. Nor is the process 
198. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,9 (1952) (upholding contempt citations and 
jail tenns for attorneys who disobeyed trial judges' speech restrictions); Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation and a jail term for an attorney's violation of evidentiary 
rulings); see also Schauer, supra note 14, at 689. As Frederick Schauer notes: 
Id. 
Those who persist in saying ittelevant things after a ruling by the judge risk punishment for 
contempt, and thus it is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a place in which people run the risk 
of imprisonment for saying things that a government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to 
the matter at hand. 
199. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (upholding a reprimand by the state bar of 
an attorney who violated the rule against extrajudicial statements that might influence court proceedings). 
200. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring the opportunity for prompt 
judicial review of an adverse licensing decision); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne 
County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (holding an ex parte court order insufficient for a prior restraint). 
201. Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, recommendations for changes ro the evidentiary and 
procedural rules for the federal courts are made by a standing committee of the Judicial Conference 
(typically following the recommendation of an ad hoc committee) to the Judicial Conference itself. See 28 
U.S.c. § 2073 (2ooo). The Judicial Conference then makes recommendations to the Supreme O:JUrt, see 
id. § 331, which has the authority to implement changes to the rules, see id. § 1072 (2ooo), subject to 
intervention by Congress, see id. § 2074{a) (2ooo). Rules affecting an evidentiary privilege must be enacted 
into law by Congress itself. See id. § 2074{b). 
Of course, U[r)he rules of evidence have evolved over centuries through the familiar common-law 
processes," lARRy L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIvIL PROCEDURE 858 (2d ed. 2000); the FRE largely 
constitute a codification of this body of evolved principles. 
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of implementing speech restrictions any more participatory in the adjudicative 
than in the political context. And yet the quality and quantity of speech 
restrictions permitted in adjudication are, as we've seen, orders of magnitude 
greater than the quality and quantity of speech restrictions permitted in 
politics. The question remains: why? 
III. A MORE SATISFAcrORY JUSTIRCATION 
fu I've attempted to demonstrate, it turns out to be harder than one might 
think to justify the apparent lack of First Amendment attention paid to evi-
dentiary rules and other content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech. Hard 
as it is to justify, though, it is even harder to believe that it can't be justified. 
Restrictions on the freedom of adjudicative speech are long-standing and 
generally accepted features of our judicial system. The question is not so much 
whether they can be justified as how; and answering that question requires more 
than the question-begging mantras about "protect[ing] the integrity and fairness 
of [the] judicial system" and the like that courts tend to intone.202 What is 
needed is an understanding of what "the integrity and fairness of the judicial 
system" might mean and of how those qualities might rationalize imposing rather 
severe restrictions on the speech of participants in that system. I outline such an 
understanding in this part. 
A. Two Kinds of Adjudicative Legitimacy 
We can begin by distinguishing between two complementary ways in which 
a court decision might be assessed for political legitimacy. 
1. Direct Legitimacy 
The first way is to ask whether the decision is legitimate with respect to 
those who will be bound by it203 -primarily the litigants themselves, but also 
similarly situated subsequent litigants and potential litigants who will be bound 
through stare decisis. We might call this the question of direct legitimacy. 
I explained above how this question of direct legitimacy might be partially 
answered by focusing on the participatory nature of Anglo-American 
202. See. e.g .• Gentile. 501 U.S. at 1076. 
203. I leave open here the question of exactly what it might mean to be bound by a court 
decision. For a bit more on that issue. see Peters. Adjudication. supra note 24. at 360-74.401-30; Peters. 
Participation. supra note 24. at 204-11. The most extensive discussion of this question of which I am aware 
appears in Robert G. Bone. Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion. 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 193.265-69 (1992). 
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adjudication.204 Because the litigants can shape the decision that will bind them 
by participating in the process of making it, that decision has significant democ-
ratic legitimacy with respect to those litigants. 
Understanding the participatory nature of adjudication only provides a 
partial answer to the question of direct legitimacy, however, because it alone 
cannot explain the legitimacy of binding subsequent litigants to a court decision 
through stare decisis. Subsequent litigants--as well as conforming nonlitigants 
who alter their behavior to avoid becoming litigants--are in a meaningful sense 
coerced by earlier court decisions that will serve as precedents in their cases, 
constraining their ability to argue for certain results. Precedents thus are 
sources of prospectively binding norms, in many respects like statutes.20S But 
subsequent litigants and conforming nonlitigants, unlike the litigants in the 
precedent-setting cases by which they now are bound, have not had the oppor-
tunity to participate directly in creating those norms. Participation theory 
alone, then, cannot justify binding these subsequent parties to decisions 
reached through the efforts of previous litigants in previous court cases. It can-
not alone answer the question of the direct legitimacy of adjudication. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, that question can be answered by 
understanding judicial precedent as essentially a form of representative govern-
ment. 206 The interests of subsequently bound litigants and conforming 
nonlitigants are represented by the litigants who directly participate in deciding 
a precedential case; the common law method generally ensures that the 
interests of the precedent-setting and subsequently bound litigants will be 
materially similar because the facts of the respective cases must be materially 
similar in order for stare decisis to operate. The more binding a precedential 
decision, the more closely the facts of that case resemble the facts of the 
subsequent case in which the precedent will apply; and the more closely the facts 
of the precedential case resemble those of the subsequent case, the more closely 
aligned the interests of the litigants in the precedential case are likely to be to 
those of the corresponding litigants in the subsequent case. The common law 
method thus creates a relationship of interest representation between precedent-
setting and subsequently bound litigants. In so doing, it promotes adequate 
204. See supra Pan I.C 
205. But in many respects different from statutes. Statutes typically embody "if and only if' rules: 
They command that result R should obtain if and only if facts F, through FN are present. Common law 
"rules," on the other hand, typically allow for the possibility that result R might obtain even if not all of 
facts F, through F N are present. Statutory rules also typically close the universe of relevant facts, command-
ing that no facts other than F, through FN may be considered in determining whether result R should 
obtain; in contrast, common law "rules" typically allow for the possibility that other facts (for example, 
fact F N) may be considered in determining whether result Rshould obtain. For a more complete 
discussion of these distinctions, see Peters, AdjuJicarion, supra note 24, at 361-66. 
206. The foundation of this approach is set out in Peters, AdjuJicarion, supra note 24. 
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representation in court decisionmaking, much as the device of frequent elections 
promotes adequate representation in political decisionmaking. Understood this 
way, court decisions can possess direct political legitimacy not only with respect 
to the litigants immediately bound by those decisions, but also with respect to 
litigants and conforming nonlitigants who are subsequently bound by stare 
decisis. 
We might interpret the "fairness" component of the Supreme Court's 
concern, expressed in Gentile, for "the integrity and fairness of a ... judicial sys-
tem,,207 as a concern for the direct legitimacy of court decisions. A court decision 
is "fair" to the litigants if it is meaningfully the product of their participatory 
efforts; it is "fair" to subsequently bound litigants if it binds them only to the 
extent that their interests were meaningfully represented by the participation of 
the litigants in the precedential case. 
2. Derivative Legitimacy 
But the question of direct legitimacy, or fairness, is not the only question 
we can ask about the legitimacy of court decisions. Suppose a court must inter-
pret and apply some provision of a statute to decide a case. Suppose further 
that the process of interpreting the statutory provision is entirely participatory, 
resulting in a judicial decision that meaningfully responds to the arguments 
made by all the litigants. That decision then would possess considerable direct 
legitimacy with respect to the litigants bound by it. Finally, suppose that subse-
quent courts apply this decision as precedent only in cases involving facts (and 
thus litigants) that are materially similar to the facts and litigants of the prece-
dential case. These subsequent decisions, too, would possess a good deal of direct 
legitimacy with respect to the litigants bound by them.20B 
But the precedential decision, and therefore the subsequent decisions, still 
might be illegitimate in another sense. Suppose that the precedential decision, 
despite being the product of meaningful litigant participation, was bad as a piece 
of statutory interpretation-it did not accurately implement the purposes of the 
statutory provision that it was attempting to interpret.209 We might then think 
that the decision is illegitimate, not from the perspective of the particular 
207. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075; see supra text accompanying note 114. 
208. This conclusion might be strengthened if we make the fairly safe assumption that, consistent 
with the participatory nature of American adjudication, the subsequent litigants themselves have 
meaningfully participated in the process of deciding their case-including the process of deciding 
whether and to what extent the prior decision is precedentially binding. 
209. I don't mean to make a "purposivist" approach to statutory interpretation crucial to my 
analysis here. The same point can be made if we substitute the words "text" or "original intent" for the 
word "purposes" in the above sentence. The idea is simply to imagine a court decision that is, by whatever 
methodology, an erroneous interpretation of a statute. 
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litigants and others who will be directly bound by it, but from the perspective of 
legislative supremacy or the separation of powers. That is, we might think the 
decision is illegitimate because it frustrates the ability of the political 
branches--the legislature that voted for the statute and the chief executive 
who signed it-to make effective policy. 
Why might we think this? Well, suppose we have a conception of the 
separation of powers by which, broadly speaking, the political branches are 
charged with making general policy and the courts are charged with applying 
that general policy in particular cases.2lO On such a conception, it would be 
problematic for the political branches, by enacting a statute, to make policy X, 
only to have a court, in deciding a particular case, interpret the statute in a way 
that frustrates policy X.211 If we believe in a concept of "legislative supremacy," 
by which legislative (or, more generally, political-branch) policymaking is supe-
rior in authority to judicial policymaking, then we are likely to think that there 
is some political illegitimacy in allowing courts to frustrate legislative policy 
when they decide cases. 
We might call this the question of the derivative political legitimacy of 
court decisions. If we assume a conception of the separation of powers by which 
the political branches legitimately make general policy, and the courts must 
attempt to faithfully apply that general policy in particular cases, then a judicial 
decision is politically legitimate only if it correctly applies the policy made by the 
political branches. In this sense its legitimacy is derivative of the legitimacy of 
the general policy it is correctly applying.212 
We might interpret the "integrity" component of the Gentile Court's con-
cern for "the integrity and fairness of a ... judicial system" as a concern about the 
derivative legitimacy of court decisions. Court decisions have "integrity," with 
respect to the proper democratic hierarchy of legitimate policymaking, if they 
are consistent with the general policies, paradigmatically those created by the 
political branches, that they are supposed to interpret and apply.213 
My thesis here is that evidentiary rules, and other restrictions on adjudica-
tive speech, can be understood and justified as means of promoting both the 
210. I will defend such a conception in Part IlI.e., infra. 
211. I put aside here, for the sake of argument, exactly what it means for the political branches to 
"make" policy X and to embody it in a statute. Here again, debates will center on the importance of 
original intent, of statutory text, and so on. 
212. As I will contend in Part III.e.3. infra, the concern for derivative legitimacy is not limited to 
cases involving the interpretation of statutes. 
213. This understanding of "integrity" echoes Ronald Dworkin's use of the term "political integrity" 
to describe a moral norm "requir[ing) government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and 
coherent manner toward all its citizens." RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 165 (1986). But my use 
of it here, or rather my reading of the Gentile Court's use of it, relates specifically to a requirement of judicial 
allegiance to norms created by politically legitimate processes, not to the more general requirement of 
holistic decisionmaking consistency that Dworkin means to invoke. 
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direct legitimacy (the "fairness") and the derivative legitimacy (the "integrity") 
of court decisions. Sometimes such restrictions promote direct legitimacy by 
preventing one litigant from skewing a court's decisionmaking process in her 
favor, without a meaningful opportunity for participation by the opposing liti-
gant. I explain this function in Part IIl.B. More often the restrictions promote 
derivative legitimacy by limiting the capacity of a judge or a jury to misapply or 
ignore the general policies they are supposed to be implementing. I explain this 
function in Part lIl.e. 
B. Adjudicative Speech Restrictions and Direct Legitimacy 
Some common types of restriction on adjudicative speech can be justified 
as means of preserving the direct legitimacy of court decisions-their "fairness," 
in the terminology of the Gentile Court. Gentile itself involved one such restric-
tion. Recall that in that case, Nevada attempted to prohibit attorneys from 
making extrajudicial statements having "a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding";Zl4 while invalidating Nevada's rule for 
vagueness, the Court upheld the "material prejudice" standard for restrictions 
on extrajudicial attorney speech.215 
The Nevada rule can be understood in part as an attempt to preserve the 
direct legitimacy of court decisions by preventing one litigant, through its attor-
ney, from influencing an adjudicative decisionmaker-the eventual jury-with-
out giving the other party an opportunity to fully and fairly respond. A verdict 
reached after the jury has been preconditioned to accept one party's version 
of events lacks the kind of fairness that we would expect from a legitimate 
government decision, because one of the parties bound by the decision has 
not had a fully meaningful opportunity to participate in that decision. As in the 
case of a preexisting judicial bias against one of the litigants,Z16 the decision 
therefore is tainted from a democratic perspective. 
In this sense, we can understand the Nevada rule in Gentile to serve a sort 
of "representation-reinforcing" function analogous to that assigned by John Hart 
Ely to constitutional rights.217 The rule attempts to ensure that one party to a 
government decisionmaking procedure (here, adjudication) does not obtain an 
unfair advantage over other parties, thus risking a skewed outcome. The Nevada 
rule also evokes the related notion, recently articulated most vigorously by Cass 
214. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033. 
215. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text. 
216. This will be discussed infra Pan IV.B. 
217. See ELY, supra note 57. 
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Sunstein, that institutional rules should promote government decisionmaking 
that is deliberative rather than biased or irrationa1.21B 
Other common restrictions on adjudicative speech serve similar participa-
tion-reinforcing functions. Consider rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence,219 which can be understood as preventing a litigant from presenting 
evidence to which its opponent has no full and fair opportunity to respond. 220 
Consider also rules against the admission of character evidence and evidence of 
other crimes;221 such rules serve to prevent the jury from developing and acting 
upon an irrational bias against a litigant, much as the Equal Protection Clause 
serves, in Ely's view, to mitigate irrational bias in the political process against 
"discrete and insular" minorities.m 
Indeed many, perhaps most, rules of evidence carry a tinge of this concern 
for direct legitimacy through procedural fairness, in the following sense. As I 
argue in the next subpart, rules of evidence and other restrictions on adjudicative 
speech often can be understood primarily as means of promoting derivative 
legitimacy-that is, as means of ensuring the accurate judicial implementation 
of general legislative policies. But there is a close connection between the goals 
of derivative and direct legitimacy. Considerations of fair notice make it prob-
lematic to decide cases according to norms that one or more of the litigants 
could not have expected might be applied. This is less a problem with out-
comes-the actual decisions resulting from adjudication-than with inputs. 
As long as the litigants have had a full and fair opportunity to participate in the 
adjudicative process, the outcome (like those of democmtic politics) can be seen 
as legitimate, even if it could not have been predicted at the start of the process. 
218. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME CoURT 24-45 (1999). 
219. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801--D7. 
220. In criminal cases, the prohibition of hearsay has a constitutional basis: the defendant's right 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him" conferred by the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CoNST. 
amend. VI; see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.s. 346 (1992); Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). But that fact doesn't eliminate the need to justify hearsay rules under the First 
Amendment. For one thing, the Confrontation Clause applies against the government in criminal cases, 
and the government itself has no free speech rights. Nor does the Confrontation Clause explain the 
applicability of hearsay rules in the context of civil cases. 
221. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404,405. 
222. See ELY, supra note 57, chs. 4, 6. Some restrictions on adjudicative speech also mitigate the 
effects of economic inequality among litigants, thereby increasing the direct legitimacy of court decisions. 
"Gag rules" like the one upheld in Gentile can prevent wealthier litigants from using the media to 
influence a jury's or judge's deliberations. More generally, the relatively level playing field imposed 
within a courtroom by evidentiary rules, and by a judge's traditional authority to limit the number of 
witnesses presented, the amount of time for examination and cross-examination, the length of oral 
arguments, and the like, see, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(15) (allowing judges to enter orders, inter alia, 
"establishing a reasonable limit on the time allowed for presenting evidence"), diminishes some of the 
advantage that a wealthier litigant might otherwise possess. But of course much potential for economic 
inequality, and thus for crises of direct legitimacy, remains in American litigation. 
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But this reasoning supposes the opportunity for full and fair participation; and 
that in tum relies to some extent upon advance notice regarding what the 
grounds of participation will be. 
Imagine, for example, an adjudicative system that has no requirement of 
relevance-that is, a system that lacks a rule that evidence must meet some 
standard of relevance in order to be admissible. In such a system, each litigant 
would have little basis for predicting what kind of evidence and arguments her 
opponent will present in court. In a personal injury lawsuit, for example, the 
plaintiff, free of relevancy requirements, could present evidence regarding the 
defendant's insurance policy, its pattern of political contributions, its propensity 
for polluting the environment, its political affiliations--anything that might 
influence the jury to decide in the plaintiffs favor. (The defendant, of course, 
could reciprocate in kind). But there would be no good way of knowing ahead of 
time exactly (or even roughly) what types of evidence and arguments the other 
side is likely to present. The result would be akin to a game played by no fixed 
rules; outcomes would be arbitrary, less the product of proofs and reasoned 
arguments than of hit-and-run guerilla tactics. 
Of course, an arbitrary, no-holds-barred game might be fine if that's what 
the players have signed up to play. (Some might describe democratic politics 
as such a "game.") But because of the need for derivative legitimacy-because 
adjudication, in our tradition, is a process of giving concrete meaning in specific 
cases to general legislative norms, as I explain in the next section-American 
litigants reasonably expect that the game of adjudication will be played by 
certain rules. They expect that adjudication will in fact be a process of 
attempting to give contextual meaning to general norms, rather than 
an anything-goes contest of name calling and mudslinging. A litigant who 
shows up expecting to play one game and finds herself forced to play another 
has, in some sense, been deprived of the full and fair opportunity to participate, 
because the terms on which she justifiably expects to participate have 
suddenly been changed. 
So the connection between the goals of derivative and direct legitimacy in 
adjudication stems from the fact that litigants generally expect adjudication to 
aspire toward the former goal. If that aspiration proves illusory, the resulting 
frustration of the litigants' expectations also threatens the latter goal. As such, 
restrictions that promote derivative legitimacy by constraining the court to the 
accurate implementation of general policies also promote direct legitimacy by 
fulfilling the litigants' expectations of such constraint. 
Which means that the First Amendment legitimacy of evidentiary rules 
and other restrictions on adjudicative speech relies significantly on the extent to 
which they promote derivative legitimacy-"integrity," in the words of the 
Gentile Court. I now tum to that question. 
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C. Adjudicative Speech Restrictions and Derivative Legitimacy 
While preserving direct legitimacy is the primary function of some restric-
tions on adjudicative speech, most such restrictions can be understood as con-
cerned chiefly with the preservation of derivative legitimacy. Derivative 
legitimacy, again, is the political legitimacy that adjudicative decisions derive 
from consistency with the general policies they are supposed to implement. In 
this subpart, I first explain in more detail what I mean by derivative legitimacy 
and defend the premise that derivative legitimacy does in fact matter in 
American adjudication. Then I contend that many common restrictions on 
adjudicative speech serve the purpose of ptomoting derivative legitimacy. 
1. The Concern With Derivative Legitimacy 
Government, of course, usually has the power, and almost always claims 
the authority, to act coercively. Perhaps the central question of political theory 
is the question of the conditions under which government may legitimately 
exercise that power and claim that authority. As I've argued, the "democratic" 
answer to that question, in its best interpretation, holds that government 
generally may coerce to the extent that those being coerced have the opportu-
nity to participate meaningfully in the process of deciding how the power to 
coerce will be used.223 In a democratic system, those coerced can participate 
directly, by means of political speech and voting,Z24 and indirectly, through the 
representatives and officials who presumably are influenced by their political 
speech and voting. 
A democratic government, then, may legitimately make policy-in Ronald 
Dworkin's terms, a decision or set of decisions designed to "advance[] or 
protect[] some collective goal of the community as a whole"225 -that is binding 
on (coercive of) the "community as a whole," because the members of the 
community as a whole have had the opportunity meaningfully to participate in 
the making of that policy. So, for example, the U.S. Congress can legitimately 
pass statutes binding on all U.S. citizens, because those citizens have had the 
opportunity to participate in the making of the statute through their political 
speech and their voting (and the incentive for legislators created by their abil-
ity to vote in the future).226 For the same reason, the President and others in 
223. See supra Pan I.A. 
224. See generally ELY, supra note 57, at 105-25. 
225. DwORKIN, supra note 141, at 82. 
226. What about noncitizens who are nonetheless bound by laws passed by Congress? The 
legitimacy of binding them is a potentially perplexing issue, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 57, at 148-50, 161-62; 
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs 119-31 (1989), that is beyond my scope here. We 
might get a stan at it by asking whether the fact that most aliens are voluntary residents of the United 
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the executive branch can legitimately make decisions that bind all of us. Offi-
cials in our state governments can legitimately coerce citizens of their respective 
states, and so on. In short, the making of binding general policy by the political 
branches is politically legitimate because those bound have (or could have) 
participated (if only by proxy) in the policymaking. 
Adjudication, as I have argued, is a participatory process too.227 Litigants 
can legitimately (democratically) be bound by judicial decisions because those 
decisions, at least ideally, are products of their meaningful participatory efforts. 
And future litigants, along with those who alter their behavior to avoid becom-
ing future litigants, are legitimately (democratically) bound by judicial decisions 
through stare decisis; their interests and those of the precedent-setting litigants 
must be materially similar in order for stare decisis to operate, and thus the 
precedent-setting litigants have a strong incentive to represent those interests. 
But note who cannot, on a participation-based theory, be bound 
legitimately by most judicial decisions: members of "the community as a whole." 
Members of the community as a whole (future litigants and conforming nonliti-
gants aside) typically do not have the ability to participate meaningfully in the 
making of court decisions, either directly or through interest representation. 
To the extent a court decision is binding on the community as a whole, then, it 
is democratically illegitimate, or at least less democratically legitimate than 
policy made by the politically accountable branches of govemment.228 
Participation theory, therefore, is one way to explain the traditional 
understanding of the policymaking hierarchy within our constitutional system 
of separation of powers. Policymaking by the politically accountable branches 
is superior in authority to policymaking by relatively unaccountable courts 
because the former follows from the broad participation of the entire commu-
nity, while the latter follows only from the relatively narrow participation of the 
litigants to a particular court case. This hierarchy of legitimacy is preserved 
States allows us to get around restrictions on their political participation by means of some sort of 
consent theory, and by noting that many constitutional protections, particularly those of equal protection 
and freedom of speech, apply to aliens. See ELY, supra note 57, at 161--62. 
22 7 . See supra Part I.e. 
228. Here again we are dealing in ideals. Obviously court decisions often are binding on the 
community as a whole in various ways. See, e.g., Peters, Adjudication, supra note 24, at 412-14; Peters, 
Participation, supra note 24, at 209-11; Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the NewJUllicial Minimalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REv. 1454, 1487-90 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, Minimalisml. One point of evidentiary rules 
and similar restrictions, I will argue, is to limit the occasions on which, and the extent to which, this is 
true. 
AI; I have written elsewhere, there are other means besides restrictions on adjudicative speech of 
imposing such limits, including narrowing the scope of judicial decisions, see Peters, Adjudication, supra note 
24, at 401-11; Peters, Minimalism, supra, at 1513-21, and of making such limits less necessary, including 
broadening participation in important public law cases, see Peters, Adjudicatian, supra note 24, at 417-19; 
Peters, Partici/XUion, supra note 24, at 210; Peters, Minimalism, supra, at 1488--90. 
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when a court accurately interprets and applies general policy made by the 
politically accountable branches. It is frustrated, however, when a court inter-
prets and applies that general policy inaccurately, or when a court rejects that 
general policy in favor of policy created by the (less accountable) court itself. 
In order to preserve their policymaking superiority, then, the political 
branches must have the legitimate authority not only to make policy, but also to 
exert some control over how that policy is applied (and to ensure that the policy 
is applied rather than rejected or changed). The authority to make policy is not 
worth much if the policy one makes is changed by those (the courts) that are 
supposed to apply it, or is applied in ways that are inconsistent with the policy. 
A word of caution here. A classic understanding of the separation of 
powers holds that policymakers and policy-appliers must be distinct from each 
other.229 The idea is that a combined policymaker/policy-applier could make 
seemingly neutral policies (say, a tax on everyone's income) and then apply those 
policies in nonneutral ways (say, by exempting the policymakers themselves 
and their friends, family, and campaign contributors). This would undercut 
one of the safeguards supposedly applicable to policymaking in a representative 
democracy: the fact that our representatives "can make no law which will not 
have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great 
fh . ,,230 mass 0 t e soclety. 
To say that policymakers should not, for this reason, also be policy-appliers, 
though, is not to say that policymakers should not be able to ensure that their 
policies will be applied in ways that are consistent with (not contradictory of) the 
policies themselves. It is not to say, for example, that the legislature that enacts 
an income tax should not be able to ensure that the courts who interpret it (and, 
for that matter, the executive who enforces it) cannot exempt their oom friends, 
family, and campaign contributors.23I 
229. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). 
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison). 
231. True, Montesquieu worries that "[wlhen the legislative power is united with the executive 
power ... there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical 
laws will execute them tyrannically." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 229, at 157; see also THE FEDERALIST 
No. 47 Games Madison) (quoting Montesquieu to this effect). This suggests a concern not for tyranny 
through inconsistency between policymaking and policy applying, but rather for tyranny through consis-
tency between those two functions. The idea here seems to be that a separate executive can temper, 
through moderate enforcement, unduly harsh laws enacted by the legislature; as such, it resonates with the 
argument made by Madison in Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers helps protect individual 
rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Montesquieu's argument for separating the judicial 
from the legislative power, however, is different: "If [the judicial power] were joined to the legislative power, 
the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator." 
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 229, at 157. This argument seems to support the notion that courts should 
not be policymake~t they should faithfully apply, not independently create, general policy in order to 
avoid "arbitrariness." Of course, Hamilton complicates matters in Federalist No. 78 when he suggests 
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My thesis in this part of the Article, which I defend below, is that many or 
most content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech can best be understood as 
means by which the legitimate policymaking branches of government control 
the case-by-case application of that policy by the courts. To put it a bit 
differently, restrictions on adjudicative speech are mechanisms for effectuating 
the policymaking role of the political branches (and, as I will argue, of the com-
mon law and the constitutional Framers) and for confining the role of the judi-
cial branch to policy-applying. As such, they legitimately constrain the speech 
of participants in adjudicative decisionmaking-Iegitimately because the process 
is one of applying policy made elsewhere, not of creating or changing it. 232 
There are some readily apparent complications of this general idea which 
flow from the fact that much adjudication does not involve the application of 
general legislative policy in the form of statutes. Common law cases involve the 
application of norms derived from prior court decisions; constitutional cases 
involve the application of norms derived from a source of law that trumps ordi-
nary statutes. I deal with these complications below. First, however, let me 
explain how restrictions on adjudicative speech serve the function I have 
described here, that of promoting derivative legitimacy. 
2. Adjudicative Speech Restrictions as Means of Preserving 
Derivative Legitimacy 
In order for a court decision to possess derivative legitimacy, it must meet 
the requirement of accuracy, meaning that it must be a reasonably correct 
implementation of the applicable legislative policy or policies. It must also 
meet the corollary requirement of faithfulness, meaning that it must not involve 
the rejection of applicable legislative policies in favor of new policies created by 
the court (including the jury). In this subpart, I explain how evidentiary rules, 
that the judiciary might "operate[ I as a check upon the legislative lxxIy" by "mitigating the severity and 
confining the operation of [unjust and partialllaws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
232. This sentence is likely to raise a red flag for the reader attuned to jurisprudential debates about 
whether courts, in deciding cases, "create" new law or merely "discover" or "apply" existing law. I am some-
thing of a Dworkinian on this question; I believe that judges exercise a creative function in determining 
the most justifiable way to apply existing general norms to specific facts. See generally DwORKIN, supra 
note 141; DwORKIN, supra note 213. That is, judges combine creativity with discovery. But I don't think 
the particular contours of my jurisprudential understanding matter much to the point I'm trying to make in 
the text. What is important is the idea that the ptoper role of judges (or rather courts, including not only 
juries but also litigants and their lawyers) within a constitutional democracy like ours is to implement (or 
apply, or translate, or whatever particular term one prefers) generally applicable norms ("policies") created 
by the other branches in specific cases, and to do so in a way that is consistent with the norms being 
implemented. Clearly this will almost always involve some creativity on the part of the judge and the other 
participants, because there will almost always be room for debate about exactly which implementation is 
most consistent with the guiding norms (or about what the guiding norms themselves are), 
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and other restrictions on adjudicative speech, can be justified as means of pre-
serving these requirements of accuracy and faithfulness. 
Restrictions on adjudicative speech can be roughly broken down into three 
different categories, according to the way in which they constrain courts' applica-
tion of legislative policy. As we shall see, the categories bleed into one another 
somewhat. I call the categories, respectively, fact-constraining restrictions (which 
are concerned with preserving the accurate application of legislative policy), 
norm-constraining restrictions (which are concerned with preserving the faithful 
application of legislative policy), and extrinsic restrictions (which are concerned 
with the accurate and faithful implementation of legislative policies that cut 
across different types of claims). I describe each category and explain its legiti-
mating function below. 
a. Fact-Constraining Restrictions 
Many evidentiary rules, and related restrictions on adjudicative speech, 
can be understood as safeguards against empirically inaccurate applications of 
legislative policy. Suppose, for example, that the legislature enacts a statute 
establishing a policy that people who knowingly make material misrepresen-
tations in securities transactions should pay damages to those who purchased 
or sold securities in reliance on the misrepresentations. Empirically accurate 
implementation of that policy requires making sure that, for example, the defen-
dant made false representations and did so knowingly, and that the plaintiff 
relied on those representations. If a defendant is found liable for securities 
fraud despite, say, not having actually made the representations alleged, the 
legislative policy has not been accurately applied. 
Evidentiary rules, and other speech restrictions, that serve the function of 
promoting the empirically accurate application of general legislative policies 
might be described as fact-constraining restrictions: They limit the universe of 
facts upon which courts may rely in their decisionmaking to those facts, or types 
of facts, that the legislature (or other policymaker) considers sufficiently relevant 
to the application of its general policies in specific cases. So, for instance, courts 
(including juries) deciding lawsuits for securities fraud might be restricted to 
relying on those facts that, in the legislative judgment, are likely to be relevant 
to whether the defendant actually committed the acts for which she is being 
sued. And if courts may be restricted in the facts upon which they rely in 
deciding a case, then the litigants (and their attorneys) may be restricted in the 
facts they present in seeking a court decision. That is where evidentiary rules and 
the like come in. 
Notice that the same justification of speech restrictions doesn't work in the 
context of democratic politics. The political branches need not be constrained 
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to accurately applying policy, because they can make policy that is legitimately 
binding on the community as a whole. That is, they can make policy that is 
legitimately binding so long as the community as a whole-including all its 
members2}} -has the opportunity to participate in making it. Imposing fact-
constraining restrictions, or norm-constraining restrictions like I describe below, 
on political debate would deprive those members of the community who think 
certain facts or norms are relevant and important of the opportunity to partici-
pate in policymaking. And, unlike in adjudication, in politics there is no 
limiting principle, based in the legitimate purpose of the enterprise, for imposing 
such constraints. 
In adjudication, many rules of evidence serve an obvious fact-constraining 
function. Rules restricting admissible evidence to what is "relevant" are salient 
1 234 1 .. 235 h 2}6 d th examp es, as are ru es governmg wltness competency, earsay, an e 
authenticity of documentary and physical evidence.237 Some other restrictions on 
adjudicative speech (besides evidentiary rules proper) also fit into this category. 
For instance, "gag orders" preventing attorneys or litigants from public discussion 
of a pending case,238 and rules of professional conduct to the same effect (as in 
Gentile239 ) , serve to prevent juries from being exposed to (and thus potentially 
basing their decisions upon) "facts" that have not been tested for their relevance 
to the accurate decision of a pending case, that is, to the accurate judicial 
application of legislative policy. 
Note in this connection that some restrictions on adjudicative speech 
appear to serve the goals of both derivative and direct legitimacy in fairly salient 
ways. The conduct rule at issue in Gentile, for example, protects against both a 
jury's departure from applying applicable legislative policies to the facts of a 
233. Of course, there will be definitional issues here. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 226, at 119-31. 
234. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. 
235. E.g., id. 602,606,702,704. 
236. E.g., id. 801-07. 
237. E.g., id. 901,1002. 
238. Such orders "are increasingly common, and there are lower court cases both invalidating 
and upholding [them)," although "[t)he Supreme Court has never addressed the question of when it is 
permissible for courts to impose gag orders on attorneys and other trial participants." Q-\EMERINSKY, 
supra note 20, § 11.2.3.3, at 931. Chemerinsky notes: 
mhe law in this area is in "significant disarray" and ... "[a)ppellate courts tend to reverse such 
gag orders when [the speech they prohibit does) not pose serious and imminent threats to the 
fairness of the proceedings. When the order is narrowly tailored to eliminate serious and 
imminent threats, however, appellate courts are inclined to sustain such orders." 
Id. (quoting RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-67 (1994». 
Thus, court-imposed gag orders typically have been subjected to roughly the same test of validity as the 
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard adopted by the rule of profeSSional conduct 
upheld by the Supreme Court in the Gentile case. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1065-76 
(1991); see also supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text. 
239. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033. 
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particular case (that is, derivative illegitimacy) and the jury's formation of an 
anterior bias against one of the parties (that is, direct illegitimacy). 240 
b. Norm-Constraining Restrictions 
Fact-constraining restrictions can be distinguished conceptually from norm-
constraining restrictions, although the line sometimes will be tricky to draw 
in practice and although some restrictions might serve both functions. Norm-
constraining restrictions are designed to ensure that courts, in "applying" general 
legislative policies, do so faithfully-that is, do not in fact apply some other 
policy of the court's (including potentially the jury's) own creation. They are 
designed, that is, to restrict courts as much as possible to the implementation of 
legislatively created norms. In slightly different terms, norm-constraining 
restrictions are designed to ensure that courts get "the law" right. HI 
So, for example, the legislature that provides liability for securities fraud 
might have the purposes of deterring knowing misrepresentations, punishing 
them when they occur, and making whole those who are injured by them. It 
might then want to prohibit a court (including a jury) from deciding to hold 
liable for securities fraud a defendant who did not actually know her representa-
tions were false or misleading, or to award damages to a plaintiff who did not 
actually rely on the defendant's representations.242 An obvious way to enforce 
such a prohibition is to prohibit the litigants from trying to persuade the jury to 
decide the case on such inappropriate grounds. Fact-constraining restrictions 
serve to prevent the court from mistakenly holding the innocent or harmless 
defendant liable for securities fraud; norm-constraining restrictions serve to pre-
vent the court (including the jury) from intentionaUy holding the innocent or 
harmless defendant liable for securities fraud. 
Norm-constraining restrictions are nearly as common as fact-constraining 
restrictions. Rules against the admission of character evidence or evidence of 
past crimes243 can be understood as norm-constraining restrictions: They prohibit 
the litigants from arguing, say, that the accused murderer should (or should not) 
be punished because she is (or is not) a "good person," or because she did (or did 
240. I discuss this latter aspect of the Gentile rule supra Part III.B. 
241. I want to be careful not to give the impression, by the language I use, that all restrictions on 
adjudicative speech have been intentionally and consciously "designed" to serve these purposes; I argue 
only that these restrictions can be understood to serve, and can be normatively justified as serving, these 
functions. I am not contending that when courts and legislative bodies promulgate the restrictions, or when 
courts apply them, they always (or even often, or even ever} are self-consciously attempting to serve these 
functions. Thus I use the terminology of "design" in the text to indicate function rather than intention. 
242. Juries might be tempted to reward particularly sympathetic plaintiffs, regardless oflegislative 
policy, or to punish particularly wealthy or arrogant corporate defendants. 
243. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (presumption against admission of evidence of character and other 
crimes). 
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not do} something bad in the past, rather than because she is (or is not) actually 
a murderer. Rules against admitting evidence that a tort defendant carries 
liability insurance144 or made a settlement offer145 prevent the plaintiff from 
arguing that the defendant should be found liable not because he actually com-
mitted a tort, but because he can afford to or offered to pay for the plaintiffs 
injuries. Even the requirement of relevance can be understood to serve norm-
constraining purposes as well as fact-constraining ones: It prevents judges and 
juries from relying on irrelevant facts intentionally as well as mistakenly. Rules 
excluding evidence that is more "prejudicial" than "probative,,146 are perhaps best 
understood as norm-constraining restrictions. And judicial gag orders, and rules 
of professional conduct to the same effect, serve the norm-constraining function 
of preventing not only the confusion of juries but also the temptation of juries to 
decide cases according to policies of their own, or of the litigants' own, devising. 
c. Extrinsic Restrictions 
Some restrictions on adjudicative speech, particularly certain evidentiary 
rules, do not fit comfortably into either the fact-constraining or the norm-con-
straining category. Consider, for example, FRE 407, which excludes evidence 
of "subsequent remedial measures" offered for the purpose of proving "negligence, 
culpable conduct, a defect in a product, ... or a need for a warning or instruc-
tion.,,147 Rule 407 does not seem like a fact-constraining rule, because exclusion 
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures typically will make a court less 
rather than more likely to accurately apply the legislative policy at issue in a case. 
(This is another way of saying that the rule excludes obviously relevant 
evidence.) If the defendant in, say, a premises liability case took steps to fence 
in the huge pit in his yard the day after the plaintiff fell into it, surely that fact 
is relevant to whether the pit should have been fenced in the day before-that 
is, to whether the defendant was negligent pursuant to the general policy of 
negligence the court is supposed to apply. 
But Rule 407 does not seem like a proper norm-constraining rule, either: It 
does not serve to avoid tempting the jury (or, conceivably, the judge) to 
change rather than apply the general legislative policy. The general legislative 
policy, after all, is to hold negligent parties liable for the injuries they cause.148 
244. See, e.g., id. 411. 
245. See, e.g., id. 408. 
246. See, e.g., id. 403. 
247. Id.407. 
248. Of course, as this example suggests, courts often will be applying common law, rather than 
legislative, policy. I address below the complications presented by this fact. See infra Part 1II.C.3.a. 
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Admitting fairly powerful evidence that a party has acted negligently only 
encourages a judge and jury to enforce that policy, not to circumvent or alter it. 
I think FRE 407, and similar rules that exclude seemingly probative and 
nonprejudicial evidence,z49 are examples of a special type of norm-constraining 
rule: one designed to prohibit courts from frustrating legislative policies that are 
extrinsic to the primary policy being applied in a case. Thus I call them extrinsic 
restrictions on adjudicative speech (although the term is somewhat misleading, as 
I explain below). The obvious policy behind FRE 407 is to encourage remedia-
tion of unsafe conditions, products, etc., even (or perhaps especially) when those 
conditions or products already have caused injury. The obvious policy behind 
the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the uninhibited solicitation and 
provision of legal advice; and so on. These "extrinsic" policies are so important 
that the legislature (or the common law) is willing to pursue them even to the 
detriment of the "primary" policies being applied in a given case--even at the 
cost of allowing a tortfeasor to avoid liability or a guilty criminal to go free. 
Restrictions on adjudicative speech like FRE 407 and the attorney-client 
privilege serve the function of ensuring that courts apply the extrinsic policy 
rather than the primary policy when the two conflict. 
In fact, it is probably better to think of the extrinsic and primary policies 
as parts of a holistic policy package rather than as separate and potentially con-
flicting policies. (This is the sense in which it is misleading to speak of "extrin-
sic" policies.) The legislative policy in tort cases, taken as a whole, is to hold 
negligent parties liable except when doing so would discourage them from taking 
reasonable remedial measures; the legislative policy in criminal cases is to punish 
guilty parties except when doing so would discourage them from seeking legal 
advice; and so on.2SO Viewed against this understanding, extrinsic restrictions like 
FRE 407 are in fact norm-constraining rules designed to prevent courts from 
249. Many or most evidentiary privileges are examples of such rules. The attorney-client 
privilege, for instance, excludes obviously probative evidence that is not likely to be "prejudicial" in the 
sense of creating factual confusion or nonnative temptation, as does the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. Other examples include FRE 412 (which generally excludes evidence of a 
victim's past sexual behavior) and, arguably, FRE 409 (which excludes evidence that a defendant paid 
or offered to pay a victim's medical expenses). I say "arguably" with respect to FRE 409 because that rule 
might also be considered a norm-constraining rule akin to the exclusion of evidence of liability 
insurance and settlement offers----one designed to prevent the jury ftom punishing the defendant solely 
because of his ability to pay. 
250. There are likely to be multiple "except" clauses applicable in any given case, because there 
are likely to be multiple extrinsic restrictions on speech that apply or potentially apply in any case. For 
instance, the plaintiff in a ton case is prohibited from presenting evidence of the defendant's subsequent 
remedial measures and from presenting evidence of the defendant's privileged communications with her 
attorney. 
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applying only part of the relevant policy-for example, the (primary) liability-
imposing part but not the (extrinsic) remediation-encouraging part. 25I 
3. Complications 
To this point, my argument connecting adjudicative speech restrictions 
to derivative legitimacy has focused on the paradigm case in which a court is 
assigned the task of applying legislatively created-that is, statutory-policy. It 
is easy to see that the argument applies also to cases involving the application 
of administrative rules, executive orders, and other nonstatutory products of the 
political branches. But cases involving statutes, administrative rules, and the like 
do not make up all of adjudication; in fact, historically they have comprised a 
minority of court cases. Does my analysis hold also in cases involving common 
law-that is, court-created-norms? In cases involving norms that derive not 
from ordinary legislation, but from a constitution? I think it does hold in both 
types of cases, and I explain why in this subpart. 
a. The Common Law 
Restrictions on adjudicative speech, including rules of evidence, apply in 
common law cases as well as in statutory cases. Indeed, despite recent codifica-
tions,252 most evidentiary rules have evolved over time through decisions made 
by the courts themselves.253 So if it is true that most evidentiary rules and other 
adjudicative speech restrictions can be justified as means of preserving derivative 
legitimacy-the supremacy of policymaking by the political branches-how can 
the use of such restrictions be justified in common law cases, in which courts 
apply law that has been made not by the legislature, but by other courts? 
We can take a step toward answering that question by appreciating the 
fairly obvious fact that the common law can be overridden by legislation; it exists 
at the sufferance of the legislature. Where it continues to exist, the common law 
reflects a de facto legislative policy to leave certain fields of the law unplowed by 
legislation.2si (The policy need not be the product of a considered judgment by 
251. Indeed, there often will be a particular danger that couns, especially juries, will shortchange the 
full legislative policy in this way: Plaintiffs in tort cases are likely to emphasize liability-imposition (which, 
after all, will get them paid) over remediation-encouragement (which won't), and defendants might prefer 
to stay away from the subject of "remediation" altogether. 
252. The FRE, for instance, were not promulgated until 1975. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 
201, at 858 n.l67. 
253. See id. at 858. 
254. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
Found. Press 1994) (1958) ("[I]n relation to the body of general directive arrangements which govern 
private activity in the society [the legislature's] responsibility is ... accurately described as secondary in 
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the legislature that certain areas are best left to the common law; it might simply 
be an implication of a series of ad hoc legislative judgments that the legislature's 
limited resources should be devoted to legislating in other areas.) In making 
and developing the common law, then, courts are in a sense applying legislative 
policy: They are applying the general policy that specific norms in particular 
areas should be adjudicatively developed. 
The idea that the common law is a sort of delegated legislation, however, 
doesn't provide a completely satisfactory justification for the application of evi-
dentiary rules and other speech restrictions in common law cases. For one 
thing, as an historical matter, extensive legislation is a relatively recent devel-
opment in Anglo-American law. The status of legislation as a source of legal 
norms didn't begin to rival that of the common law until the late nineteenth 
or early twentieth century,255 but of course rules of evidence and other speech 
restrictions had been applied in common law cases from a much earlier date. So, 
even if such restrictions might now be justified on the theory that courts are 
doing the legislature's work when they decide common law cases, their historical 
development can't be explained in that way. 
Moreover, even if we can satisfactorily conceptualize common law-making 
as a type of delegated legislation, participation theory does not necessarily require 
the presence of adjudicative speech restrictions in common law cases. Even if 
common law norms exist at the sufferance of the political branches, it wouldn't 
be accurate to say that their content has been determined by means of a broad 
participatory process. The fact that the legislature has not chosen to replace a 
common law rule does not mean that the rule itself has the same democratic 
legitimacy that a statute has. The process of generating a statute is more broadly 
participatory than the process of creating a common law rule. It would be a bit 
strange, then, to equate the function of speech restrictions in statutory cases, 
which is to maintain the court's faithfulness to broadly participatory, politically 
generated policy, with their function in common law cases, which is to maintain 
the court's faithfulness to policy generated by other (narrowly participatory) 
courts. 
Of course, while court decisions are more narrowly participatory, as a gen-
eral matter, than political decisions, they also are more narrowly binding. Most 
political decisions-statutes serve as the paradigm example here-set out a 
general rule that applies in a broad range of specific cases. Common law court 
decisions, however, produce only decisions of specific cases and, through stare 
decisis, of future materially similar cases; their binding effect, therefore, is not 
the sense of second-line. The legislature characteristically functions in this relation as an intennittently 
intervening, trouble-shooting, back-sropping agency."). 
255. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATlITES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
ST A nrrORY INTERPRET AnON 59-63, 88-96 (1999). 
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usually as broad as a statute's. Thus the participation that is required in order for 
a typical common law decision to be legitimate is the participation of a relatively 
narrow segment of the community: the parties to a particular case (who partici~ 
pate directly) and future similar litigants and conforming nonlitigants (who are 
represented by the parties to the precedential case). In this sense, as I suggested 
in Parts II.C. and IV.A, it is inaccurate to say that a common law court decision 
is "less legitimate," from a democratic perspective, than a statute or other political 
decision. Common law decisionmaking is less broadly participatory than politics, 
but it also is less broadly binding. 
The problem for evidentiary rules and other adjudicative speech restric-
tions, however, remains. If it is the participation of the litigants we care about 
in assessing the legitimacy of common law court decisions, why should the 
terms of that participation be circumscribed by things like evidentiary rules? 
Here the notion of a policymaking hierarchy doesn't supply the answer: While 
courts may be bound to faithfully apply politically generated policy, it is hard to 
see why, from the perspective of participatory legitimacy, a court should be bound 
to faithfully apply the judicially (or, as I prefer, the adjudicatively) generated policy 
from a previous case. The legislature may have the authority to control how its 
general policies are applied in specific cases, but what authority does a court have 
to control how its decisions are applied by subsequent courts? A court decision is 
intended to bind only the parties before the court, not society at large. (If it is 
intended to bind society at large, it is illegitimate, because society at large has not 
had the opportunity to participate in the process of making it.) So subsequent 
courts should be under no duty to follow the decisions of previous courts; the 
litigants in subsequent cases should be free to participate in an unfettered process 
of creating the decision that will bind them. And if so, the application of eviden-
tiary rules and other speech restrictions in subsequent cases seems unjustifiable. 
This line of reasoning shows, I think, that participation theory alone can't 
justify speech restrictions in common law cases. What is needed is another rea~ 
son why courts should be bound, at least to some extent, to faithfully implement 
norms generated by earlier courts. In other words, what is needed is a justifica-
tion for the practice of stare decisis. 
This is not the forum in which to provide such a justification at any length. 
Elsewhere I have argued against two popular justifications for stare decisis: the 
"egalitarian" idea that likes should be treated alike merely because of their like-
ness,Z56 and Ronald Dworkin's theory that a norm of political consistency called 
"integrity" requires adherence to precedent. Z57 By default, the only remaining 
256. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 
105 YALEL.J. 2031, 2033-73 (1996) [hereinafter Peters, Foolish Consistency]; Christopher J. Peters, Equality 
Revisited, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1215-56 (1997). 
257. See Peters, Foolish Consistency, supra note 256, at 2073-112. 
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reasonable justifications for stare decisis are consequentialist, or strategic, justifi-
cations: the ideas, for example, that stare decisis promotes legal predictability and 
thus social stability, or that it serves judicial economy, or that it protects justified 
reliance interests, or that it fulfills a sort of Burkean function of developing rules 
that can stand the test of time.2ss It isn't necessary here to reject or defend par-
ticular explanations for stare decisis, though, because of the salient fact that 
stare decisis is, for whatever reasons, a central feature of Anglo-American legal 
practice. Our entrenched practice of respecting precedent serves as a reason to 
constrain the ability of courts to depart from precedent, just as our practice of 
assigning democratic legitimacy to processes of participatory decisionmaking 
provides a reason to constrain the ability of courts to depart from politically 
d 259 generate norms. 
Thus evidentiary rules, and other restrictions on adjudicative speech, can 
be justified in common law cases as means of promoting adjudicative faithful-
ness to norms generated by earlier courts. As I explained earlier, such restric-
tions encourage courts to apply common law norms accurately and discourage 
courts from creating new common law norms sub silentio. 
Now is perhaps a good time to take overdue notice of the elephant standing 
in the corner of the room. It is a salient fact that most rules of evidence are 
targeted at juries rather than judges; they are designed primarily to constrain the 
facts and arguments that can be made to juries, and thus to limit the grounds 
upon which a jury can base its verdict.260 This suggests that the primary threat 
to the authority of stare decisis-whatever the justifications for that 
authority-historically has been thought to come from juries. Perhaps juries 
are less likely than judges to respect the need for consistency and more likely to 
be moved by the exigencies of particular cases, thus undermining whatever 
values are served by adherence to a gradual and relatively predictable develop-
ment of legal norms. There is an active debate about "jury nullification" that is 
relevant to this question, although that debate focuses primarily on criminal 
prosecutions {and thus on jury adherence, or lack thereof, to statutory rather 
258. On the distinction between such "consequentialist" justifications for stare decisis and 
"deontological" justifications, the latter of which I reject, see id. at 2039-44; for some examples of each, see 
id. at 2044-50. 
259. Which is not to say that strategic considerations of efficiency, stability, predictability, and the 
like don't also playa role in justifying the courts' subservience to the political branches in our system. 
260. "It is an oft repeated bon mot among lawyers that jurors should be treated like mush-
rooms-kept in the dark and fed an ample supply of horse manure." Stephan Landsman, Of Mushrooms 
and Nullifiers: Rules of Evidence and the American Jury, 21 Sr. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 65, 69 (2002). 
Landsman adds that "[ilf the state of affairs described in this witticism has any reality, it is in part 
because, in certain circumstances, American evidence law purposely tries to blindfold jurors with respect to 
information about the consequences following from certain of the factual decisions they reach." rd. 
Landsman's article, by the way, offers a thought-provoking brief analysis of the relationship between the 
role of the jury and evidentiaty tules. 
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than common law nonns}.261 Generally speaking, rules of evidence and other 
speech restrictions appear to make it more difficult for juries to engage in nullifi-
cation, because they limit juries' exposure to information they can use to create 
their own policy. AB such, while it can be argued that juries are sufficiently 
"democratic" that they should be entitled to reject court-made norms--perhaps 
even legislatively created norms--in particular cases, the continued existence of 
evidentiary rules is itself strong evidence that such arguments historically have 
not been persuasive. 
But to return to the primary point here: Evidentiary rules and other adju-
dicative speech restrictions can be justified in common law cases as means of 
preserving the faithfulness of courts-especially including juries-to nonns 
developed over time through the common law process. The fact that our tradi-
tion accords significant legitimacy to common law-making is consistent with 
the participation theory I have expounded here, because the creation of the 
common law is a meaningfully participatory process, but it is not fully explained 
by that theory. Whatever the reasons for the practice, however--efficiency, 
predictability, stability, Burkean gradualism-it would be frustrated if any given 
court, including any given jury, easily could reject or pervert the common law 
nonns it is supposed to be applying. AB I have explained, evidentiary rules and 
other adjudicative speech restrictions serve to reduce the possibility that this will 
happen. 
b. Constitutional Adjudication 
Evidentiary rules and other speech restrictions apply in constitutional 
cases, too; but if it seems difficult to justify them in common law cases as means 
of controlling the application of policy, it seems even more difficult to justify 
them that way in constitutional litigation. Courts in constitutional cases do not 
apply policy, but rather review policy for consistency with the Constitution. 
How, then, can speech restrictions in constitutional cases be justified as means of 
preserving accurate and faithful judicial adherence to policy? 
This superficial conceptual problem can be solved quite easily by under-
standing constitutional law as simply another level of policy. While legislation 
and the common law are levels of government-created policy typically designed 
to constrain private activity, constitutional law is a level of meta-policy designed 
to constrain government activity. Restrictions on adjudicative speech in constitu-
tional cases are means of promoting the faithful and accurate judicial implemen-
tation of constitutional policy. 
261. See, e.g., landsman, supra note 260; Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the 
Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 433 (1998). But see latS Noah, Civil Jury 
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601 (2001) (assessing the question of jury nullification in civil cases). 
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There are, of course, many disputed questions about what exactly 
constitutes constitutional policy, but we need not engage those questions here. 
Disputes about the legitimate sources of constitutional law--original intent, 
text, precedent, morality, tradition, consensus, and the like262_have little if any 
relevance to the kinds of restrictions on adjudicative speech that might be 
imposed in constitutional cases. Such disputes are almost always played out in 
the litigants' legal arguments, not in their proofs. For example, in the recent 
case La'Wrence v. Texas,263 in which the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated 
Texas's criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy, an amicus brief argued 
that the Court should consider rulings of courts in other countries, including a 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in determining whether the 
Texas law was consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.264 
Whether such sources were relevant to the Court's decision became a point of 
contention among the Justices, with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion partly 
relying on them over Justice Scalia's strong objection.265 But even if a majority 
of the Court had found decisions of foreign courts to be constitutionally irrele-
vant, there was no possibility that future litigants would somehow be prohibited 
from basing their arguments upon such decisions, or from attempting to con-
vince the Court to change its mind about their value. Precisely because the 
proper sources of constitutional law are contested, litigants are never con-
strained in their ability to argue about them. 
In other words, disputes about the legitimate sources of constitutional law 
are disputes about what constitutional law is; in the parlance of this Article, they 
are disputes about the content of policy. There is no legitimate reason to prevent 
litigants from engaging in such disputes; indeed, the question of what constitu-
tionallaw is is logically prior to the question of how it should be applied, which 
is the central question for courts in constitutional cases. And so litigants in 
constitutional cases remain free to argue about such questions, unfettered by 
restrictions on their adjudicative speech. 
As in other kinds of cases, actual restrictions on adjudicative speech in 
constitutional cases almost always go to questions about the facts to which the 
law-whatever it may be-must be applied. For example, in another recent 
Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger,266 involving the University of Michigan 
Law School's policy of affirmative action in admissions, the FRE applied to the 
262. A helpful survey of the popular alternatives can be found in ELY, sutyra note 57, at 1-72. Ely's 
own preferred alternative, "representation-reinforcement," is defended in id. at 73-183. 
263. 123 S. Ct. 2472,2484 (2003). 
264. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson et al. at 10--13, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 
(U.S. 2(03) (No. 02-102). 
265. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2474, 2483, 2494-95; id. at 2494-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
266. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
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trial court's process of factfinding about the nature and effects of the Law School's 
policy. The restrictions imposed by the FRE were important in promoting the 
accuracy of the Court's ultimate constitutional ruling. But those restrictions 
constrained the litigants' arguments about facts-not their arguments about the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause or its proper application to those facts. 
This observation about speech restrictions in constitutional adjudication 
can be generalized as a deeper and more important point about adjudicative 
speech restrictions. Regardless of the type of case, such restrictions as a rule 
apply only to arguments about the application of the law, not about the content 
of the law. Litigants almost always are permitted to argue about what the law 
is; indeed, the infrequent exceptions to this rule are, in my view, illegitimate 
restrictions on free speech.267 Actual restrictions on adjudicative speech-rules 
of evidence are the paradigmatic example here-almost universally apply only 
to arguments about the facts to which the law, whatever it is, will apply, or to 
arguments that, like those of the abortion protestors in Za1 v. Steppe ,268 
essentially amount to appeals for jury nullification of the law. They apply 
to ensure accurate and faithful application of the law by courts and juries-not 
to impose some uniform dogma about what the "law" that must be applied 
really is. 
D. A Word About Lawyers 
Thus far I have elided a fact about adjudication that might be seen as 
significant, especially on a participation-based theory. That fact is simply that 
litigants typically participate in adjudication indirectly, through the agency of 
lawyers. What implications, if any, does this apparent attenuation of a litigant's 
participation have for the connection between participation and adjudicative 
legitimacy? 
The short and probably obvious answer to this question is that law, like 
many other disciplines, is a specialized field that usually cannot be navigated 
successfully without the help of an expert. So long as the clients themselves call 
the important shots, lawyers make their clients' participation more effective than 
it otherwise would be. The presence of lawyers thus enhances, not undermines, 
the legitimacy of adjudication. 
There is a somewhat more nuanced way of understanding the lawyer-client 
relationship, however, that relates closely to my themes in this Article, and it 
seems worth articulating that understanding briefly here. As I've argued, 
267. In Part IV.A. infra, I make this argument with respect to two extant examples of such 
restrictions-those invalidated in the Velazquez case and those embodied in court rules prohibiting 
citation of unpublished opinions. 
268. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
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adjudication has direct legitimacy to the extent that it incorporates the full and 
meaningful participation of the litigants. That participation, however, takes a 
particular fonn, as my description of derivative legitimacy shows. The grounds of 
the litigants' participation are defined and cabined by the courts' role as appliers 
of general policies created elsewhere. Derivative legitimacy demands that the 
litigants participate in a process, not of creating general norms, but of applying 
general norms to specific facts. 
And that is where lawyers come in. The process of applying general 
nonns, or policies, to specific factual circumstances is a highly specialized task 
that entails distinctive types of reasoning and of argument; as such, it is a job 
that requires special expertise. To put the point as an overused law school cli-
che, the process of adjudication demands that its participants be able to "think 
like lawyers." It is legal reasoning and argument, not just any type of reasoning or 
argument, that are required in order for the derivative legitimacy of adjudication 
to be preserved. And of course it is lawyers who are experts in legal reasoning 
and argument. 
As such, for a litigant's participation in the adjudicative process to be fully 
effective, the litigant usually must have the help of an expert at applying gen-
eral norms to specific facts: that is, a lawyer. Generally speaking, then, the 
presence of lawyers actually increases the legitimacy of adjudication: It increases 
derivative legitimacy by improving the accuracy of a court's application of 
general policies to specific facts, and it increases direct legitimacy by giving 
litigants access to the special kinds of reasoning and argument that derivative 
legitimacy requires. 
Understood on these terms, the mediating presence of lawyers shares a 
justification with the existence of evidentiary rules: Both are necessary to effec-
tuate and preserve the courts' limited and specialized role as appliers of general 
policy. 
IV. SOME TOPICAL IMPLICATIONS 
My analysis so far suggests that evidentiary rules and other content-based 
restrictions on adjudicative speech can be justified on one or both of two 
grounds: as means of preserving the direct legitimacy of adjudication by ensur-
ing that the litigants can participate fully and fairly, and as techniques of pre-
serving the derivative legitimacy of adjudication by constraining courts to the 
accurate and faithful application of general policy. In this part, I discuss a few 
implications of this analysis for some current issues in adjudication and free-
speech law. 
First, the justification of adjudicative speech restrictions offered here has 
a negative corollary: Such restrictions are unjustified if they fail to serve either 
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of the legitimacy-promoting purposes described in the previous part. In Part 
IV.A., below, I offer some topical illustrations. 
Second, some types of speech that have been treated by the courts 
as "political" are in fact better understood as examples of adjudicative speech, 
which can be subjected to reasonable restrictions in order to promote direct or 
derivative legitimacy. An important recent example is the canon of profes-
sional ethics struck down---erroneously, I will argue-by the Supreme Court 
in Republican Party v. White,Z69 the case that served as the template for my Case 2 
in the Introduction. I examine that case in subpart B, along with some con-
trasting examples of speech that, while it is about adjudication, is in fact true 
political speech and thus cannot justifiably be restricted in order to preserve the 
legitimacy of court decisions. 
A. Constitutional Limits on Evidentiary Rules 
Some recent attempts to restrict adjudicative speech are not, in my view, 
justified as protective of either direct or derivative legitimacy. I discuss two 
timely examples here: the speech-restrictive conditions imposed by Congress 
on attorneys who receive Legal Services Corporation funds, and the flurry of 
court rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions. 
1. Velazquez Redux 
Recall that in Velazquez,Z70 the Supreme Court invalidated certain 
congressionally imposed funding restrictions and the rules implementing them, 
which effectively prohibited attorneys who received LSC funds from challenging 
existing welfare laws on statutory or constitutional grounds. This prohibition was 
a sort of content-based evidentiary rule-a restriction on the kinds of proofs and 
arguments that could be offered in certain cases. But the understanding of the 
adjudicative role I've outlined here actually undermines, not justifies, the 
prohibition at issue in Velazquez. 
Rather than facilitating the application of policy by the courts, the prohi-
bition in Velazquez frustrated the application of policy by excluding proofs and 
arguments that were clearly relevant to that task. A court cannot accurately 
determine whether welfare laws are being administered consistently with legis-
lative policy if the litigants (or at least the only litigant inclined to do so) cannot 
offer proofs and arguments relevant to that question. Nor can a court accurately 
determine whether welfare laws or their administration are consistent with 
constitutional policy if the litigants can't make arguments on that issue. The 
269. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
270. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); see supra Part 1.0.3. 
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LSC funding restriction prevented the litigants not from making unfaithful or 
erroneous arguments about how to apply the law, but from arguing about what 
the law is in the first place; as such, it actually impeded the derivative legitimacy 
of the cases it affected. 
The restriction also impeded direct legitimacy in a fairly obvious way: It 
tipped the balance of welfare litigation rather severely in favor of the govern-
ment. The government's lawyers were free to argue, without penalty, that the 
government's conduct was consistent with applicable statutory and constitu-
tionallaw; but lawyers challenging the government's conduct were not free to 
argue that it was inconsistent with the law. In this way the restrictions were 
not only content based, but viewpoint based; they handicapped the participation 
of one class of litigants, namely those who sought to challenge the legality of 
government policy. 
Thus the Court in Velazquez got it precisely right when it struck down the 
restrictions as inconsistent with the judicial role. "Interpretation of the law and 
the Constitution"-that is, in the idiom I've been using, application of general 
legislative or constitutional policy to specific facts-"is the primary mission of 
the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a case or 
controversy.,,271 And, "[b]y seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues 
and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review [in 
Velazquez] prohibided] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for 
the proper exercise of the judicial power."m The speech restrictions in Velazquez 
worked to obstruct "the judicial power," not to preserve it. 
Perhaps, though, we can justify the restrictions at issue in Velazquez by 
understanding them as examples of what I call extrinsic restrictions--restrictions 
designed to enforce policies independent from the policies that give rise to par-
ticular court cases. It may be that Congress's policy of providing welfare benefits 
to those who deserve them-the policy LSC-funded attorneys are seeking to 
vindicate when they bring benefits cases-is qualified by Congress's extrinsic 
policy of preserving the structure of the existing welfare system. The speech 
restrictions in Velazquez could then be justified as Congress's mechanism for 
ensuring that courts apply the extrinsic rather than the primary policy when 
the two conflict (or, if we prefer, for ensuring that courts apply the entire policy, 
including the caveat about preserving the existing welfare system). 
There are two reasons why we can't excuse the restrictions in Velazquez this 
way. First, "[a]s interpreted by the LSC and by the Government, the restric-
tion[s] prevended] an attorney from arguing to a court that a state [welfare] statute 
271. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545. 
272. ld. 
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conflicts with a federal [welfare] statute."m Even if it is Congress's policy that its 
welfare statutes should not be enforced against conflicting state statutes, it may 
not be any particular state's policy that its welfare statutes be enforced against 
conflicting federal statutes. By preventing LSC attorneys from arguing that state 
statutes conflict with federal ones, Congress was attempting to dictate state 
policy-something Congress does not have authority to do274-rather than 
simply to enforce its own policy. 
Second, and more saliently, "the restriction[s] prevent[ed] an attorney from 
arguing to a court ... that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its 
application is violative of the United States Constitution."m Obviously 
Congress cannot simply dictate constitutional policy; it cannot prevent a court 
from applying constitutional policy to override inconsistent legislative policy. 
So the speech restrictions in Velazquez cannot really be understood as extrinsic 
restrictions along the lines of, say, the attorney-client privilege. 
The Court in Velazquez was right, therefore, to strike down the restrictions 
as attempts to obstruct, rather than preserve, the proper policy-applying function 
of the judiciary. The interesting thing is the particular basis on which the Court 
struck the restrictions down. The Court's own language suggests that the case 
could have been decided pursuant to the Article III grant of "the judicial 
power,,,Z76 which the Court in Velazquez essentially interpreted, following 
Marbury v. Madison,177 to be the power of policy application ("interpretation of 
the law") and to imply unfettered access to the information necessary to fully 
exercise that power. (Understood this way, the Article III "judicial power" 
includes a guarantee of derivative legitimacy-the "integrity" component of the 
judicial process, by the Gentile formulation.) We might think the case also 
could have been decided pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,Z78 on the theory that the opportunity to fully present proofs and 
arguments that are relevant to the application of policy is part of the "process" 
that traditionally is "due" in a court of law. (The Due Process Clause thus pro-
tects direct legitimacy-the "fairness" component of Gentile.) But the case was 
273. rd. at537 (emphasis added). 
274. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). 
275. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537. 
276. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1,2. 
277. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545 (citing Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). 
278. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Presumably the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not 
its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart, would apply in Velazquez, despite the fact that the restrictions at 
issue there apparently applied in both federal and state courts, because their source was Congress rather 
than the states. 
780 51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 705 (2004) 
hought, litigated, and decided as a free speech case-a fact that seems fairly 
significant. 
Conceptualizing Velazquez as a free speech case rather than an Article III 
or due process case emphasizes-and bespeaks an implicit recognition by the 
Court of-the importance of participation to judicial legitimacy and the parallels 
between adjudicative and political participation. Deciding the case on Article 
III grounds would have implied a focus on the injury done by Congress to the 
judicial branch as an institution-on the attempt to undermine "the judicial 
power," which sounds like a garden-variety separation-of-powers problem. (As 
it was, much of the Court's language adopted this tone.) Deciding the case on 
due process grounds would have shifted the focus somewhat to the participation 
of the litigants themselves, but the due process concern with tradition279 still 
would have anchored the result in ideas about the judiciary's institutional role. 
Deciding the case on free speech grounds, however, swung the spotlight squarely 
around to focus on the litigants themselves and the importance of their 
participation in the decisionmaking process. As a result, it is possible to under-
stand the decision as being grounded not simply in the Court's self-protective 
vision of the judicial role, but also, maybe even primarily, in an acknowledge-
ment that participation is as important to legitimacy in the adjudicative as in the 
political context. It is possible, that is, to read the decision as being primarily 
about direct rather than derivative legitimacy, and as endorsing the notion that 
direct legitimacy is intimately connected to meaningful litigant participation. 
The Velazquez decision thus contributes to a fuller understanding of adjudi-
cative legitimacy and, ultimately, to a fuller understanding of the Free Speech 
Clause. It suggests that, while restrictions on adjudicative speech are justifiable 
so long as they contain courts within their legitimate policy-applying role, they 
are unjustifiable when they frustrate the ability of the litigants to meaningfully 
participate in deciding what it means to properly apply policy. I expand on this 
embryonic idea in Part IV.B. below. 
2. No-Citation Rules 
Another example of what I believe are unjustifiable content-based restric-
tions on adjudicative speech is the recent phenomenon-now, hopefully, in 
decline-of court rules that prohibit citation of unpublished opinions.2so 
279. See, e.g., Int'I Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (relying in part on "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice" to uphold the state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
an out-of-state corporation). 
280. Recent developments suggest that the tide has turned against no-citation rules. See Stephen R. 
Barnen, From Anastasoff w Hart w West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 
J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 1, 1-6 (2002) (surveying judicial opinions, bar association positions, rule 
changes, and other developments to this effect). "Of the thirteen [federal) circuits, there remain only 
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"Approximately 80% of the caseload of the federal appellate courts is resolved 
by means of 'unpublished' opinions,,,281 meaning that "the court has designated 
the opinion for exclusion from the bound volumes of the Federal Reporter, the 
official reporter for the federal courts of appeals.,,282 Typically "no-citation rules 
take the form of an outright prohibition on reference to unpublished opinions in 
briefs and arguments,,,283 although sometimes they assume the more hortatory 
form of "disfavoring" or otherwise discouraging citation.284 
No-citation rules, at least in their mandatory form, pretty clearly are 
content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech:285 They prohibit lawyers and 
litigants from making certain kinds of arguments, namely those based upon 
unpublished opinions.286 But no-citation rules probably cannot be justified as 
attempts to preserve either derivative or direct legitimacy. 
With respect to derivative legitimacy, no-citation rules seem to be neither 
fact-constraining, norm-constraining, nor extrinsic restrictions on speech in the 
senses in which I have defined those concepts. Judicial opinions, published or 
not, are neither facts to which existing policy must be (or must not be) applied 
nor norms that might be used, illegitimately, to change existing policy; they are 
rather evidence of existing policy, means of determining what existing policy is. 
five--the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal-that ban citation of unpublished opinions .... " 
Id. at 45 (citations omitted). The ABA House of Delegates has come out against no-citation rules, and one 
federal judge has held them unconstitutional in the federal coutts as exceeding the Article III "judicial 
power." See ill. at 1-2; Anastasoff v. United States, 223 FJd 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 FJd 
1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Still, the use of no-citation rules remains prevalent in both federal and 
state coutts. See David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Jtulidary, 35 u.c. 
DAVIS L. REv. 1133, 1135 (2002) (surveying the use of no-citation rules in the federal circuits); Melissa 
M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Note, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of 
Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 251 (2001) (surveying rules on the publication and citation of 
opinions in all federal circuits and state appellate coutts). 
281. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1137. 
282. Id. But legal publishers, like nature, abhor a vacuum: "[T)he West Group in September 
2001 launched its Federal Appendix[,l ... a new case-reporter series in West's National Reporter System 
that consists entirely of 'unpublished' opinions from the federal circuit coutts of appeals (except, currently, 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits}." Barnett, supra note 280, at 2 (citation omitted). 
283. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1139. 
284. See ill. at 1140. 
285. Greenwald and Schwarz suggest that they can be analyzed either as content-neutral or as 
content-based restrictions, but they don't explain the former possibility-indeed, they "think the better 
view is" that no-citation rules are content-based--and frankly I can't think of a reasonable argument that 
they are content-neutral. See ill. at 1162--64. 
286. And the dodge that those arguments can be made (or those opiniOns cited) outside the 
courtroom will not do, for reasons we've rehearsed already. The whole point of citing unpublished cases is 
to affect the resulting judicial decision; citing them outside the courtroom obviously defeats this purpose. 
The obviousness of this conclusion did not srop one reputable federal judge from making the "alternative 
forum" argument, however. See ill. at 1165 n.l27 (citing remarks by Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth 
Circuit: "You can publish an unpublished decision in the San Francisco Examiner. You can put it online 
on a web page. You can tattoo it to your chest. You can write articles about it. You can't do it in a 
brief .... But that is not a First Amendment issue."). 
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An on-point judicial opinion applying a principle of the common law to a par-
ticular set of facts is evidence, in a later case, of how that common law principle 
should be applied to a similar set of facts; it is evidence of what that principle 
means when applied to those facts. 287 The same is true of an on-point opinion 
applying a constitutional or statutory policy. To deny litigants the ability to 
build their arguments upon this evidence is to deny them the ability to fully 
participate in deciding what the applicable principle is and how it should be 
applied in their case. It has nothing to do with preventing courts from 
erroneously misapplying policy or from intentionally changing policy. 
No-citation rules, then, seem to present the same free speech problems 
that the restrictions struck down in the Velazquez decision presented: The rules 
deny litigants the ability to participate fully in the process of making a decision 
that will bind them, and they do so without finding justification in the limits of 
h . d' . 1 1 288 t e JU lCia ro e. 
Admittedly there is an argument-somewhat tenuous, in my view-that 
such rules serve direct legitimacy by denying an advantage to litigants with 
significantly greater resources than their opponents. The idea would be that 
litigants who can afford to hire expensive lawyers, use electronic databases, 
send messengers to courthouses, and the like would have better access to 
unpublished opinions than their poorer counterparts, justifying a ban on citing 
those opinions as a field-leveling mechanism.289 There is something to this point, 
287. I use the word "principle" here with caution, not wanting to beg questions about the difference, 
asserted by Dworkin, between "principles" and "policies." See DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 82--84. 
288. What is apparently the only court decision to have invalidated no-citation rules on 
constitutional grounds was based on Article III, not the First Amendment. See Anastasoff v. United 
States, 223 FJd 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 FJd 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane). (Of 
course, Article III is the other side of the First Amendment coin where adjudicative speech is concerned; 
the two provisions protect judicial legitimacy from different angles. See supra notes 276-279 and 
accompanying text.) In 1976, the Supreme O:lUrt rejected, without comment, a petition brought by a 
litigant seeking a writ of mandamus against the Seventh Circuit's striking a reference to an unpublished 
opinion in the litigant's brief. See Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States O:lUrt of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976). More recently the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to its 
no-citation rule on standing grounds. See Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001), afj'd, 279 FJd 817 (9th Cir. 2002). A number of com-
mentators, though, have argued that no-citation rules are invalid under the First Amendment. See 
Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1161--&5; Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the 
Common in the Law: A Proposal far the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in 
Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 215-17 (1992); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. 
Chachkes, Constitutionality of"No-Citation" Rules, 3 j. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 287,297-300 (2001). 
289. Lauren Robel has argued that unpublished opinions disproportionately advantage frequent 
litigants, such as government entities. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished 
Opinions and Government Utigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940, 959--62 
(1989). She concludes not that no-citation rules are appropriate, however, but that the practice of issuing 
unpublished opinions itself is suspect. See id.; Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, 
Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399, 404-09, 
414-17 (2002). 
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but not enough, I think, to outweigh the harm that no-citation rules do to 
derivative legitimacy. The potential disadvantage to less-wealthy litigants posed 
by unpublished opinions seems quite marginal-a drop in the bucket-in the 
context of the much larger structural handicaps that such litigants face. Poorer 
litigants often cannot afford to hire skilled attorneys (or, sometimes, any 
attorneys) in the first place; they may not be able to conduct extensive discovery, 
hire jury consultants, commission visually compelling trial exhibits, pay reputable 
expert witnesses, or afford other valuable litigation tools. Prohibiting citation of 
unpublished opinions seems unlikely to equalize the balance in any appreciable 
way---especially now that most "unpublished" opinions have become widely 
available, and easily accessible, in electronic and print form.290 And of course 
no-citation rules apply to both wealthy and poor litigants, regardless of which 
litigant's case would be helped by the unpublished opinion she cannot cite. 
There is no reason I can think of to suppose that this disadvantage will not harm 
poor litigants as often as wealthy ones. 
No-citation rules, then, clearly undermine the derivative legitimacy of court 
decisions, and on balance there seems no reason to believe that they improve 
their direct legitimacy. At the very least, such rules should be viewed with 
considerable suspicion as restrictions on litigants' free speech rights. 
B. White and Political Versus Adjudicative Speech 
In its 2002 decision in Republican Party v. White, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a canon of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct that forbade a "candidate 
for a judicial office" to "announce his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues.,,29I The Court treated the Minnesota canon as a paradigm example of a 
restriction on political speech,292 subjecting it to strict scrutiny on the ground that 
it "both prohibided] speech on the basis of its content and burden[edl a category 
of speech that is 'at the core of our First Amendment freedoms'-speech about 
the qualifications of candidates for public office.,,293 Not surprisingly, the Court 
held that the canon did not survive strict scrutiny.294 
Minnesota attempted to justify the canon at issue in White as a means of 
"preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance 
290. See Barnett, supra note 280, at 1-7. 
291. 536 U.S. at 765, 770 (2002) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUer Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002». The operative provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct was made applicable ro 
nonincumbent lawyers running for judicial office by Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(b) 
(2002). 
292. See also White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The political speech of candidates is 
at the heart of the First Amendment .... "). 
293. Id. at 774 (quoting Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001). 
294. Id. at 774-88. 
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of the impartiality of the state judiciary."z95 The various opinions in the case thus 
sparred about the meaning of judicial "impartiality" and whether preserving it, 
whatever it might mean, qualified as a compelling state interest that the canon 
was narrowly tailored to serve. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia distinguished three different senses 
of judicial "impartiality" that the canon might be intended to promote. First, 
Justice Scalia noted, "impartiality" might mean "the lack of bias for or against 
either party to the proceeding."z96 But Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the 
Minnesota canon was narrowly tailored to preserve this sense of impartiality 
because it was directed not at "speech for or against particular parties, but rather 
hI:· . I' "Z97 speec [or or agamst parttcu ar ISSueS. 
Justice Scalia also noted a second possible meaning of "impartiality" in 
judging: "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal vieW."Z98 
"Impartiality" in this sense, Justice Scalia wrote, "would be concerned, not with 
guaranteeing litigants equal application of the law, but rather with guaranteeing 
them an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points in their case."Z99 
But Minnesota could not have a compelling interest· in preserving this kind of 
impartiality, Justice Scalia concluded, because 
[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case 
has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with 
good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who 
does not have preconceptions about the law .... Indeed, even if it were 
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal 
issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so. "Proof that a Justice's mind at 
the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of 
295. rd. at 775. 
296. rd. at 775. The idea of a "patty to the proceeding" here is a bit slippery: A judge might be 
biased with respect to particular litigants in particular cases (for example, she might favor Smith in Smith 
v. Janes because she is Smith's business partner), or she might be biased with respect to certain categories 
of litigants across multiple cases (for example, she might tend to favor employers over employees in 
workplace disputes). Justice Scalia didn't distinguish between the two types of bias. 
297. rd. at 776. The problem with Justice Scalia's distinction is that speech about issues can have 
implications for decisiOns about parties. A judicial candidate who complains during her campaign about 
the shoddy way in which Minnesota's courts have treated employers is likely, if she remains true to her 
campaign rhetoric, to hold something like a bias in favor of particular parries who happen to be employers 
when they appear before her as a judge. Justice Stevens made this point in his White dissent: 
Even when "impartialiry" is defined in its narrowest sense to embrace only "the lack of bias for or 
against either party to the proceeding" ... the announce clause serves that interest. Expressions 
that stress a candidate's unbroken record of affirming convictions for rape, for example, imply a 
bias in favor of a particular litigant (the prosecutor) and against a class of litigants (defendants in 
rape cases). 
Id. at 8CJO-.Dl (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted). 
298. Id. at 777. 
299. Id. 
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constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not 
lack of bias. ,,300 
785 
Finally, Justice Scalia described a third, even broader potential meaning of 
judicial "impartiality"-"open-mindedness": 
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on 
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his 
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a 
pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant, not 
an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at least some 
h fd . 30l C ance a omg so. 
Justice Scalia and the majority rejected this premise for the Minnesota canon, 
not because it was insufficiently compelling, but because they did "not believe 
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.,,302 
The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office 
may not say "I think it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-
sex marriages." He may say the very same thing, however, up until the 
very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly 
(until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing 
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the 
announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that 
purpose a challenge to the credulous.3D3 
As I suggest in some of the foregoing footnotes, and as the dissents in 
White do a pretty good job of showing, the details of Justice Scalia's application 
of strict scrutiny to the Minnesota canon are vulnerable, to say the least. But 
my criticism of White goes deeper than that: I think the Court in White was 
mistaken to treat the Minnesota canon as a restriction on poUtical speech (and 
300. Id. at 777-78 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.». Putting aside 
the fact that Justice Scalia's conception of what is "desirable" in the selection of judges, and thus what 
can serve as a "compelling" state interest, seems little more than a product of his personal views, Justice 
Scalia simply identified the wrong interest here. The interest served by the Minnesota canon was not 
the selection of judges who have no "preconceptions about the law," but rather the selection of judges 
who do not make JYrecommitments about the law-who do not effectively announce ahead of time how 
they will decide cases. Justice Scalia did address something like this interest in describing a third 
possible conception of "impartiality." See infra notes 301-303 and accompanying text. 
301. White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 779--80. Of course, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, a judge's statement of a 
particular legal or political belief takes on a special character when made in the context of a judicial 
election: It becomes "a reason to vote for" the candidate and is offered precisely as such a reason. Id. at 800 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). A judicial candidate who advertises her views about law or policy is making a 
campaign promise, not a contribution to academic debate. She is saying, in effect, "Vote for me because I 
believe X, and I will judge cases accordingly." Id. 
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thus, arguably, to subject it to strict scrutinlo4 ) in the first place. The canon, I 
believe, is better understood as a restriction on adjudicative speech, and is justifi-
able as such on one or both of two complementary arguments. 
1. The Canon as a Safeguard of Derivative Legitimacy 
First, the Minnesota canon might be justified as a son of norm-constraining 
restriction designed to promote faithful application of policy by judges. In Pan 
Ill, I defined norm-constraining restrictions on adjudicative speech as restrictions 
designed to limit courts to applying general policy made by the legislature (or the 
Constitution, the common law, or an administrative agency) rather than policy 
of the courts' own creation.30s Minnesota's goal of preserving judicial "impani-
ality" can be understood in this sense: as a goal of preventing a judge's own "pre-
conceptions on legal [or political] issues"-her own ideas of good policy-from 
tainting her decisionmaking process. In other words, it can be understood as a 
means of promoting derivative legitimacy in adjudication. 
Suppose, for instance, that a judge is faced with a case affecting the interests 
of employers in the state. The Minnesota canon might prevent the judge from 
deciding the case not in accordance with legislative policy ("the law"), but 
with the pro-employer statements she made during her last campaign. By 
preventing the judge from making those pro-employer statements in the first 
place, Minnesota is removing a temptation for the judge to act according to her 
own (announced) conceptions of good policy rather than those of the legislature. 
Thus the Minnesota canon operates analogously to judicial gag orders and rules 
of professional conduct prohibiting litigants or attorneys from speaking publicly 
about a pending case: The point is to avoid tempting the decisionmaker (here 
the judge, elsewhere the jury) to rely on policy norms that have not been 
sanctioned by the appropriate political process. 
If this way of understanding the Minnesota canon is correct, then the Coun 
was wrong to treat that canon as a restriction on political speech merely because 
it regulated speech in something that looks like "politics.,,306 Threats, "fighting 
words," or obsceniry would not deserve protection as political speech merely by 
304. I don't want ro take the position that restrictions on adjudicative speech (for example, 
evidentiary rules) should not be subjected to strict scrutiny as a doctrinal matter; I'm not sure how I would 
come out on that question. My position is simply that restrictions on adjudicative speech, properly 
understood, are generally justifiable as a theoretical matter. Doctrinally, that conclusion might result from 
application of a lower standard than strict scrutiny; or it might result because appropriate restrictions on 
adjudicative speech will survive strict scrutiny. 
305. See supra Pan III.C.Z.b. 
306. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, in their respective dissents in White, would have distinguished 
between judicial elections and other kinds of elections for free speech purposes-in effect recognizing that 
the Minnesota canon did not regulate true political speech. See 536 U.S. at 80Z (Stevens, J., dissenting); iii. 
at 805-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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virtue of having occurred during a political campaign--or even by virtue of 
having been intended to influence people's votes. (My threat to break both 
your legs if you don't vote for me is not political speech.) Those kinds of 
speech can legitimately be regulated, even in a political context, to avoid the 
(nonpolitical) harms they might cause. And the same should go for adjudicative 
speech that happens to occur in the political arena.307 If the speech poses a real 
threat to the impartiality-that is, the policy-applying function--of the 
judiciary, then the state ought to be able to regulate it in the interest of avoiding 
that threat. 
We need to be careful here to distinguish adjudicative speech that has no 
real political function from "adjudicative" speech that has. A judicial candidate's 
statements of policy on the campaign trail do have a sort of "political" function, 
in that they are designed to cause, and might succeed in causing, people to vote 
for the candidate. But this is not the kind of political function I mean. Politics 
ultimately is about the making of policy, and a judicial candidate's speech about 
"disputed legal or political issues" is not intended to influence the making of 
policy. It is intended to influence the applying of policy-the deciding, by the 
judicial candidate if she is elected, of particular court cases. The judicial candi-
date who criticizes anti-employer court decisions is not calling for the legislature 
to enact pro-employer legislation; she is hinting that, if she is elected judge, she 
will decide cases in a pro-employer way. This is the sense in which her speech 
is adjudicative speech and, I believe, may be regulated as such. It is not really 
political speech (although the exact same speech would be political if the candi-
date were running for the state legislature).308 
By the same token, there is some speech that looks "adjudicative" at first 
blush but in fact turns out to be political-to be about (or at least partly about) 
the making, not the applying, of policy. Consider the speech involved in 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart309 (which I used as the template for Case 3 
in the Introduction). The defendant in Stuart was on trial for a grisly multiple 
murder; the Nebraska trial judge entered a "restrictive order" forbidding the press 
Id. 
307. Cf. Schauer, supra note 14, at 693-94. Schauer asserts: 
[f]here is ... a serious question about ... why an argument that would be thought frivolous 
quickly becomes a serious First Amendment claim just because the physical locus of the speech 
is outside of the courthouse walls, given that the substance of the restriction and the motivations 
behind it are virtually identical. 
308. And speech by a judicial candidate that is intended to influence legislative policymaking-a 
candidate's call for the legislature to enact more employer-friendly statutes, for instance-would be political 
speech and probably should be protected as such. But arguably the state should be able to proscribe even 
that kind of speech in the context of judicial campaigns, on the theory that it might serve as a veiled 
promise to decide cases in a certain (for example, pro-employer) way. 
309. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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from reporting certain facts about the case.310 On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that failing to restrain the press might threaten the fairness of the 
tria1.311 But still the Court unanimously overturned the restrictive order, reason-
ing that the cost of restraining speech about the judicial process outweighed, at 
least in that case, the danger that the speech would taint that process: 
The damage [caused by restraining speech] can be particularly great 
when the prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and 
commentary on current events. Truthful reports of public judicial pro-
ceedings have been afforded special protection against subsequent pun-
ishment. For the same reasons the protection against prior restraint should 
have particular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings, 
whether the crime in question is a single isolated act or a pattern of 
criminal conduct. 
"A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of 
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its func-
tion in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over 
several centuries. The press does not simply publish infonnation about 
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the 
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny 
and criticism.',J12 
What the Court is saying here is, in essence, that the speech in Stuan must 
be protected as political speech. It is true that media reporting of facts about a 
high-profile court case has the potential to influence the case's outcome; and it 
may even be true that media reporting (and other speech) about pending cases 
sometimes is intended to influence the outcome.313 But speech like that in Stuan 
also has the arguable intent, and the potential effect, of influencing public policy, 
and it is on that basis that it is entitled to protection. The Court in Stuan 
recognized this when it characterized the press "as the handmaiden of effective 
judicial administration, ... guard[ing] against the miscarriage of justice by 
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public 
scrutiny and criticism.,,314 The speech in Stuan was protected, despite its potential 
to influence the decision of a particular court case, because of its potential to 
influence the administration of justice more generally. How justice should be 
administered generally is, ultimately, a question of policy for the political 
branches; speech about that question, then, is protected political speech. 
310. See id. at 543--44. The Nebraska Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the order somewhat. 
See id. at 545. 
311. See id. at 562-63. 
312. Id. at 559--60 (citations omiued) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
313. See, for example, the speech in Bridges v. Califamia, discussed infra notes 315-321. 
314. Stuart, 427 U.s. at 559--60 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
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The speech protected by the Court's decision in another case, Bridges v. 
Caliiornia,315 also should be understood as political speech, despite the 
adjudicative context in which it occurred. In Bridges, two separate California 
state trial judges issued contempt citations against nonlitigants for extrajudi-
cial speech about pending cases. In one instance the Los Angeles Times 
published editorials proclaiming, among other things, that a trial judge would 
"make a serious mistake" if he granted probation to two convicted criminal 
defendants;1'6 in the other instance a union official sent a telegram to the 
u.s. Secretary of Labor stating that enforcement of a judge's ruling against 
the union "would tie up the port of Los Angeles and ... involve the entire 
Pacific Coast."m 
In an opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court overturned both con-
tempt convictions as violative of the First Amendment. Although California 
had an interest in avoiding the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice,,,lIB 
that interest was outweighed by "how much, as a practical matter, [the contempt 
convictions] would affect liberty of expression,,:J'9 
It must be recognized that public interest is much more likely to be kindled 
by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however 
penetrating, of the historian or scientist. Since they punish utterances 
made during the pendency of a case, the judgments below therefore 
produce their restrictive results at the precise time when public interest 
in the matters discussed would naturally be at its height. Moreover, the 
ban is likely to fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important 
topics of discussion. Here, for example, labor controversies were the 
topics of some of the publications. Experience shows that the more acute 
labor controversies are, the more likely it is that in some aspect they will 
get into court. It is therefore the controversies that command most 
interest that the decisions below would remove from the arena of public 
discussion.J20 
The speech in question was protected because of its capacity to generate "public 
interest" in the "important topic[]" of "labor controversies." It was protected, 
that is, because of its capacity to influence public policy with respect to labor 
disputes, despite its concurrent potential (which the Court discounted in any 
event)l2l to affect the results of pending court cases. 
315. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
316. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Probation for Garillas?, L.A. TIMES, May 5,1938, at II4). 
317. Id.at275-76. 
318. Id. at 271. 
319. Id.at268. 
320. Id. at 268-69. 
321. See id. at 271-78 (concluding that the speech was not sufficiently likely to affect the fairness of 
the pending court proceedings to justify punishment). 
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Stuart and Bridges on one side, and Gentile on the other,322 can be seen as 
recognizing a line, albeit a fuzzy one, between speech that is predominantly 
political, with the intent and likely effect of influencing public policy, and 
speech that is predominantly adjudicative, with the intent and likely effect of 
influencing a court decision. The former kind of speech is subject to special 
protection; the latter is not. And the decisions show that the nature of the 
speech, adjudicative or political, does not depend entirely or even primarily on 
where or when the speech occurs: Speech may be political even though it refers 
to a pending court case (Stuart and Bridges)323-indeed, even if it takes place in 
a courtroom324-and speech may be adjudicative even though it occurs outside 
the courthouse (Gentile). I would add that speech may be adjudicative even 
though it occurs during an election campaign, and that White was wrongly 
decided because the Court failed to recognize that fact. 
2. The Canon as a Safeguard of Direct Legitimacy 
The second way to justify the Minnesota canon at issue in White, which 
goes hand-in-hand with the first way, is to understand the canon as protective 
rather than restrictive of speech-at least of the kind of speech that matters. 
The canon, to be specific, can be justified as necessary to protect the adjudicative 
speech of litigants in court cases, and thus to promote the direct legitimacy of 
court decisions. 
Court decisions, I have argued, are legitimately binding on litigants 
because, and to the extent that, the litigants have the opportunity to partici-
pate meaningfully in making them. If a judge has pre-judged a case, however, 
the litigants are denied this opportunity; they cannot contribute to a decision 
that has already been made.325 Put another way, the litigants' presentation of 
322. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); supra notes 105-115 and accompanying 
text. 
Id. 
323. See Schauer, supra note 14, at 697-98 (citation omitted). Schauer writes: 
[I)f one of the important purposes of the First Amendment is to ensure that government, its 
officials, and its processes are subject to public criticism, then it would be wrong to give those 
governmental officials who happen to wear black robes an immuniry from this otherwise 
prevalent and vitally important principle. 
324. One of the Court's most famous speech-protective decisions involved political speech that 
occurred in a courthouse. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning the conviction, for 
disturbing the peace, of a Vietnam war protestor who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in 
the Los Angeles Counry Courthouse). 
325. I discuss this particular point at greater length in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 25-26, and 
in Peters, Participation, supra note 24, at 192-93. 
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proofs and reasoned arguments-their adjudicative speech-is made worthless 
by a judge's precommitment, or "partiality," with respect to a case.326 
The Minnesota canon can be seen, then, as a means to protect the efficacy 
of litigants' speech, to safeguard litigants' right of participation in making 
decisions that will bind them. It is a mechanism for ensuring that every 
Minnesota judge will be "willing to consider views that oppose his preconcep-
tions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case."m 
By limiting the adjudicative speech of judges, the canon effectuates, makes 
meaningful, the adjudicative speech of litigants. 
This is in fact precisely the argument at the center of Justice Ginsburg's 
dissent in White---except that Justice Ginsburg characterized it as an argument 
about the litigants' rights of due process, not their rights of free speech.J28 As 
we saw in analyzing the Velazquez decision, however, due process and free 
speech-and indeed the Article III grant of "the judicial power"---effectively 
merge in the context of adjudicative participation.329 Litigants have the free 
speech right to participate in creating the court decisions that will bind them. 
But the scope of that speech may be limited by the boundaries of the judicial 
power, which extend only to the application, and not to the creation, of policy, 
and by the requirements of due process, which prohibit giving one litigant an 
unfair participatory advantage over another. Each of these concepts-free 
speech, due process oflaw, and the judicial power---emphasizes a different aspect 
of the nature of participation in adjudication. And the value of participation 
necessitates both freedom of speech and constraints on that freedom. 
CONCLUSION: FREE SPEECH AT BOTH ENDS 
Adjudication is one of those contexts, not tremendously uncommon, in 
which the Free Speech Clause seems not to operate, or to operate with much 
less than full force. Commercial advertising, employment, and labor relations 
are a few other environments in which the First Amendment dog rarely barks 
or, when it does, barks much more loudly than it bites. Adjudication, 
though, is qualitatively different from these examples: It is a government 
decisionmaking process with the capacity legally to coerce people, backed by 
326. In this sense, a judge's ideological precommitment to a particular result is akin to her 
acceptance of a bribe to reach a particular result: Both render meaningless the litigants' efforts to influence 
the result. See Peters, PersuasimJ, supra note 24, at 25; Peters, Participation, supra note 24, at 192. 
327. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002). 
328. See id. at 803, 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 
242 (1980)) ("This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant's right, protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 'an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both 
civil and criminal cases .... m). 
329. See supra Part IV At. 
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the force of the state. We thus need some special justification for our willingness 
to squelch the free speech of participants in adjudication. 
The justification I've offered here turns on the need to preserve the political 
legitimacy of the adjudicative process. Freedom of speech is a component of 
political legitimacy; it is a necessary means of self-governance, of citizen par-
ticipation in government decisions. In adjudication, though, strong freedom 
of speech would threaten legitimacy, in two senses. First, it would threaten the 
direct legitimacy of the process, which relies on the opportunity for full and fair 
participation, by opening the door to prejudgment of a case or to bias in favor 
of one of the litigants. And second, it would threaten the derivative legitimacy 
of the process, which relies on the accurate and faithful judicial application of 
general policy, by inviting judges and, particularly, juries to incorrectly apply 
policy or to reject applicable policy altogether. 
Using adjudication as a laboratory, we thus can see that concerns for politi-
cal legitimacy operate at both ends, so to speak, of free speech theory. Such 
concerns animate freedom of speech in the first place, mandating it as a vital 
element of citizen {or litigant} participation in government. But legitimacy 
concerns also justify limitations on freedom of speech where unfettered speech 
would serve to undermine participation or to invert the legitimate policymaking 
hierarchy. 
Let me conclude by suggesting, rather tentatively, a further implication that 
flows from this understanding. I believe that the Janus-faced nature of free 
speech, revealed in the adjudicative context, obtains in the pure political context 
as well. Our willingness to restrict the freedom of adjudicative speech in the 
name of legitimacy implies that even political speech may be restricted where 
necessary to preserve the very legitimacy that free political speech is designed to 
promote. 
The justification for free political speech that I described in Part I holds 
that free speech generally is necessary to allow for meaningful citizen participa-
tion in policymaking. But we've seen, in the context of adjudication, how 
complete freedom of speech sometimes can frustrate participatory legitimacy. 
Without fact-constraining speech restrictions, courts might inaccurately apply 
policy, frustrating the participatory efforts of the community as a whole. Without 
norm-constraining restrictions, courts might make up policy themselves---illegiti-
mately, because court decisionmaking lacks full community participation. And 
without restrictions on judicial speech like that invalidated in White, the partici-
pation of the litigants in the process of applying general policy to their specific 
circumstances might be rendered meaningless. 
Democratic politics does not need, and therefore cannot legitimately 
impose, the kinds of fact-constraining and norm-constraining speech restrictions 
that are acceptable in adjudication. This is because the process of democratic 
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politics, unlike that of adjudication, can legitimately create generally binding 
policy. There is no concern for derivative legitimacy, then, that can justify 
limiting the empirical or normative inputs into democratic politics, and indeed 
doing so would undermine direct legitimacy by frustrating the participatory 
efforts of those who think that the prohibited facts or norms actually are relevant 
to public policy. 
But there is the persistent danger that the speech of some participants in the 
political process, like the speech of judicial candidates in White, will effectively 
render the speech of other participants meaningless, or at least less meaningful. 
That is, there is the danger that unfettered political speech might itself, in certain 
circumstances, undermine the direct legitimacy of democratic politics. 
Consider, for instance, the fact that some in our society disproportionately 
control, through money or political power, access to the mass media that are 
the most effective platforms for political speech.3JO Large corporations, for 
example, powerfully influence the content of everyday television programming, 
including news programming, through the use of their advertising dollars or 
through their ownership of the media outlets themselves.331 Even more trou~ 
blingly, well~financed candidates, political action committees, and interest 
groups can dominate debate about candidates and issues during political cam~ 
paigns by purchasing large amounts of advertising.33l Because the opportunity 
for speech through the mass media is a marketable commodity, those with more 
money can afford to purchase more of it-to engage in more, and more effective, 
speech-than those with less money. The result, both in potential and in actual 
practice, is that the contributions of some (richer and more powerful) members of 
society to political debate effectively drown out the contributions of others.333 
Many have argued that government has the power, under the First 
Amendment, to regulate the "marketplace" of speech in order to mitigate or 
prevent these kinds of free speech inequities. l34 Arguably the Supreme Court 
has not been consistent in deciding whether, when, and to what extent 
330. Here I derive examples from, and reach conclusions generally consistent with, those offered in 
SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, particularly in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6. Sunstein's excellent 
analysis is much more in-depth and much less tentative than the suggestions I make here. 
331. See id. at 62--66. 
332. This was the rationale behind the Michigan restriction on corporate political expenditures 
challenged in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and behind the Court's 
decision upholding that restriction: "Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections," id. at 660 
(citations omitted). See also Fallon, supra note 21, at 37 (explaining the result in Austin as "reflectling) 
the worry that political advertising achieves causal dominance, not rational persuasion"); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 20, at 1043-44 (explaining the rationale behind Austin). 
333. See generally SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48; John Rawls, Basic Liberties and Their 
Priority, in THE TANNER LEClURES ON HUMAN VALUES III 76 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982); 
RAWLS, supra note 51, at 362--63. 
334. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 333. 
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government may do SO.335 My analysis in this Article suggests, quite generally, 
that government may reasonably regulate speech in order to prevent the speech 
of some from being rendered comparatively less meaningful. Doing so would be 
analogous to preventing judicial precommitment-in the form of de facto 
campaign "promises," as in White, or in the starker form of, say, a bribe-to a 
particular result in a particular court case; it would restrict the speech of some 
participants in government decisionmaking (the judge in adjudication, the rich 
and powerful in politics) in order to preserve the speech of others.336 Such restric-
tions, if reasonable, might actually en}ul7lce the overall freedom of speech, and 
political participation more generally, rather than impair them.337 They might, in 
other words, increase the direct participatory legitimacy of the political process, 
which is after all what justifies freedom of political speech in the first place.338 
Consider also examples of "hate speech," such as the racially motivated 
cross burning held protected by the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.339 It is 
debatable, first of all, whether hate speech directed at women or at racial, ethnic, 
religious, or other minorities, at least in its most egregious forms, constitutes 
political participation at all; does hate speech really contribute, or even attempt 
335. For example, the Coun has upheld the K:C's so-called "fairness doctrine" requiring broadcast 
television stations to offer balanced discussions of public issues. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367,369-71,400-01 (1969). But the Coun also has invalidated a state law requiring newspapers to 
accept and print letters by political candidates replying to criticism in the paper, see Miami Herald 
Publ'g v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,243,258 (1974), and has held that intermediate scrutiny must be applied 
to a federal statute requiring cable TV companies to carry local broadcast channels, see Turner Broad. 
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994). In the area of campaign finance regulation, the Coun has 
invalidated federal restrictions on campaign expenditures by candidates and noncandidates alike but has 
upheld restrictions on campaign contributions, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), and has invali-
dated some resttictions on corporate campaign expenditures but upheld others. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (invalidating a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks or businesses from 
making contributions or expenditures in connection with ballot initiatives or referenda), with Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655, 669 (1990) (upholding a Michigan law prohibiting 
corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with political campaigns). Shonly 
before this Article went to press, the Coun issued a lengthy and fractured decision upholding provisions of 
the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), that 
regulate the use of "soft money" (campaign related funds previously unregulated by federal law) and of "issue 
ads" (advenisements intended to affect federal election results without ovenly advocating a panicular 
candidate's election or defeat). See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
336. It would, on the other hand, be foolish for government to attempt to make everyone's 
speech, in adjudication or in politics, equally effective. Even if every panicipant who wants to speak, in 
either context, is given an equal opponunity to do so, some people's arguments will simply be more 
persuasive than others. The idea is to equalize--or at least to remove the most egregious forms of 
inequality in-<>pponunity to meaningfully panicipate, not the results of participation. 
337. The Supreme Coun suggested as much in Red Uon. See Red Uon, 395 U.S. at 375 (FCC's 
fairness doctrine would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press."). 
338. I am offering only a very general suggestion here and leaving many problems and details 
unconsidered. For careful analysis of many of those problems and details, see SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, 
supra note 48. 
339. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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to contribute, to anyone's understanding about good public policy?J4O But this 
may be too narrow a conception of valuable political participation, and so let's 
suppose that cross burning and other egregious forms of hate speech do amount 
to true political speech. The possibility remains that protecting hate speech 
actually impairs freedom of speech more than it enhances freedom of speech, 
because hate speech might result in "silencing" the speech of its targets.341 
We might compare hate speech in this regard to a judge's campaign 
promise to decide certain cases in certain ways.342 A judge's pre commitment 
to a certain decision renders the litigants' participation ineffective; what is 
more, a litigant's knowledge of a judge's pre commitment may deter the 
litigant from attempting to meaningfully participate at all. The litigant 
is essentially silenced by her knowledge that the judge will not take her 
arguments seriously. 
Hate speech may have a similar silencing effect: It tells its targets not only 
that the speaker thinks poorly of them, but also that the speaker simply will not 
take their arguments seriously. The hate speaker is telling his targets that, 
because they are his "moral subordinates,,,J43 he need not listen or respond to 
their moral (including their political) arguments--not even to their arguments 
that they are not in fact his moral subordinates. This message matters to the 
targets because the speaker, like the precommitting judge, is a government deci-
sionmaker: He can influence government decisions with his speech and, assum-
ing he is a citizen, with his vote. Like a judge's announcement of how he will 
decide certain cases, then, hate speech might be understood as an attempt by a 
government decisionmaker to preempt the meaningful participation of those 
who will be bound by his decisions. 
Understanding hate speech in this way allows us to distinguish (albeit only 
roughly) between, on the one hand, garden-variety statements of opinion about 
the abilities or worth (or lack thereof) of women, racial minorities, and the 
like-which seems fully deserving of First Amendment protection as political 
speech, however disagreeable most of us might find it to be-and, on the other 
340. Perhaps only in that its existence suggests that good public policy would be to restrict it. 
341. For descriptions of how racist hate speech can "silence" its victims, see Mari ). Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2335-41 (1989); 
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-CaIling, 17 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 136--49 (1982). 
342. The majority in White did not decide that this overt sort of promise is protected by the First 
Amendment; its decision applied only to judicial candidates' statements about "disputed legal or political 
issues" that fell short of precommitments to particular decisions. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 
765,770 (2002). 
343. I take this phrasing from Larty Alexander, who takes it in turn from Andrew Altman. See 
Alexander, supra note 127, at 87~9 (citing Andrew Altman, Uberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A 
Philosophical Examination, 103 En-lIes 302, 310 (1993 ». 
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hand, true hate speech, which might not be so deserving. Consider an example 
offered by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.: 
Contrast the following two statements addressed to a black freshman at 
Stanford: (A) LeVon, if you find yourself struggling in your classes here, 
you should realize it isn't your fault. It's simply that you're the beneficiary 
of a disruptive policy of affirmative action that places underqualified, 
underprepared and often undertalented black students in demanding 
educational environments like this one. The policy's egalitarian aims may 
be well-intentioned, but given the fact that aptitude tests place African 
Americans almost a full standard deviation below the mean, even control-
ling for socioeconomic disparities, they are also profoundly misguided. 
The truth is, you probably don't belong here, and your college experience 
will be a long downhill slide. (B) Out of my face, jungle bunny.344 
Statement A is within the realm of moral or political argument; it is a statement 
of opinion that allows for the possibility of disagreement, even of persuasion in 
the other direction. If it is not exactly an invitation to reasoned debate, at least 
it isn't an advertisement that the speaker has precommitted to a particular moral 
or political judgment, debate be damned. But Statement B is precisely such an 
advertisement: It tells the listener that none of his moral arguments, including 
the argument that he is capable of moral argument, can possibly be effective 
with respect to the speaker. It is one citizen telling another that he has, in 
effect, prejudged the other's case. As such, it seems to me analogous to the 
judge's precommitment to particular decisions of cases; it is speech that might be 
justifiably restricted in the name of greater freedom of political expression.345 
344. ld. at 72 (quoting Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Uberties Pose No Threat 
to Civil Rights, NEWREPUBLlC, Sept. 20 & 27,1993, at37, 45). 
345. Thus I lean towards disagreement with Larry Alexander's conclusion that bans on hate speech, 
at least outside the context of public universities, cannot be justified under the First Amendment as 
protections against subordination. See id. at 87-89. Alexander argues that hate speech cannot in fact 
subordinate its targets because, 
[~or one to be legally subordinated, he must have his legal rights and duties altered in a way that 
brings about a subordinate legal status. Hate speech does not effect such an alteration. Nor does 
it alter moral rights and duties. It leaves the target's moral status as it was. Of course, those who 
engage in hate speech may often believe that the targets are moral subordinates. However, they 
do not believe that uttering epithets is what makes them moral subordinates. 
[d. at 88. I think that hate speakers do in fact believe that uttering epithets makes their targets into legal (or 
perhaps political) subordinates by deterring the targets from offering reasoned moral and political arguments 
(including arguments about the targets' moral and political status). The desire to subordinate in this way is, 
at least in part, what motivates people to engage in hate speech rather than in reasoned argument about the 
supposed inferiority of women, blacks, or whomever. Reasoned argument, after all, invites a reasoned 
response; hate speech seeks to cut off a reasoned response before it can be offered. 
It seems to me, then, that the only "value" hate speech adds to moral and political discussion is the 
questionable one of silencing its targets; any moral or political ideas lurking beneath hate speech could be 
expressed in the form of reasoned arguments rather than epithets. Thus the harm of silencing hate speech 
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Of course there will be very difficult lines to draw in these and other kinds 
of cases. My point here is only that, despite the Supreme Court's occasional 
pronouncements to the contrary,346 the project of line drawing itself should not 
be taboo in the context of political speech any more than in the context of adju-
dicative speech. Sometimes we must restrict speech in the name of democratic 
legitimacy, which after all animates the freedom of speech in the first place. We 
have been doing it in adjudication for centuries. 
is not really a harm at all-the ideas it expresses can be conveyed effectively in other fonns---while the 
"silencing" harm of hate speech seems to me quite real. 
Of course, this leaves many line-drawing or "slippery slope" problems, see id. at 88-89, 91-96 
(discussing the slippery slope problem with regulating hate speech), including the problem of distinguishing 
hate speech from reasoned arguments. Perhaps those problems, and the risk of erroneous political or 
judicial resolutions of them, outweigh the gains to true freedom of speech that could be obtained by a 
perfectly drawn and perfectly administered ban on hate speech. I take no position here on that extremely 
difficult and probably ultimately decisive question. 
346. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) ("To allow a 
government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the government control 
over the search for political truth."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[Ilhe 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... "); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, ]., dissenting) ("mhe absolutely central truth of the First 
Amendment [is] that government cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of political 
debate."). 
*** 
